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Abstract 
This thesis uses empirical data to explore criminal justice social workers’ experience of 
‘ethical stress,’ which is the discomfort experienced by workers when they cannot achieve 
value/behaviour congruence in their practice. The research was operationalised via 
questionnaires distributed to criminal justice social workers in four Scottish local 
authorities, from which both quantitative and qualitative data were gathered. From the 
data, it appears that the more risk averse a workplace is perceived to be, and the less value-
based the ethical climate is judged to be, the more ethical stress will be experienced. The 
approach to working with offenders, however, seems not to have a direct effect on ethical 
stress experienced. Rather, workers are very clear that public protection/risk work takes 
priority and this only becomes a source of stress when the ethical climate is such that any 
additional welfare, helping work the social worker is inclined to undertake, is thwarted. A 
worker’s experience of ethical stress may depend upon where they work, as levels vary 
significantly between local authorities, as do perceptions of ethical climate. Approaches 
taken to risk and to working with offenders, however, do not vary between local 
authorities, probably because of the strength of influence from government. A model of 
ethical stress in criminal justice social work (CJSW) is ultimately suggested, highlighting 
the connections and influences above, and depicting the important role of the senior social 
worker. Finally, significant differences on all variables were found between older, more 
experienced workers and younger, less experienced workers who appear to be happier with 
a ‘new penological’ approach to the management of (as opposed to engagement with) 
offenders. Less experienced workers seem to accept, more uncritically, the prioritisation of 
public protection and reduced autonomy and, although they do experience ethical stress 
when value based practice is impeded and risk aversion prevails, it is experienced to a 
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significantly lesser degree. The culmination of these differences may well cast doubt upon 
CJSW’s continuing commitment to social work values. 
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1 Introduction 
“Obviously the probation service cannot fight a lone battle against the powerful forces 
that propel our society towards a war against foreign countries, immigrants, claimants 
and offenders, seen as threats to our personal and property rights. But it can attempt 
still to base its values and its practices in ideas of equality, tolerance, respect, 
agreement and co-operation. The most important point is not to adopt a technical 
pseudo-expertise that disguises the fundamental violence behind current policies. 
Probation officers should not become the brainwashed foot soldiers in a war against 
the outsiders in our society.”  (Jordan, 2003, p209) 
 
The motivation for undertaking this doctoral thesis stems from my own experience as a 
criminal justice social worker and senior social worker in a local authority (LA) criminal 
justice social work (CJSW) agency, between the years of 1994 and 2006. During my time 
as a social worker I formed relationships with many service users and was privileged to be 
allowed into their lives and to hear their stories. Each service user had a unique and 
individual story to tell about circumstances leading to offending, factors keeping them 
caught within a cycle of offending and the important factors which might help them stop 
offending. 
 
During my time in CJSW, I was very aware of the changes which were taking place, 
especially in the mid-90s, which were impacting on the way we, as a service, worked with 
people. It seemed that the introduction of cognitive-behavioural programmes of work, and 
the automatic referral of each person to general groupwork programmes was paralleled by 
a reduced belief in building relationships with service users, a reduced commitment to 
doing home visits and building relationships with service users’ families and a reduced 
focus on ‘helping’ people with their problems (as defined by them). Instead, we were 
restricted to working on ‘criminogenic needs’ (as defined by us), undertaking structured 
risk assessments and ensuring compliance with groupwork attendance. Myself, and many 
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of my peers felt intrinsically unhappy about the changes, articulated by us as the service 
losing sight of its social work value base. It seemed, however, that in the new world our 
arguments about values seemed quite insignificant, and that the ‘real’ social workers were 
working with police on the management of ‘high risk’ offenders. The unsettled and 
unhappy feeling I can now recognise as disjuncture, and I can understand why I felt as I 
did. 
 
Upon moving to the university and undertaking more study, I began to understand more 
and more about the situation in CJSW. Discovering the literature on ‘disjuncture’ was the 
turning point in my journey to find the focus of this thesis. Hopefully, then, the thesis 
which grew from that starting point will constitute a comprehensive investigation and 
analysis of ethical stress (including disjuncture) within contemporary CJSW. 
 
Section 2 of the thesis reviews the literature in three sections: the history of CJSW, and the 
changing place and importance of welfare and ‘helping’, disjuncture and risk and anxiety. 
Section 2 also explores the literature concerned with ‘desistance,’ an approach to work 
with offenders which, it is suggested, would relieve the disjuncture which might, 
potentially, be experienced by workers in CJSW. From the literature, four variables are 
drawn which may influence social workers’ experience of disjuncture. The four variables 
are: ‘how we work with offenders,’ ‘ethical climate,’ ‘ontological anxiety/guilt’ and 
‘agency approach to risk.’ Research question 1 arises from the suggestion that these 
variables will impact upon workers’ experience of ‘disjuncture.’ Because of the possible 
variability of the influences upon those four variables, as uncovered by the literature 
review, the probability that they, and consequent ‘disjuncture,’ might vary from agency to 
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agency is raised as a further research question.  The research questions are therefore 
identified as: 
 
Does each of the independent variables contribute uniquely and significantly to 
workers’ experience of disjuncture?  
AND 
Do different local authorities (LA) produce different scores on the model variables? 
 
Finally, the literature review concludes by iterating the aim of the research: that is, to 
construct a model of disjuncture in Scottish CJSW, based on the answers to the two 
research questions above. 
 
Section 3 reviews the methodology and explores the construction of the questionnaire used 
to gather data from criminal justice social workers across four LAs. Reliability and validity 
of the questionnaire were established and 240 questionnaires were distributed. A usable 
sample of 100 completed questionnaires was returned. 
 
Section 4 demonstrates that the variables are statistically connected in a complex way and 
explains how a new variable, ‘ethical stress’ was computed from the original variables 
‘disjuncture’ and ‘ontological anxiety/guilt.’  Findings can be summarised as follows: 
‘ethical stress’ has a significant, contributory and reciprocal relationship with ‘risk’ and 
‘ethical climate;’ ‘risk’ and ‘ethical climate’ have significant and reciprocal relationships 
with ‘how we work with offenders;’ there is no direct contributory relationship between 
‘how we work with offenders’ and ‘ethical stress;’ ‘ethical stress’ and ‘ethical climate’ 
vary from LA to LA; ‘risk’ and ‘how we work with offenders’ do not: there is a significant 
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difference on all variables between workers who started in CJSW prior to 1997, and those 
who started afterwards; and excessive workloads are seen as the real barrier to undertaking 
traditional social work with service users. A model of ethical stress is drawn from the 
results. 
 
Section 5 discusses all of the above findings in turn and attempts to explain the 
connections or the lack of connections. The model of ethical stress is enhanced as the 
discussion progresses, by the incorporation of the role of the senior social worker, the 
effects of basic underlying value assumptions upon the ethical climate and the extremely 
powerful direct effect of government instruction and direction upon ‘risk’ and ‘how we 
work with offenders.’ Triangulation of the data is attained by utilising the qualitative, 
explanatory data and research findings from relevant literature, to better understand the 
quantitative data, and to elaborate upon the original model. Ultimately, a final ‘Model of 
Ethical Stress and its Influences in CJSW in Scotland’ (see Diagram 8) is suggested. 
 
Section 6 reviews the thesis, highlighting the main findings and themes. This section also 
looks at the future implications of the findings, suggests what may be required if a 
desistance approach is to be promoted and raises the question of whether there is 
continuing commitment to social work values within CJSW. Finally, areas for future study 
are suggested. 
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2 Literature review 
 
2.1 History 
2.1.1 Introduction 
According to Feeley and Simon (1992) there is a “new, strategic formation in the penal 
field” (Feeley and Simon, 1992, p449) which they refer to as the ‘new penology’.  In 
essence, they state that the ‘old penology’ was concerned with the individual and 
maintained a focus on welfare, responsibility, blame, treatment or punishment, with a view 
to changing that individual’s behaviour.  Therefore, the ‘old penology’ was centrally 
concerned with change.  Political shifts might mean a shift in belief about what affects 
change (helping somebody with their problems (welfare) or deterring somebody from 
repeating their actions (punishment)), but, nonetheless, the focus was on the individual and 
changing their behaviour from anti to pro-social. 
Feeley and Simon state that, in contrast to this, the ‘new penology’ is not concerned with 
the individual and, as such, is not concerned with affecting any change for that individual 
or their circumstances. What the new penology is interested in, is managing groups of 
offenders, classified by varying degrees of risk. They state that “the task is managerial not 
transformative” (ibid. p452). Feeley and Simon define the new penology as having three 
distinct areas: new language and discourse, when the language of welfare or punishment is 
replaced by the language of risk and probability; new objectives, for example efficient 
control of groups of people; and new techniques such as targeting offenders as groups 
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rather than as individuals, using statistical predictors of re-offending and risk assessment 
tools. 
It can be seen, then, that the new penology would not be a framework congruent with the 
Report of the 21
st
 century social work review (Scottish Government, 2006). The review’s 
themes of therapeutic work with individuals, using desistance theories to promote change, 
and the emphasis on worker-service user relationship are not at all consonant with a new 
penology where managing groups is the primary aim.  Robinson (1999), however, points 
out that there has been a re-emergence of “new-rehabilitationism” (still concerned with 
change) within probation services, most obviously the ‘what works’ body of research and 
its implementation (Robinson, 1999, p426). It must be noted, however, that there are 
criticisms of the ‘what works’ agenda and, in fact, Mair (2004) credits “aggressive 
marketing” (Mair, 2004, P28) with its almost evangelic adoption by the National Probation 
Service (as opposed to adoption based on a robust evidence base). Despite this, Robinson 
concludes that managing risk classified groups of offenders, and engaging in rehabilitative 
work are not incompatible activities. She states that this is a “tentative” conclusion and 
that, although the potential is there for compatibility, the reality of probation practice might 
not demonstrate it (Robinson, 1999, p430).  Robinson accepts that the probation service 
has become a primarily risk management agency, but believes that rehabilitation work, and 
the individual nature of that, plays an important part within the risk framework. Also, as 
McNeill points out, in 2003 Jack McConnell (the then First Minister) proposed 
organisational changes in Scotland, but in his vision, retained rehabilitation as an important 
element: “Respect, Responsibility and Rehabilitation” (McNeill, 2004, p425). McConnell 
also made it clear the offenders must be given the chance, and the support, to change their 
behaviour (McNeill, 2004).  McNeill goes on to say that rehabilitation has always retained 
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its place within Scottish penal policy, before and since the introduction of  National 
Objectives and Standards for Social Work Services in the Criminal Justice System 
(NOAS), in 1991 (Social Work Services Group, 1991). McNeill outlines that even the 
Criminal Justice Social Work Services: National Priorities for 2001-2002 and Onwards 
(Scottish Executive, 2001) retain rehabilitation as the third of their three priorities. These 
social policy developments would therefore seem to add weight to Robinson’s idea and 
point to the potential, or actual, co-existence in Scotland anyway, of an increasing 
emphasis on risk and management and real rehabilitative efforts. Interestingly, however, 
McNeill, in his account, states that themes of tolerance and inclusion (and, implicitly, 
rehabilitation and welfare) are acknowledged “more quietly and discreetly” (ibid. p426) 
and that the continuing commitment to penal reductionism is “somewhat more qualified” 
(than the commitment to punishment) (ibid. p426). McNeill, therefore, raises some doubt 
about the robustness of the Scottish commitment to rehabilitation and welfare. He does, 
however, point out that the persistence of this commitment (even if it is diluted) is exactly 
in keeping with our underpinning legislation, the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 and its 
central tenet of social welfare. McNeill also notes that these continuing commitments are 
in contrast to developments in the rest of the UK, where, when there is any official mention 
of rehabilitation, it is “’rehabilitation-as-treatment’ or ‘correctionalism’ which is inferred: 
that is, the reduction of reoffending risk by the application of accredited, ‘rehabilitative’ 
programmes of intervention” (ibid. p426). 
So far then, Feeley and Simon’s account of current criminal justice practice has been 
somewhat challenged in that Robinson suggests that rehabilitation can co-exist with risk 
management. This idea, combined with the social policy framework as described, suggests 
that even although there have been changes, there is still a commitment to rehabilitation in 
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Scotland. Garland (2001) perhaps sums up the situation most coherently when his 
consideration of the ‘old’ versus the ‘new’ penology leads him to suggest that “one needs a 
way of discussing change  that will be attuned to…complexity and variation and will avoid 
the pull towards simplified dualisms and the false essentialism they imply.” (Garland, 
2001, p23)  Garland’s claim is that there is an “emergence of a reconfigured field of crime 
control and criminal justice” (ibid. p23, emphasis added) 
In effect, then, there appears to be broad agreement that things have changed. That risk is a 
more dominant narrative within criminal justice and that rehabilitation work, although it 
might still go on, has been re-inscribed within a risk framework and has become a 
secondary consideration. These historical changes require further exploration and are 
important for ‘setting the scene’ for the research study and for locating the area of enquiry 
within a broader picture of CJSW. It is also important to understand what the changes have 
meant in terms of values, before attempting to understand the place of values in the 
contemporary world of CJSW.  
 
2.1.2 Early history until 1970 
 
The dominant ideology in criminal justice work has, from the beginning of the 20
th
 century 
in the UK and USA, been characterised by a penal-welfare ethos, which has rehabilitation 
as its central tenet (Garland, 2001). The two axioms which underpin this approach are that 
crime should gradually lessen as people’s material, social and personal circumstances 
improve and that the state is best placed to manage issues of crime control and sanctions 
rather than these being personal or civic tasks (Garland, 2001).  Within this framework, it 
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is assumed that to assist somebody with problems in their material, social or personal 
circumstances will assist with successful rehabilitation.  
 
According to Vanstone (2004), early probation emerged in Britain when Warwickshire 
magistrates ‘bound over’ young offenders into the care of their employers in the 1820s, 
with the scheme being subsequently expanded to include adults. In 1876, the first police 
court missionary was appointed by the Church of England Temperance Society 
(McWilliams, 1983). According to Barnard (2008) this time can be described as “the 
morality period” in social work’s history. Barnard states that social work was “more 
concerned with the morality of the client…..(and) this led to paternalistic attempts to 
strengthen the moral rectitude of ‘wayward’ clients” (Barnard, 2008, P10). Therefore, 
guardians and officers would be tasked with ‘rectifying’ the moral character of the 
offenders they were responsible for rather than looking to their surrounding circumstances. 
 
Barnard (2008) suggests that there was, however, a shift in the early part of the twentieth 
century from concern with the offender’s morality to concern with the living conditions of 
people in need. This culminated in the ‘War on Want’ and, thereafter, the conception of the 
welfare state in 1945 (Garland, 2001). At the same time, an emerging class of social 
workers and welfare personnel evolved, and undertook, what Barnard refers to, as 
“traditional social work” (Barnard, 2008, p11). He cites Rojek et al. (1981) to describe 
‘traditional social work’ as “the technical management of personal problems and the 
maintenance of order” (Rojek et al (1981) in Barnard, 2008, P11), in effect, helping with 
welfare and other needs, whilst controlling and rectifying the ‘wayward.’ 
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Within the above model, then, the two principles of penal-welfarism can be seen. Social 
workers were responsible for dealing with offenders (the state managing this aspect of 
crime control) and were also centrally concerned with improving the circumstances and 
personal problems of the offender (crime should lessen if circumstances improve). These 
principles are completely consonant with Rojek’s traditional social work, although the 
‘maintenance of order’ is less clear. It is there implicitly, within the axiom that improved 
personal circumstances and welfare needs should reduce crime, but the link is indirect 
rather than directly causal. 
 
Bottoms (1980) states that thereafter, and persisting until the late 1960s, another significant 
shift took place, with criminology becoming dominated by the belief that a scientific 
methodology could be applied to criminology. The assumption was that the causes of 
crime lay within the individual and that a principle task for criminology was 
‘correctionalist’ work, dealing with and correcting the internal character flaws which were 
leading to offending. McWilliams (1983) states that, at the same time, there was a general 
desire for the probation service to recognise this medical model or “emerging ‘science’ of 
social work”  (McWilliams, 1983, p129).  McWilliams defines the key development as the 
demise of the ‘mission’ and the triumph of the scientific approach. He states that 
deterministic thinking around temperance was pivotal in this development. In essence, 
drinking alcohol was viewed as the “stumbling block” to being accepted by God (ibid. 
p141). Once the missionaries agreed that some offenders’ behaviour was ‘determined’ by 
underlying causes, it meant that “the Mission had no ultimate defence left against the 
determinist ontology of the diagnosticians. The triumph of the ‘scientific’ social workers 
ensued” (ibid. P142). 
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At this juncture, then, it can be seen that social work in the courts had become 
‘professionalised’  in that there existed a class of professional social workers who had 
‘expertise’ to identify and work with people in trouble.  All of this was, however, still 
located within a robust penal-welfare framework, as poor circumstances were still a central 
area of concern. As Garland (2001) would say, the field had become ‘reconfigured.’  
Garland suggests, in fact, that penal-welfarism actually grew in strength during this period 
when the welfare state was conceived, people were more affluent, there was full 
employment and a concern for the welfare of the whole community influenced, perhaps, by 
the ending of the Second World War.   
 
Another factor in the success of penal-welfarism was, according to Garland, the perceived 
effectiveness of criminal justice agencies. He points out, however, that perhaps this 
‘perceived success’ was somewhat misplaced. At that time, social control played a very 
significant role within communities, played out via strong family units, belief in tradition, 
the role of the church and other social organisations. This resonates with Foucault’s 
‘disciplinary’ thinking (Foucault, 1979).  The power that exists within relationships one 
has (for example, with family, church, workplace) can exert great control and regulation 
over behaviour. Within a Foucauldian framework of ‘discipline’ a person is described as 
moving from one ‘enclosed space’ to another and obeying the regulations and controls 
within those spaces.  It may be therefore, that the disciplinary society was exerting great 
control and regulation over behaviour, leading to low rates of crime, but that crime control 
agencies were given credit for this as they were a more obvious candidate for the success 
than the hidden or taken-for-granted social norms. Suffice to say, however, that penal-
walfarism as the foundational ideology of our crime control agencies was unquestioned at 
the time (Garland, 2001), and appeared to be ‘maintaining order’ as per Rojek’s second 
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strand of ‘traditional social work’. Overall, therefore, probation work was entirely 
consistent with traditional social work in that it seemed to be maintaining order (by 
‘scientific’ endeavour supported by low crime rates), as well as helping people with social 
welfare and other personal problems. 
 
What, then, was the specific picture in Scotland?  The Probation service was established in 
Glasgow in 1905 (McNeill, 2005). The service was staffed by police officers, and was 
concerned with supervision, not treatment (but not punishment either). The origins of this 
service were linked to concern about the high use of custody for fine-defaulters, and was 
therefore born out of penal-reductionist thinking (McNeill, 2005).  The service was 
revolutionised in 1931 by the introduction of the Probation of Offenders (Scotland) Act 
1931, whereby police officers were prohibited from being probation officers. The thinking 
behind this is not explained, although McNeill states that it implies the victory of 
rehabilitation over supervision as the primary aim of probation.  McNeill also points out 
that the use of ‘expertise’ and ‘knowledge’ was in keeping with the thinking of the time 
and that a scientific approach was encouraged, as already covered.  At this point, then, 
probation in Scotland had a clear rehabilitation and penal-reductionist remit and was 
located securely within a wider penal-welfare framework.   
 
One of the most interesting aspects of McNeill’s account, is his point that there was 
“breathtaking confidence” in probation, from the Secretary of State for Scotland (McNeill, 
2005, p31). He quotes, “The value of probation as a means of dealing with offenders….has 
been proved beyond doubt.” (Scottish Office, 1947, cited in McNeill, 2005 p31). McNeill 
also points out that there was an effort to measure performance at this time, with only 17% 
of offenders subject to probation re-appearing in court during their orders.  Again, there is 
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a clear link to the suggestion that crime control agencies, perhaps, were given the credit for 
controlling crime in post war years which actually belonged to  communities  and to 
Foucault’s ‘Disciplinary Society’ (Foucault, 1979).  Recorded crime statistics show that 
recorded crime rose between 1930 and 1939 (unsettling effects of the impending Second 
World War is suggested as the reason by Young (1975)), then fell again to the 1930 rate 
between 1939 and early 1950s (Scottish Government, 2008a). In summary, the 1950s saw 
low crime rates and faith and belief in the ‘modern’ expertise of criminal justice agencies, 
including the probation service. Even with this clear optimism and faith, however, the 
actual use of probation was declining. The Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1949 widened 
the scope of probation (McNeill, 2005), and, even although the reluctance to use probation 
was explained by a perception that it was “letting offenders off”, the centrality of “an 
essentially benevolent and offender-centred view of rehabilitation as restoration to full 
citizenship” prevailed (ibid. P32). Notions of helping and welfare were firmly rooted in the 
work. 
 
Thus far, then, it can be clearly seen that Feeley and Simon’s  ‘old penology’ was 
congruent with a penal-welfare approach. No matter that changes had taken place, from 
concern with an offender’s morality, to help and assistance with welfare needs to positivist 
‘diagnosis’ and ‘expert’ treatment, the individual was still the central concern. In Scotland, 
rehabilitation characterised the essence of probation work with offenders and was 
consistent with Rojek’s traditional social work, and with the value base of wider social 
work.  
 
It is important, at this point, to understand the motivation for the emergence of probation. 
Vanstone (2004) suggests that orthodox explanations of humanitarianism, clear notions of  
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helping people and civilising a brutal penal system are perhaps too simplistic. He further 
suggests that elements such as social control, class difference, responsibilisation and 
individualisation are crucial elements. This also ties into the Foucauldian  idea that 
cautions us against simply defining the changes as being humanitarian. Foucault points out 
that when brutal corporal punishment (short attacks on the body and extreme displays of 
sovereign power) was replaced by carceral methods (longer punishment, imprisonment and 
attempts to effect change not just punish), then the state began to have further reaching 
power, making judgements about offenders’ morals and exerting control to a much greater 
extent (Foucault, 1979).  
 
Young (1975) also points out that class difference was extremely important in the early 
development of probation. He states that although this has always been recognised, the 
importance of it has, perhaps, been underestimated. He states quite clearly that the purpose 
was to control certain sections of the working class population. Young’s evidence for his 
suggestion is that indiscriminate charity was very much frowned upon by the established 
and new professional middle classes. There was ideological conflict; should poverty be 
seen as the problem, and, thus, charity given to anyone in need? Or, as Young states, was 
charity  given on the basis that those who took it up become part of an essentially middle 
class structure where success is down to the individual? It seems that the latter prevailed. 
Those who would not, or could not, benefit from charity, were viewed as moral failures. In 
other words, they failed because of individual failings of character, not because of poverty 
or oppression (‘incorrigible’ offenders).  Within this ethos, notions of ‘underclass’ can be 
clearly identified (Feeley and Simon, 1992; Murray, 1990) which are congruent with the 
idea of a risky, ‘other’ population of offenders who must be managed. Ideas of 
‘deservedness’ (of help) also exist within this framework.  McNeill and Whyte (2007) 
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illuminate the practice implications of this when they point out that, although probation 
always seems to have been about diversion from custody (and explicit penal-reductionism 
in Scotland (McNeill, 2005)), it has always had a role in justifying custody. By 
‘diagnosing’ suitability for ‘treatment’ social workers decided who was deserving of 
probation and who was not. This required rationalisations about why a person might not be 
suitable for probation, and therefore, suitable for custody. The City of Glasgow’s policy 
was that probation “should be applied only to those in whom wrong-doing is not habitual 
and whose age, record or home circumstances give reasonable hope of reformation” (City 
of Glasgow (1955) cited in McNeill and Whyte (2007)). In other words, those who would 
not join in with a middle class ethic, the ‘incorrigibles,’ were defined as undeserving of 
support. The theme of ‘deservedness’ is today still important in work with offenders, 
especially in the context of values, and is discussed again in Sections 2.2.2,  2.2.3 and 
2.3.2. 
 
At this point in time, then,  Feeley and Simon’s ‘old penology’ was holding fast;  working 
with the individual on probation, undertaking traditional social work was the central task. 
However, the theorists above have also drawn attention to thinking around ‘incorrigibles’, 
deservedness, those who will not or cannot join in with the middle class ethic (the 
‘underclass’?) and the expansion of control and surveillance. Some tensions, therefore, 
were clearly already present in the work with offenders. 
 
The next important development for social work with offenders in Scotland was the 
Kilbrandon Report in 1964 which led to a reorganisation of the Social Work Department, 
and, as a consequence, the inclusion of offender services within generic social work teams 
(McNeill and Whyte, 2007). The purpose of probation as being essentially welfare driven 
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was now enshrined in legislation:  “to promote social welfare” (Social Work (Scotland) 
Act 1968). Social workers still made judgements about who ‘deserved’ to be on probation, 
but once a person was subject to an order, they were entitled, in law, to welfare help and 
support. 
 
Barnard (2008) states that radical social work emerged during this period. Radical social 
work is described as “a broad church” (Barnard, 2008, p11) which saw personal problems 
as resulting from the structural inequalities in society, and which based its approach upon 
several ideologies including Marxism, feminism and labelling theory. Barnard also notes 
that the influence of humanism and existentialism became stronger during this period. Carl 
Rogers  (1980, [1963]), a humanist, suggested his three core conditions for successful 
relationships between social worker and service user, namely unconditional positive 
regard, workers should be perceived as genuine and congruent and should have empathy 
for service users.  In terms of academic thinking at the time, then, and legislative 
framework, helping offenders with welfare and other problems, building relationships with 
them and unashamedly working on their behalf was a legitimate and clear direction for 
probation work in Scotland.  
 
At this point, then, CJSW in Scotland was very clearly concerned with welfare, had the 
confidence of the public and the state and, because it was included in the wider social work 
department and underpinned by the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, was influenced by 
ideas of radical thought, humanism and existentialism.  This, then, appears to have 
produced a very solid foundation upon which work with offenders was based; legislation, 
values and theory all in synch.  Surprisingly, however, McNeill (2005) states that, “by the 
late 1970s commentators in academic and professional journals were expressing concerns 
  
 
27 
about the viability of probation” (McNeill, 2005, p34). Garland also states that  in terms of 
penal-welfarism, “Instead of being the highlight of a century long correctionalist project, 
the 1970s became the  ground zero for a newly contested field of crime control” (Garland, 
2001, p63). So, what were the “concerns” which McNeill mentions and how does Garland 
explain his emotive quote above? 
 
 
2.1.3 What happened in the 1970s? 
 
 Recorded crime statistics rose steeply and consistently from the early 1950s (recorded at 
under 200,000 crimes and offences per year) to approximately 1,000,000 per year in 1993 
(Scottish Government, 2008a). Therefore, by the 1970s there had been 2 decades of rising 
crime. However, according to Garland (2001), such were the supporting structures around 
penal-welfarism (including the disciplinary society, inclusive politics, academic thinking, 
belief in the welfare state, the centrality of professionalism and research based social 
policy) that practitioners, criminologists and social theorists were caught entirely unawares 
by the dislodgement of penal-welfarism from its central position. The strength of the belief 
in, and centrality of, penal-welfarism meant that the ideology should have been able to 
withstand the potential threat from rising crime rates. 
 
Garland discusses several key causes which, he suggests, brought about the collapse of 
penal-welfarism. First of all there was a spate of publications in the USA which presented 
“damaging critiques of penal-welfarism and its ‘individualised treatment model’” 
(Garland, 2001, P55).  According to Garland, an example of those critiques was a report by 
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the Working Party of the American Friends Service Committee, published in 1971. The 
working party was made up of activists, ex-prisoners and academics, and the central 
message of the report was an objection to the discretion of the criminal justice system and 
its power to punish. This included discretionary sentences of imprisonment which the 
Working Party saw as a weapon used to oppress young, black, male, poor and other 
excluded people.  The report suggested that rehabilitation efforts, and the power to punish 
if people refused to engage, were equally oppressive. They suggested that discretionary 
powers be reduced, that punishment should equate to the criminal act only, that the least 
restrictive option be chosen and there be established a prisoners’ ‘Bill of Rights’.  
Alongside these reforms, the report suggested broad socio-economic change, 
decriminalization and empowerment of poor communities and making a whole range of 
therapy, counselling, education and other services freely available to the whole population. 
As Garland (2001) points out, this first assault on penal-welfarism was particularly 
powerful because it came from within the system itself.  Barnard’s (2008) discussion of 
radical social work with its emphasis on structural problems, not individual characteristics, 
resonates with the criticisms from the American Friends and, therefore, it seems that social 
work academics were adding their support to these criticisms. Rehabilitation or 
correctionalism was seen to be unfairly invasive and to coerce people into conformity.  
 
Echoing these strands of thought in Britain were Bottoms and McWilliams (1979) who 
promoted a “non-treatment paradigm” for work with offenders (Bottoms and McWilliams, 
1979, p59). Bottoms and McWilliams, in keeping with the radical thinkers outlined above, 
felt that coercive probation was essentially wrong. Their critique was based on the fact that 
coercing a person to accept ‘help’ or ‘work on their problems’ completely undermined the 
values of autonomy and self determination. Because the work is incompatible with those 
  
 
29 
values, then it is wrong. Bottoms and McWilliams suggested that offenders should have to 
accept the ‘punishment’ part of probation (in line with justice), for example, reporting to an 
officer, but that they should not have to participate in therapeutic work. If they chose not to 
participate, this should have no effect on sentencing, increased punishment or sanctions. 
The self determination of the offender would be preserved in that they would know best 
whether therapeutic work or assistance would be good for them. Again, community 
services should be universal and available to all if people chose to take them up. Young 
(1975) also drew attention to the part that probation practice played in the maintenance of 
the middle classes through social control, which adds weight to the academic thinking of 
the time. 
 
 
In Scotland, concerns were being raised about criminal justice work being subsumed 
within generic social work teams. For example, Moore (1978) raised these concerns as 
well as highlighting how an unacceptably high prison population was causing a ‘crisis’ in 
Scottish criminal justice. Prisons were being used instead of probation, and this lack of 
confidence demonstrated by the justiciary was not helped by social workers having mixed 
caseloads with offenders having to ‘compete’ with children, older people and disabled 
people for priority.  According to McAra (1999), however, these concerns were only about 
the ‘how’ of delivery of the services and the rehabilitative endeavour, and not about 
whether the service itself was worthwhile. That did not seem to be in question in Scotland. 
 
The second of Garland’s key issues in the 1970s, is the exploration of effectiveness of the 
current system, and the increasing number of publications concluding that existing 
structures and methods were not having any success in reducing crime. Garland points out 
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that a crucial factor here is that those debates and critiques became far more mainstream 
than earlier comment. The most influential of those reports was a study by Robert 
Martinson, the findings being summarised in “What works? Questions and answers about 
prison reform” (Martinson, 1974). This study looked at all writings on rehabilitation 
attempts in America from 1945 to 1967, and found that there was little evidence of 
‘successful’ rehabilitation efforts. Martinson, however, also suggested that the research, in 
the main, was poorly conducted and that it might be that successes were happening, but 
inadequate research was not picking them up. Also, some positive results were found, but 
they were isolated findings and did not produce any evidence of a coherent pattern. 
Martinson suggested that people might draw several conclusions from his research 
findings: either the current system was not working hard enough and, therefore, more 
efforts in the same direction were required; or that any programmes at their best would not 
overcome ingrained offending. He points out, however, that these conclusions would 
ignore the ‘normality’ of crime in our society and the fact that many offenders are simply 
responding to the conditions of their environments. Martinson objected to the commonly 
held belief in “a theory of crime as a ‘disease’ - that is to say something foreign and 
abnormal in the individual which presumably can be cured” (Martinson, 1974, p 49). 
Martinson goes on to say that the resulting “treatments have, on occasion become…so 
draconian as to offend the moral order of a democratic society; and the theory of crime as a 
social phenomena suggests that such treatments may not only be offensive, but ineffective 
as well” (ibid p49). 
 
Martinson’s research was absolutely pivotal in the loss of confidence in the Probation 
Service, and his findings were reduced to a statement of ‘nothing works’ in the 
rehabilitation of offenders (Mair, 2004).   Closer reading of Martinson, however, affords 
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nuances and subtleties that such reductionism cannot do justice to, and, in effect, 
Martinson was making a convincing case in accordance with the radical thinkers of the 
time: perhaps social conditions and inequalities contribute very significantly to offending, 
and therefore, individual ‘treatments’ are always going to be somewhat ineffective. It is 
also interesting to note that there were emerging themes from Martinson’s research such as 
coercion into treatment showing a consistently poor result in terms of recidivism, and, 
more positively, enthusiasm, belief, skill and relational factors on the part of the supervisor 
being important in terms of positive results. Martinson consistently returns to the phrase 
“good people” (Martinson, 1974, p46). This is a significant point which will be revisited 
later.   
 
The emerging critique of penal-welfarism reached a critical point with, according to 
Garland, the publication of the Doing Justice report in the USA (von Hirsch, 1976). This 
was a pivotal publication because, as Garland states, “‘Doing Justice’  explicitly endorsed 
a retributivist philosophy of punishment.” (Garland, 2001, P59). It advocated, in moral 
terms, backward looking punishment, concerned with the act not the actor, a ‘just deserts’ 
model of justice which eschewed as immoral penal measures based on future predictions of 
risk or on evaluations of the individual’s behaviour and lifestyle. The report included a 
sentencing grid designed to replace discretionary sentencing. This was taken further, 
according to Garland, by a seminal text Thinking About Crime (Wilson, 1975).  Wilson 
took an opposite ideological stance to the American Friends and was dismissive of 
widespread social reform. He supported  fixed term sentences, retribution and ‘just 
deserts’. Also, and of critical importance, he wrote in terms of deterrents, and advocated 
harsher, more punitive sentences; more deterrence and control and less welfare. Martinson 
(1974) in his conclusion also raised the subject of deterrence as a potential avenue for 
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exploration in terms of reducing reoffending:  “it is possible that there is something that 
works – that is working now right under our noses, and that might be able to work better – 
something that deters rather than cures…” (Martinson, 1974, p50). He adds the caveat, 
however, that more research is required into deterrence as a crime control strategy. 
 
Meanwhile, the beginnings of a  ‘just deserts’ model of retributivist justice was being 
suggested  in Britain, culminating eventually in the government’s 1990 White Paper, 
Crime, Justice and Protecting the Public leading to the Criminal Justice Act in1991 (Home 
Office, 1990). Although the paper explicitly rejected the language of deterrence, the 
guiding principle of the new Act was to very clearly be “desert or proportionality” (Wasik 
and von Hirsch, 1990, p508). The Act heralded the change in community based sentences 
from alternatives to sentences to sentences in their own right, that is, they had a just 
deserts, punitive purpose, rather than being primarily concerned with rehabilitation (ibid.). 
 
 
So, it can be seen quite clearly that there were major forces working against the 
perpetuation of the long standing ideology of penal-welfarism and a concern with 
rehabilitation, and these forces were creating “a pervasive sense of disillusionment and 
pessimism” (Garland, 2001, P61). According to Bottoms (1980),  three powerful criticisms 
can sum up the attack on rehabilitation:  it is theoretically faulty, it is discriminatory and it 
is inconsistent with justice. These themes equate to a summary of what we have already 
looked at, that is, Martinson’s criticism of rehabilitation not being effective (theoretically 
faulty) and the Friend’s Society and other radical thinkers pointing out the dangers inherent 
in ‘discretion’, punishment being linked to agreement to ‘treatment’ and lack of attention 
to poverty and inequality (discriminatory) and judgements made on impressionistic and 
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scant information (inconsistent with justice).  Essentially, according to Bottoms, the 
underpinning problem is the “coercive nature of the rehabilitative ideal” (Bottoms, 1980, P 
3), and the most influential response to this was the promotion of the “justice model” (ibid. 
p10) as described above. Bottomley (1980) describes how, in essence, the demise of 
rehabilitation left a very significant vacuum, and the justice model was ready and waiting 
to step in to fill the gap.  
 
Garland (2001) suggests that the power required for the demise of penal-welfarism  was 
generated by radical thinkers (for example,  American Friends) and reactionary thinkers 
(for example, Wilson) coming together in their criticisms of rehabilitation, and therefore, 
of penal welfarism. Whilst radical thinkers had proposed universal community 
improvements, and supported a more equal society, reactionary thinkers fairly and squarely 
held individual offenders responsible for their transgressions. These were peripheral 
(though extremely important) differences, however, and the central criticism of the penal-
welfare approach was promoted by both schools of thought. The irresistible force of this, 
then, brought about the end of, as Garland states, a “century long correctional project” 
(Garland, 2001, P 63).  
 
 
2.1.4 Recent History 
Barnard (2008) states that the end of the previous era was signalled by political 
developments in many western countries involving the rise of Conservative Governments.  
In Britain, a Conservative Government was elected in 1979.  Mair (2004) states that during 
the majority of the era of Conservative rule (1979 – 1997) probation in England and Wales 
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went through a period of depression, as a result of loss of status, loss of public confidence 
and, Garland (2001) would suggest, as a result of the above discourse involving both 
radical and reactionary thinking.  According to Mair, recovery of the probation service was 
prompted by a meta-analysis known as the ‘What Works’ research which had been 
undertaken in Canada by Andrews et al. (1990). Amongst other practice principles distilled 
from the findings, Andrews et al. promoted working with offenders via groupwork 
programmes based on cognitive-behavioural psychology.  Mair further suggests that this 
very well respected study was embraced and promoted by the Probation Service and was 
vastly instrumental in its salvation (including the restructuring of the service around 
programmes of manualised, cognitive-behavioural groupwork). 
 
In Scotland, the government responded to the concerns from the justiciary and from 
academics discussed earlier, that work with offenders was subsumed within generic teams, 
and reorganisation took place, creating specialist criminal justice teams and agencies 
(McNeill and Whyte, 2007). Also, National Objectives and Standards for Social Work in 
the Criminal Justice System (NOAS) (SWSG, 1991) were introduced, detailing 
expectations and standards for social work with offenders. Considering the introduction of 
NOAS further, McCulloch and McNeill (2011) state that they (the standards) “also 
signified and enshrined a recalibration of the underlying ideology of criminal justice social 
work” (McCulloch and McNeill, 2011, p 186). No longer was welfare unquestioningly the 
priority; rather, a ‘responsibility model’ had taken its place. Offenders were to be held to 
account for their actions (and their thinking was to be ‘corrected’), although understanding 
their particular context was still a requirement (McCulloch and McNeill, 2011, p186).   A 
short time after this, the effects of ‘what works’ began to be felt in Scotland, for example 
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the advent of accredited programmes of cognitive-behavioural work and structured risk 
assessments (McCulloch, 2005). 
 
Cognitive-behavioural work is characterised by “cognitive restructuring” (Scott and 
Dryden, 1996). In essence, this involves identifying thought distortions, minimisations and 
excuses and challenging these, with the aim of changing how the offender thinks, which 
very much resonates with the scientific approach of early probation workers, as already 
discussed.   The other strand involves practising new ways of behaving in response to 
‘triggers.’ Although the aim in cognitive-behavioural groupwork is to treat the individuals 
within the group, if thought distortions are assumed to pertain to the whole group and are 
the targets of a manualised programme of ‘cognitive restructuring,’ then the underlying 
premise is that all offenders ‘think wrongly’ in the same way. It can be suggested that 
programmed cognitive-behavioural ‘treatment’ with offenders, delivered either 
individually or via groupwork, is premised on quite a stereotypical and pathologised view 
of offenders (Kendall, 2004), within which elements of the medical model, discussed 
earlier, exist (Martinson, 1974, McWilliams, 1983).  
 
In actuality, of course, offenders are individuals with unique survival strategies, values, 
ways of looking at the world and responses to “the facts and conditions of our society” 
(Martinson,1974, p49). In fact, McNeill et al. (2005) note that “although there are certain 
commonalities, for example among young people involved in persistent offending, the 
categorisation of their characteristics, needs and deeds…..tends to conceal their 
differences” (McNeill et al., 2005, P35). Interestingly, McNeill (2004) describes an aspect 
of ‘managerialism’ as “a homogenising approach that predictably struggles to cope with 
the heterogeneity of offenders to which practitioners must respond on a case-by-case basis” 
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(McNeill, 2004, P428). Furthermore, in the same article, McNeill states that 
“managerialism’s production and reproduction of uniformities of thought and 
practice….neglect the individual-level view” (ibid. P428). Therefore, the adoption, in 
Scotland, of ‘What Works’ influenced practice is congruent with the advancement of a 
managerial culture, including its erosion of attention to the individual, the homogenising of 
offenders and mirroring the direction of the probation service in England and Wales. 
However, McNeill (2004) also acknowledges that “the very different context for probation 
in Scotland might have been seen as a protective factor against the adoption of the crude 
reductionism of correctional approaches and of increasingly punitive penal politics” 
(McNeill, 2004, p423). As well as a unique legal and policy framework, the ‘different 
context’ for work with offenders in Scotland is characterised by the persistence  of the 
requirement for a social work qualification which lends itself to social-welfare concerns 
(Tata, 2010), workers employed by local authorities and not by central government where 
the nuances of, often media-driven, political influence are more keenly felt (ibid), and a 
less centrally driven and prescribed approach, allowing for a more diverse interpretation of 
evidence-based practice and the less wholesale adoption of a correctionalist approach 
(Munro and McNeill, 2010).  So, there is a unique Scottish context to work with offenders, 
but did it offer any protection?  
 
It seems that, by the end of the 1990s, the same dichotomy, which brought rehabilitation to 
its knees in the 1970s, remained a real tension in CJSW in Scotland. The Kilbrandon, 
welfare ethos providing the unique context for work with offenders promotes welfare and, 
thus, helping. This allows for work to be done to alleviate hardship, inequality and poor 
circumstances, by assisting and helping. However, government and policy direction in 
England and Wales was promoting a model more in keeping with the ‘justice model’ 
  
 
37 
whereby sentences were more punitive and controlling and public protection was the 
central issue. Correctional methods (for example, accredited, cognitive-behavioural 
programmes) were central to the work of the Probation Service. Within a justice model, of 
course, coercive correctionalism sits quite comfortably with the idea that offenders alone 
are to blame for the choices they make regarding offending and that inequality of 
opportunity and circumstance is unimportant. As McCulloch (2005) points out, Scotland 
felt the influence of these developments, as demonstrated by the responsibility model and 
the advent of accredited programmes and actuarial risk assessments. The question which 
arises is: to what extent did Scotland withstand these moves and retain its pro-welfare and 
helping stance against “the crude reductionism of correctional approaches and of 
increasingly punitive penal policies” (McNeill, 2004, P 423)? The nub of the matter, it 
seems, is the notion of ‘helping’ in terms of welfare versus punishing and ‘correcting’.  
 
McAra (1999) looks at this point in some detail, pre-devolution. She considers that most 
commentators on the changes that have taken place within penal philosophy have explored 
the situations in USA and England and Wales and have taken them to be typical of western 
systems as a whole. McAra disputes that this is the case, again suggesting that Scotland is 
unique and not affected to a great extent. She sums up the themes from the writers on 
‘transformation’ (for example, Feeley and Simon (1992), Garland (1996) and Bottoms 
(1994)) as being threefold. Firstly, the writers have agreed that penal-welfarism has been 
eclipsed by actuarial justice, punitive and preventative strategies, just deserts and 
individual rights. Within this theme we see the management of risk classified offenders, 
the emphasis on punishment, the failure of governments to deal with high crime rates, and 
hence ‘active community’ and other programmes of prevention. Secondly, the writers 
agree that there is a shift towards managerialism and bureaucratic administration systems 
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characterised by a move away from tackling social change (which would have been in 
keeping with penal-welfarism) to key performance indicators, audits and internal 
regulation systems. McAra considers that the above two themes outline the changes that 
have taken place. The third theme relates to the reasons why. She states that the writers 
agree that the changes reflect deeper sociological processes, for example, the growth of the 
idea of an ‘underclass’, the acceptance of high crime rates as ‘normal’, the crisis for 
governments in trying to deal with them and the changing nature of social relationships 
involving changing patterns of work and increased technology. 
 
In effect, then, McAra has succinctly summed up where we have come to in our 
exploration of the changes thus far. She then looks at the key question about the impact 
this has had on the unique Scottish position. 
 
McAra looks at two aspects of CJSW in relation to the above issues, managerialism and 
risk management. She suggests that an increase in managerialism (via 100% funding of 
CJSW from central government, and the implementation of NOAS) has supported effective 
work with offenders rather than supplanted penal-welfare work. She states that because the 
‘what works’ research encourages a managerial approach, and has been shown to be 
effective, then managerialism in itself is not in conflict with a penal-welfare approach. This 
argument, however, does not consider the reductionist, ‘correctionalist’ thinking which we 
have already looked at. Mechanistically applying cognitive-behavioural ‘correctional’ 
programmes to offenders does not encourage or support the personalised, helping, 
relationship-based work which is central to welfare. McAra also looks at risk management 
and, again, states that the emphasis on risk (which could be seen to support Feeley and 
Simon’s ‘new penology’) has only served to sharpen the focus on social workers’ 
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interventions, and has not supplanted rehabilitation. She states that NOAS state explicitly 
that offenders are better managed in the community because that better serves 
rehabilitation. This is consistent with Robinson’s (1999) ‘new rehabilitationism’ whereby a 
‘what works’ approach, risk management and rehabilitation can all co-exist. Robinson does 
state that this is a tentative conclusion and also admits that rehabilitation has been re-
inscribed within a risk management framework.  
 
The above argument, however, can also be viewed from another angle more in keeping 
with the writers on transformation. McNeill (2004) sums up the change from the court 
missionaries’ “essentially altruistic” (McNeill, 2004, p422) endeavour to focus on the 
offender, help him with his problems, save his soul, identify his ills and give him 
‘treatment’, the reduction in future victimisation being a positive by-product; to the 
situation where reduced victimisation is the product. Thus, when McAra talks about more 
efficiently reducing re-offending, then this has become the aim, rather than helping the 
offender as an end-in-himself. The argument now is that ‘rehabilitation’ is essential to 
public protection, future victims are helped by the rehabilitative process, not the offender 
himself (although this might now be the positive by-product). McNeill (2005) notes that 
the focus on reducing re-offending was seen as crucial to enhancing the credibility of 
probation and, as such, had to be based on the best emerging research evidence. It was 
thought that the still-sought-after reduction in the use of custody heavily depended upon 
this. 
 
McNeill (2004) might be seen to support McAra’s argument that the welfare ethos in 
CJSW was not eroded by surrounding changes, when he states that “At first sight the 
organisational settings of probation…..practice in Scotland might seem likely to at least 
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inhibit the development of unfettered correctionalism” (McNeill, 2004, p424).  At this 
point, then, the question about the tension in Scottish CJSW between the ‘new penology’ 
and the traditional welfare model has been progressed somewhat. The picture may not be 
as binary as it appears on the surface and, again, reference to Garland’s ‘new 
configuration’ seems appropriate, for example  rehabilitation being reinscribed within a 
risk framework (Robinson, 1999). Still unanswered, however, is the question of whether, 
within the ‘new configuration’, there is still a significant tension. McNeill (2005) explores 
this question further when he discusses developments just pre-devolution. His suggestions 
might compromise the assertion that Scotland can indeed withstand the “development of 
unfettered correctionalism” (McNeill, 2005, p424).  
 
McNeill (2005) points out that by the mid-90s there was a growing emphasis on public 
protection in both England and Wales and Scotland. Due to the introduction of the 
Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993, many prisoners were liberated 
subject to non-parole licences, that is, they had not been granted parole. Tragedies such as 
the Scott Simpson case in Aberdeen (McManus, 1997) meant that CJSW agencies had to 
pay strict heed to different levels of risk when dealing with prisoners released on different 
types of licence. Where a parole licence might suggest low risk, a non-parole licence, by its 
very nature and the fact that the offender had not been granted parole, implied increased 
risk (McManus, 1997).  As McNeill states,  advances in public protection practice and 
rhetoric from then on were rapid, and when The Tough Option (Scottish Office, 1998) was 
published, the minister responsible clearly stated “Our paramount aim is public safety” 
(McNeill, 2005 p 34). McNeill goes on to say that subsequent revision to NOAS and other 
guidance clearly reflected this change in emphasis. 
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So, at this point then, just pre-devolution, we have different issues impacting on the 
question of whether Scottish CJSW should be able to retain its welfare heart. Were social 
workers still able to help offenders, an endeavour defined as an end in itself, or was this 
only credible if a reduction in re-offending was the outcome (a socially included and 
rehabilitated offender simply a pleasing by product?). Also, was helping an offender and 
promoting welfare considered a laudable endeavour in a climate where public protection 
was paramount? How much were changes in policy and practice in US and England and 
Wales affecting policy and practice in Scotland?  These were, perhaps, some of the 
questions being raised in CJSW as Scotland headed into devolution. Has devolution 
answered these questions? Croall, writing in 2005 would suggest not, as the following 
quotation demonstrates:  “It has generally been argued that the Scottish approach to 
criminal justice shows a greater commitment to welfare than the rest of the UK. In the last 
few years, however, all elements of criminal justice have faced what ministers in Scotland 
have described as profound changes accompanied by a more punitive 
discourse……….many fear that Scotland’s welfarist tradition is under threat” (Croall, 
2005, P 177). 
 
 
2.1.5 Post-devolution 
 
 After devolution, Scotland’s parliament in Edinburgh was dominated by a Labour Party 
heavily influenced by New Labour policies (Croall, 2005).  Croall suggests that the 
‘popular punitivism’ developed by the preceding Conservative Government was seen to be 
an electoral advantage. Popular punitivism is the ideology that offenders choose to commit 
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crime and this cannot be ‘explained away’ by talk of poverty or disadvantage. The New 
Labour Party retained this concept to avoid the label of being ‘soft’ on crime (a common 
criticism of the ‘old’ Labour party) and it could be seen clearly in the well-known strap-
line “tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime” (Blair, 2002).  
 
 Croall goes on to say that elements of ‘popular punitivism’ were in evidence in the 2003 
election campaign in Scotland, where Jack McConnell made much of ‘the ned culture’ and 
‘antisocial behaviour’. It can be seen, therefore, that the persistence of popular punitivism 
may well have posed a threat to Scotland’s welfarist tradition. Providing help and welfare 
for ‘neds’ is not in keeping with popular punitivism, and the idea that these anti-social 
offenders need to be ‘corrected’ sits far more comfortably.  In fact, the Labour Party’s 
manifesto for the election promised a single agency for CJSW and the Scottish Prison 
Service, to be known as “The Correctional Service for Scotland” (McNeill, 2004, p425). 
Following the election, however, this was modified (by the Labour/Liberal partnership) to 
a promise to publish proposals for consultation regarding a single agency.  The Convention 
of Scottish Local Authorities and the Association of Directors of Social Work, however, 
pledged to fight “tooth and nail” against the proposals, arguing that there was no 
justification or evidence that such changes would reduce offending (ibid. P425). 
 
McNeill and Whyte (2007) point out that, although the above proposed changes were 
clearly in a correctional direction, the government also made explicit its continuing 
commitment to rehabilitation and penal-reductionism, for example, “In an important 
speech, McConnell (2003), argued that,  ‘there is a balance to be struck. A balance 
between protection and punishment – and the chance for those who have done wrong to 
change their behaviour and re-engage with the community’” (McNeill and Whyte, 2007, 
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p10). However, importantly, the authors, and McNeill (2004), also note that the 
government is “quiet and discreet” (McNeill, 2004, p426) about the social inclusion of 
offenders. Is this perhaps in recognition of the electioneering power of popular punitivism?  
 
The next significant development was the Management of Offenders (Scotland) Act 2005. 
This Act created Community Justice Authorities (eight groupings of CJSW local authority 
areas) as well as giving explicit direction about defining and managing ‘high risk’ 
offenders. The Act was operationalised via Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements 
(MAPPA) mirroring the MAPPA arrangements in England and Wales.  MAPPA is a 
system of multi-agency case-conferences which determine the level of risk of an offender 
(categorised into one of three risk levels) and formulate an action plan in response 
(Scottish Government, 2007). This would seem to be the clearest example of all of 
managing offenders classified by risk and of putting public protection at the heart of 
criminal justice work, and is very much in keeping with Feeley and Simon’s (1992) ‘new 
penology’. Even the language of the legislation and the policy make this explicit. 
 
Therefore, at this point we have a very much bifurcated service:  MAPPA and ‘High Risk’ 
or ‘Public Protection’ teams dealing with ‘potentially dangerous offenders’, and ‘ordinary’ 
probation teams dealing with lower risk offenders. Those social workers dealing with ‘high 
risk’ offenders are guided in their work by MAPPA meetings and instructions, and work 
closely with the police to carry out action plans. Sex Offenders will attend groupwork 
based on cognitive-behavioural principles (for example, C-SCOGP, (Safeguarding 
Communities – Reducing Offending (SACRO), 2009)) and they, along with other ‘high 
risk’ groups will be managed by MAPPA. Alongside this, ‘ordinary probation’ teams will 
send ‘lower risk’ offenders to general offending groupwork programmes such as 
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Constructs. Constructs is a programme of groupwork, based on cognitive-behavioural 
psychology and designed to “obtain a measurable reduction in re-offending for participants 
who complete the programme” (Criminal Justice Social Work, Development Centre for 
Scotland (CJDCS), 2009, P8), which was piloted by the Scottish Government, beginning in 
2007. CJDCS was tasked with evaluating the programme and did so by analysing the 
psychometric tests which are administered before and after the programme. Re-offending 
data may be collected in later years, as follow-up evaluation.  The psychometric tests 
measured problem solving ability, impulsivity and pro-criminal attitudes and beliefs and 
the extent to which participants feel responsible for their own behaviour (CJDCS, 2009).  
 
Clearly, then, Constructs is a correctional method, employing cognitive behavioural 
psychology and attempting to correct the offender’s faulty thinking and anti-social 
attitudes. This sits clearly in Martinson’s ‘disease model’ and within a ‘what works’ 
framework.  Any other welfare needs must be purely criminogenic (directly linked to the 
offending behaviour) to be a target for social work intervention or help. The evaluation 
team were explicit about this (CJDCS, 2009).  The main findings from the evaluation were 
that attrition rates were very high (77%); targeting (medium or high risk) was, in the main, 
appropriate; participants “generally” move in a positive direction on the psychometric tests 
(but the small number of ‘completers’ is highlighted as a cautionary factor); feedback from 
participants was “overwhelmingly positive” (again, note small numbers completing); the 
vast majority of participants had other “criminogenic” needs, which practitioners were 
aware of and “working on”; and relapse prevention plans were found to be overly 
simplistic, and limited to only what the participants themselves could do to avoid re-
offending; other problems such as poor housing or drug misuse were “ignored” (CJDCS, 
2009, P6). Overall, the evaluation group conclude that some objectives were met for some 
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participants. They suggest that, given the high levels of attrition, the programme content 
might need to be improved before being rolled out. 
 
 It is clear, therefore, that the Constructs pilot has not been an overwhelming success. It is 
also, as stated, an example of the advancement of a correctional rather than a welfare-based 
approach and that welfare issues which practitioners would traditionally have helped with, 
are often ignored. Therefore, currently we have high risk offenders ‘managed’ by MAPPA 
in a way most congruent with notions of a ‘new penology,’ and ‘other’ offenders also 
‘managed’ via programmed, cognitive-behavioural work within a correctional framework, 
also in keeping with a ‘new penology’. Maybe, then, Scottish CJSW is not, in practice, 
withstanding the “development of unfettered correctionalism” (McNeill 2004, p 424)? 
 
So,  are social workers still working with offenders at all? Are they involved in anything 
like Kilbrandon, welfare, helping work? Should they be? The Scottish Government’s 
Social Work Services Inspectorate commissioned a literature review  published in 2005 to 
support the review of social work: Changing Lives: Report of the 21
st
 Century Social Work 
Review (Scottish Government, 2006), entitled 21
st
 Century Social Work, Reducing Re-
offending: Key Practice Skills (McNeill et al., 2005). The review group was tasked with 
identifying what skills were required to work with offenders based on the most up to date 
research and evidence. The group decided to work back from the intended outcomes of 
interventions with offenders to the skills such a worker would require. As a starting point, 
the group took the three national priorities from Criminal Justice Social Work Services 
National Priorities for 2001-2002 and onwards (Scottish Executive, 2001) which were: 
contributing to public protection, reducing unnecessary custody and promoting the social 
inclusion of offenders. The review group point out that the third priority recognises the 
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“intrinsic worth of promoting the social inclusion of offenders and its instrumentality in 
reducing reoffending” (McNeill et al., 2005, P7, emphasis added), thereby illuminating an 
earlier point of debate. The rehabilitation of the offender is explicitly acknowledged as a 
worthwhile end in itself.  The review group goes on to provide robust evidence that the 
offenders subject to community based disposals have very high levels of need, and to state 
categorically, that even if those problems do not appear to be directly linked to offending 
behaviour, they are important for supervision and must be considered in the work done. 
This is, perhaps, the first indication that social workers might have to work individually 
with offenders, teasing out the myriad of unique problems they may have, and helping with 
them. Again, this is contra to Constructs which concentrated solely on ‘criminogenic’ 
needs (CJDCS, 2009), and supports help for the offender as a primary aim, not solely as a 
means to reducing re-offending.  
 
The literature review discussed above draws heavily on a body of work concerned with the 
concept of ‘desistance.’ Desistance from offending is the maintenance of not offending 
(Maruna, 2001). Desistance thinking takes us in a fundamentally different direction from 
previous ideas about ‘what works’ and questions about effectiveness in stopping people 
offending. The emphasis in desistance thinking is about what interventions might support 
an offender’s own journey to desist. As Ward and Maruna (2007) suggest, the question 
‘what works?’ is probably the wrong one. We should be asking “what helps people go 
straight?” (Ward and Maruna, 2007, p12). Ward and Maruna’s perspective on the whole 
debate is that the far more modest endeavour of helping people to desist is different in 
several key ways to the provision of programmes of treatments or corrections which aim to 
stop people offending. The focus changes from service provider as ‘expert’ in providing 
treatment to an offender, to a service provider providing support to the offender’s own 
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desistance journey (offender as ‘expert’); if an offender is given help and continues to 
offend, the agency of the offender is not ignored, the person chose to reoffend despite the 
help (whilst also accepting that the help might have been inadequate); instead of the heavy 
reliance on the ‘science’ of meta-analysis and randomly controlled trials, the best way to 
find out what helps people to desist is to actually ask them; and desistance occurs in a 
person’s natural environment and thus if services are involved in supporting the process, 
they must become engaged in that environment, rather in the detached world of 
programmes, groupwork and other criminal justice processes (Ward and Maruna, 2007). 
 
This, then, lays the foundational reasons for investigating the desistance literature. Can it 
help us, however, to answer the question posed earlier about whether social workers should 
be involved in helping, welfare work?  To get closer to an answer, it is important to look at 
what the desistance literature tells us about the best ways agencies should be supporting 
offenders’ desistance endeavours. Maruna (2001) discusses three main theories in relation 
to desistance research. The first is maturational reform theory, which in essence is the 
recognition that most people mature out of crime. Maruna notes, however, that critics of 
maturational theories of desistance, whilst recognising that aging has an impact on 
desistance, point out that the theory fails to help us understand the how and why of that 
impact.  Secondly, Maruna explores social bonds theory.  This theory concerns the links 
that an individual has within their social world, for instance a relationship, employment, 
wider family or education, and suggests that the stronger these bonds are, the more of a 
“stake in conformity and a reason to go legit” an offender has (Maruna, 2001, p30).  
McCulloch and McNeill (2008) point out, however, that the research evidence supporting 
social bonds theory is complex and inconclusive which should “alert us to the fact that the 
relationship between the formation of social ties and desistance is by no means 
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straightforward” (McCulloch and McNeill, 2008, p156). Thirdly, Maruna recognises 
narrative theory as an emerging theoretical perspective on desistance. McNeill (2006) 
states “narrative theory has emerged from more qualitative research which stresses the 
significance of subjective changes in a person’s sense of self and identity” (McNeill, 2006, 
p46). Maruna (2001), via his research entitled the Liverpool Desistance Study uncovered 
key differences between the self-narratives of persisters and desisters. These differences 
included a renewed sense of agency, that is, the future is less in the hands of fate, and the 
individual can make active choices; a renewed sense of identity that explains, to the 
individual offender himself and to others, the logical progression to desistance, for 
example, “because of all that I have been through, I am now this new way” (Maruna, 2001, 
p87); a feeling that even when at their peak of offending, deep down the ‘real me’ was a 
good one all along; the influence of a significant other, often somebody who ‘believed in’ 
the offender; and the expressed desire to give something back to society or to  make 
amends.  
 
Farrall (2002) adds to the analysis of desistance with his suggestion that an objective 
change in a person’s life, which is subjectively valued by that person is the type of change 
which will support desistance. These changes are what social workers, therefore, need to 
support. This concept resonates with Hennessey’s suggestion that social work is based on 
relationships between workers and services users. To this end, workers must become 
involved not only in the service user’s “outer world” (behaviour) but also in their “inner 
world” (understanding why they are offending, properly ‘hearing’ their perspective, 
understanding their context, history and circumstances) (Hennessey, 2011, p87). In order 
to properly support desistance, therefore, a worker must really get to know the service user 
and both his or her inner and outer worlds. 
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McNeill (2006) suggests a further reason for embracing the desistance research evidence. 
He considers the original “non-treatment paradigm” (Bottoms and McWilliams, 1979) as 
discussed previously, which was underpinned by the notion that coercive ‘treatment’ was 
contradictory to social work values, particularly self-determination. As McNeill states, 
Bottoms and McWilliams hoped that by exposing the weakness of the ‘treatment 
paradigm’ they would allow a re-emergence of the core values of self-determination ( the 
social worker does not know what is ‘best’ for the offender), hope and respect for persons. 
They rejected the objectification of offenders, where the expert social worker ‘diagnoses’ 
and ‘treats’ the offender, and, instead, promoted help and partnership. Help might be for 
any problem the offender feels they have, and Bottoms and McWilliams stated that was 
unashamedly the aim – to help the offender. They made no claims that this would reduce 
re-offending. Diagnosis is also discarded and shared assessment replaces it, collaboratively 
defined tasks are the basis for social work action. As stated earlier, the paradigm is 
premised on the offender being able to choose to be helped or not, with no sanction 
attached whatever is chosen. In essence “the authority for supervision derives from the 
court, but the authority for help resides in the offender” (McNeill, 2006, P42).  
 
McNeill goes on to discuss the revised paradigm proposed by Raynor and Vanstone in 
1994, where, in essence, the authors wanted to re-couple ‘helping’ offenders with a focus 
on influencing and helping individuals to stop offending. They were not advocating a 
return to treatment, but felt that Bottoms and McWilliams had rejected all forms of 
intervention, even those sitting outside the ‘medical model’(to which they so strongly 
objected). They also felt that victims were neglected in Bottoms and McWilliam’s 
paradigm and that ‘respect for persons’ should also be applied to victims.  In effect, 
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probation  had “to work to reduce the harms caused by crime as well as the ills that 
provoke it” (McNeill, 2006, P43). A desistance approach to work with offenders is, 
therefore, one way to fulfil this dual purpose. 
 
At this point then, it can be suggested that the adoption of a desistance approach to 
working with offenders would generate a plurality of benefits and would resolve some long 
experienced tensions for any CJSW agency. These benefits and resolutions can be 
summarised as follows:  
 
1. Helping/welfare work with offenders having a clear place within a desistance 
approach, because workers need to hear from offenders about what will support 
them to desist. Problems the offender has, beyond purely criminogenic needs, can 
be legitimately worked on. This is in keeping with the welfare duty of social work 
enshrined in the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968. 
 
2. Because desistance approaches are underpinned by a body of research, adopting 
such an approach should be effective. The evidence base would suggest that social 
workers are still fulfilling the aim of their agency: to reduce reoffending. 
 
3. The emphasis on the relational aspect of the work brings an understanding of the 
individual and their life and allows workers to be responsive to people within their 
own environments (where social bonds and social contexts are so important). 
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4. Underpinning a desistance approach is a clear commitment to social work values. 
The offender’s right to self determination, respect and being the expert partner in 
deciding on work done/problems tackled is maximised.  
 
5. Less of a likelihood of promising too much as a profession and consequently 
incurring blame when we cannot live up to our promises. ‘We will stop people 
offending,’ becomes the more modest aim of ‘we will help people to stop 
offending.’ 
  
 
So, to sum up,  desistance is the process of someone remaining offending-free. McNeill’s 
(2006) argument is that CJSW should provide services which support the individual’s 
process of desisting, rather than trying to provide expert treatment or correctional services. 
Desistance is a complex and individual  process and CJSW services should be a 
subservient  support service within that context. This would address some of Bottoms and 
McWilliams concerns about objectifying and doing things to the offender ‘for his own 
good’, but would also address Raynor and Vanstone’s concern that social work, morally, 
has to connect its work to an attempt to reduce harm. By supporting desistance, CJSW 
would indeed do that.  
 
Supporting desistance, therefore, would seem to address some of the original value 
dilemmas and to relieve some of the tensions inherent in working with offenders. To return 
to the 21
st
 century social work, reducing re-offending: key practice skills (Key practice 
skills) (McNeill et al., 2005), the skills which are highlighted belong in four sets, all 
concerned with effectively supporting desistence. Skill set one is about building 
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relationships which support change. The authors state that social workers need to be able to 
build empathetic, warm, respectful and genuine relationships, or as Hennessey would 
suggest, the social worker must work to be allowed access to the service user’s “inner 
world” (Hennessey, 2011, p87). The approach needs to be person-centred and 
collaborative.  The authors state that offering practical help is very important as it 
demonstrates concern for offenders as people and gives the worker legitimacy (in the eyes 
of the offender).  Skill set two involves assessing risks, needs and strengths and is, again, 
based on working collaboratively, really listening to the offender and his reality and being 
able to ask difficult questions and create a culture where the offender can talk openly. This 
skill set is also about going beyond the standard risk assessment tools to the environment 
within which the information is gathered. Again, communication and relationship-building 
are vital so that assessments are thoroughly individualised and not solely based on 
commonalities and shared profiles.  
 
Munro (2011) echoes the above in her review of child protection work, and suggests that 
social workers must “create a relationship where the parent is willing to tell you 
anything.....(and to know) how to ask challenging questions” (Munro, 2011, p87). Skill set 
three concerns delivering planning and interventions which are research-based. Social 
workers and service users must, together, know why what they are going to do has a 
chance of working. The review group suggests that because ‘what works’ implemented a 
centralised and homogeneous theory of change at a strategic level, the individual, nuanced 
applications of change theory were neglected. The evidence around social capital and how 
it is of utmost importance for desistance must also be considered in the light of the 
offender’s narrative. Finally, skill set four focuses on managing change, in essence that 
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change is best managed by one, consistent, committed therapeutic worker, again the 
relational aspect of the work must be central. 
 
In summary, then, it is evident that the literature is consistent in its messages about the 
importance of supporting desistance, building relationships and working in thoroughly 
person-centred ways with offenders. The evidence base in terms of desistence is very 
significant and robustly supports the effectiveness of this approach. Also, adopting a 
position where workers are supporting desistance means that they can work in a way which 
is completely congruent with social work values: self-determination, respect for persons, 
and building genuine, empathetic, person-centred relationships. So, to return to the original 
question, should social workers be working to help offenders with their problems? Is there 
still a place for Kilbrandon welfare? It would seem that, yes, such work, based on what the 
offender sees as important (or defines as problematic) is entirely consistent with the Key 
practice skills and the underpinning desistance theory evidence base. Given the picture of a 
managerial service, concerned with managing high risk offenders and offering compulsory, 
programmed cognitive-behavioural work, however, is it possible?  
 
It can be seen quite clearly that Constructs, as outlined earlier, is not consonant with the 
desistance literature and Key practice skills. There is little about building therapeutic 
relationships, hearing from the offender what problems they are experiencing, offering 
practical help or thoroughly individualising assessments. The psychometric tests measure 
internal, diagnosed (or assumed) pathologies which the offender is seen to have, for 
example poor problem solving skills, external locus of control and anti-social thinking. The 
programme offers ‘treatment’ in line with cognitive-behavioural cognitive restructuring 
(Scott and Dryden, 1996). If Constructs was delivered as the only intervention, then a 
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managerial, administrative, purely correctional approach to working with offenders would 
indeed prevail.  Although the evaluation group did note that other needs were recognised 
and worked on, the needs were very clearly defined as “criminogenic” and therefore not as 
the offender himself might have defined them.  
 
 Also interestingly, within the evaluation document there is no mention anywhere of the 
desistance literature and how it might be used to inform probation work more widely, for 
example how were social workers working on other needs? Why did those needs have to 
be directly related to the offending behaviour? Where is the mention of the relationship 
between worker and offender, and the ‘thoroughly individualised’ nature of assessment, 
problem definition and action planning? Where is the recognition that community and 
relationship links are crucial to desistance? (McNeill et al., 2005). 
 
 
In conclusion, then, are criminal justice social workers undertaking the kind of work 
envisioned in Key practice skills in a context where Scottish CJSW has retained its 
commitment to welfare, or are social workers simply technicians, unconcerned with getting 
to know the offenders and mainly attentive to supervising their attendance at groupwork?  
It could be suggested that the original tension between these two positions still remains; 
helping, via dealing with welfare concerns which are important to the individual offender; 
and supervising correctional interventions and ensuring compliance with those measures. It 
would also seem that the direction from the Scottish Government also mirrors that tension; 
Key practice skills advocating relational, therapeutic, desistance based work; and the 
piloting of Constructs with little reference to the desistance literature.  
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It should be noted at this point that Scotland is at this very time operationalising 
‘community payback orders’, contained in the 2010 Criminal Justice and Licensing 
(Scotland) Act. Community payback orders replace existing social work disposals, 
although probation-type work or ‘working at change’ remains as a core activity. The 
question still remaining is, therefore, how best to do that? 
 
 
2.1.6 Conclusion 
 
The original tasks of criminal justice social workers, to help alleviate the poor 
circumstances of offenders, grew from the penal welfare framework within which criminal 
justice agencies had operated for a hundred years (Feeley and Simon, 1992). This then 
became enshrined in legislation in Scotland via the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 with 
its central tenet of commitment to social welfare, and has been restated as a policy 
commitment to greater or lesser degrees over the years. Over the past few decades, 
however, this welfare ethos has also suffered from several attacks, mainly due to policy 
direction in the rest of the UK being on a far more punitive path, but also due to 
responsibility for offending being placed solely on the individual offender, an increase in 
public protection priorities, the adoption of ‘What Works’ thinking in terms of working 
with offenders (cognitive behavioural work) and the much increased focus on managing 
risk classified groups of offenders. The problematic tension between the commitment to, 
and the erosion of, welfare has a potential solution via the adoption of desistance-based 
practice which would allow helping to be reinstated legitimately within the work of 
criminal justice social workers. McCulloch and McNeill (2008), however, state that “the 
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muted impact that the desistance literature has had on policy and practice is both surprising 
and problematic” (McCulloch and McNeill, 2008, p. 155). Therein lies the suggestion that, 
rather than being complimentary, desistance-focused work is in fact being overshadowed 
by the emphasis on correctional, cognitive–behavioural, programmed groupwork. Even as 
Scotland has taken a step further from a purely punitive agenda, by introducing ‘payback’ 
orders and a legal presumption against short term sentences, is the idea of social workers 
returning to the good old days of ‘helping’ offenders, palatable?  
 
This section has ‘set the scene’ for further exploration of value tensions. The congruence 
of helping and welfare work and building relationships, with social work values is 
undisputed.  If criminal justice social workers, however, are constrained in their ability to 
help with welfare needs, and to build individual relationships with offenders, what might 
this actually mean for them in terms of basing their practice upon their values? Why might 
this be important? 
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2.2  Disjuncture 
 
2.2.1 Introduction 
 
The previous section illustrates how developments in criminal justice social work in 
Scotland have led to increased managerialism, increased management of groups of risk-
classified offenders, public protection firmly occupying centre stage, working with 
offenders via cognitive-behavioural programmes and less relational, helping work. What 
does all of this mean for workers feeling that they can base their work upon their values? 
McIvor (2004), talking about the Scottish picture, states “One effect of these developments 
has been to depersonalise probation practice both for offenders and for probation staff. 
Although the critical role of supervisor as case manager is recognised……, the primary 
emphasis on programmes effectively removes the personal qualities and skills of the 
probation officer from the equation”. A similar picture emerges regarding those ‘high risk’ 
offenders managed by MAPPA. Decisions and action plans are taken and devised by 
MAPPA Case Conferences (Scottish Government, 2007) and the social worker follows 
instructions. 
At this point, then, the question emerges; does the ‘What Works’ research, the programme 
based work, and the emphasis on public protection mean that there is no room for 
discretion, relationship building and the active employment of values in decision-making 
in criminal justice social work, even although, as we have seen in the last section, all of 
these elements appear to be crucial for desistance-based, effective practice? 
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This question is illuminated somewhat by Jones (2001) who interviewed Local Authority 
social workers in England and Wales. Jones found that Local Authority social work 
departments were grim places to work, populated by disillusioned and unhappy social 
workers. He interviewed workers with 8 years or more experience and focussed 
particularly on the nature of the relationships they had with their service users. Jones states 
that he was unprepared for the strength of feeling from social workers, which showed 
remarkable consistency regardless of setting. The roots of their stress and unhappiness lay 
in agency policies and practices – the workers felt that their job was about policing. Access 
to resources was extremely difficult, there was too much bureaucracy and paperwork, 
management were sometimes aggressive and often ‘managerial’, there was little contact 
with clients, and budgets, not people, were felt to be the central concern.  Workers also felt 
that everything had become routinised and procedural with little opportunity to get to know 
service users and to really engage with them. In effect, workers felt that their job was not 
social work as they would recognise it. Although not explicit, could this suggest that social 
workers were unable to enact their values?  Social workers reported feelings of stress 
generated by not being able to meet modest, essential requests. In other words stress was 
generated when social workers could not ‘help’. 
 
Jones suggests that all of the above reflects a political agenda based on an extremely 
negative view of dependency (on the state). If dependency is to be discouraged, then 
reducing social work to the role of gatekeeper is logical. This leads to real frustration given 
that working with people is social work’s raison d’etre.  Workers also felt that New Labour 
had embraced the notion that social work was failing, rather than under resourced,  and that 
there was a continuation of authoritarianism and punitivism from previous conservative 
governments.  A social worker said “Governments believe that social workers can’t do the 
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job, therefore you turn it into a job that you do in boxes and you tick the boxes and do the 
job” (Jones, 2001, p555). It would seem possible that values brought to the job are being 
squeezed out under such managerial structures.  
 
Preston-Shoot (2003) found similar themes in his review of the evidence from social work 
practitioners.  Social workers reported “dehumanisation and depersonalisation” (Preston-
Shoot, 2003, p 10) characterised by pressure to conform to aggressive managerial cultures, 
bullying and a lack of support. They also reported “demoralisation and disillusionment” 
(ibid) because they felt “unable to uphold the knowledge base and values of a competent 
professional” (ibid). Echoing Jones’ findings, workers reported a lack of time to build 
relationships with service-users, and an over-reliance on procedures and routines. 
 
 Jones (2001) also discusses New Labour’s view that waged work is the solution to 
society’s problems. However, he points out that many of those who cannot join the 
workforce are those who make up social work’s client base. Therefore, they are more 
troubled and distressed than before, but there is less help. This has led to ghettos and sink 
estates where almost all of social work’s work is concentrated. Caseloads are therefore full 
of heavy-end cases, service users feel hopeless and rehabilitation and prevention efforts 
have gone. Feeley and Simon (1992) would suggest that containment of the ‘underclass’ 
has taken its place. Preston-Shoot adds to this idea when he talks about “social brutalism” 
(Preston-Shoot, 2003, p13), a process which leaves the most vulnerable in our society 
experiencing severe curtailment of life chances and lack of opportunities to meet needs. 
The whole concept is, of course, exacerbated by the increasingly wide divide between rich 
and poor in society. 
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So, given Jones’ and Preston-Shoot’s findings and the exploration in section 2.2.1 of the 
managerial nature of current CJSW, is it logical to wonder if criminal justice social 
workers feel frustrated about not being able to base their work on their values?  Might 
there be some tension there?  
 
2.2.2  The concept of ‘disjuncture’ 
 
Di Franks (2008) uses the term ‘disjuncture’ particularly to mean the state of disjoinment 
between behaviour and values, and the resultant stress this produces. For the purposes of 
this discussion, then, we might suggest that the above social workers in Jones’ and Preston-
Shoot’s studies were experiencing disjuncture. In the same vein, we might also ask 
whether social workers in CJSW are also experiencing disjuncture. To provide further 
context to this idea, an examination of Di Franks’ study is essential. 
 
Di Franks distributed 500 questionnaires to a random sample of social workers in the USA 
who were all members of the National Association of Social Workers (NASW). The 
response rate was 41%.  The main purpose of the questionnaires was to measure the social 
workers’ belief in the NASW Code of Ethics,  the behaviour in implementing it and 
‘disjuncture,’ that is, the stress felt when belief and behaviour are discordant. Di Franks 
had found that there was an absence in the literature of research into social workers’ belief 
in the Code of Ethics. Respondents ranked their answers from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly 
disagree’.  To measure behaviour, social workers were asked Likert-type questions about 
behaviour vis-à-vis the code e.g. “I promote client self-determination in the area of…”.  
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Similarly structured questions were used to measure disjuncture e.g. “I experience stress 
because I am not always able to protect my client’s confidentiality”. 
 
To measure beliefs, Di Franks employed the Professional Opinion Scale (POS) originally 
developed by Abbott in 1988.  Abbott (2003) explains the further development of this scale 
from data collected from two studies – one in 1988 and one in 1998. The resultant 
questionnaire is a values assessment scale and is based around four dimensions: respect for 
basic human rights (including the elimination of oppressive rules), support of self-
determination, sense of social responsibility and commitment to individual freedom. These 
four values comprise the overarching headings for four sections which contain statements, 
linked to the appropriate value, against which the social worker is asked to give a rating of 
strength of belief.  The statements (or ‘factors’) are drawn from policy statements from 
NASW and, according to Abbott, although particular policy statements have changed over 
time, their commitment to the advancement of a social work value base comprised of the 
four elements, has not.  Between the 1988 and the 1998 study, some refinement took place, 
with some statements being re-assigned to a different value and some being removed. 
 
An example of the statements used to measure respect for basic human rights is 
“Retirement at 65 should be mandatory” – clearly a strong belief in this value would lead 
to a ranking of ‘strongly disagree’. Likewise, an example of a statement linked to a sense 
of social responsibility is “There should be a guaranteed minimum income for everyone”, 
(Abbott, 2003, p651), where a strong belief in the value would lead to a ranking of 
‘strongly agree’.  The final version of the POS contains 32 statements which are ranked as 
above. According to Abbott, the POS “continues to be a useful instrument to enhance the 
examination of values” (Abbott, 2003, p 664).  
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Di Franks found that social workers scored high for disjuncture (experienced stress) when 
their belief scores and their behaviour scores were discordant. So, when social workers 
could not behave in a way that was congruent with their value beliefs, they felt distress 
(this was significant at the p<0.05 level). The highest correlation was a negative one 
between high congruence of behaviour and belief scores and low disjuncture. Therefore, 
workers who could behave in a way which was highly congruent with their value beliefs 
experienced low disjuncture. There was a positive relationship between beliefs and 
behaviour, but it was not significant. Di Franks points out that this might mean that 
Abbott’s assumption that belief influences behaviour is questionable. An ideal outcome in 
social work terms is that belief in the code influences behaviour, but this is not necessarily 
the case. This is an important point because it begs the question ‘why not?’  What gets in 
the way?  It may be that social workers’ beliefs would indeed influence their behaviour if 
they were allowed the autonomy to let it be so, but that practice expectations and 
restrictions get in the way, as in Jones’ (2001) and Preston-Shoot’s studies explored earlier. 
This may be why stress is experienced when belief and behaviour scores are at odds.  
 
Finally, there is no correlation between belief scores alone, and disjuncture scores. Di 
Franks suggests that this means that behaviour rather than beliefs lead to disjuncture. 
However, this may be because the POS measures belief in the value base of social work 
rather than the ethical expression of that value base, whereas the behaviour scores pertain 
to ethical behaviour in line with the code.  This may mean that overarching basic beliefs 
might be interpreted as sometimes not wholly applicable to the task in hand (the 
behaviour). For example, a criminal justice social worker might score very highly in belief 
in terms of  “commitment to individual freedom” e.g. “the employed should have more 
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government assistance than the unemployed” (strongly disagree) or “sterilisation is an 
acceptable method of reducing the welfare load” (strongly disagree) etc. (Abbott, 2003, 
p652). However, when specifically asked about practice induced disjuncture, may answer 
in a much more qualified way e.g. “I experience stress because I am not always able to 
protect my clients’ rights to privacy and informed consent” (Di Franks, 2008, p12). The 
social worker might well disagree with that statement because of the competing, and more 
highly prioritised value of social responsibility and keeping victims safe.  This may be 
even more pronounced for those dealing with ‘high risk’ offenders, child protection 
matters, vulnerable adults at significant risk etc.  
 
Some important related findings were that disjuncture was highest in ‘managed care’ (the 
nearest equivalent category to Care Management in Scotland). This, again, relates closely 
to the distress and unhappiness felt by the social workers interviewed by Jones (2001) and 
the finding that this was heightened in care management where budgetary concerns and 
procedures had taken the place of working with, and getting to know, people. Jones only 
considered Local Authority social workers, so it might well be that those employed in the 
voluntary sector feel very differently. According to Jones, they would not suffer from the 
stigma of public sector employment, the political view that public sector work is of poor 
quality and the resultant tightening up of practice. 
 
In summary, then, Di Franks’ main findings, relevant to the exploration of disjuncture 
within criminal justice social work are: 
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1. Disjuncture is low when behaviour and beliefs are congruent. Therefore, low levels 
of disjuncture (stress) would be expected if social workers feel they can put their 
value beliefs into action. 
 
2. Disjuncture is high when behaviour and beliefs are discordant. Therefore, if social 
workers cannot act on their values, we would expect to find disjuncture. 
 
3. Belief does not necessarily influence behaviour. Although Di Franks suggests that 
this might call into question Abbott’s claim that belief and behaviour are linked, it 
may be that the particular restrictions of the context impede beliefs influencing 
behaviour, hence the resultant stress. 
 
In terms, then, of the current situation in CJSW, might it be that social workers are 
experiencing disjuncture? Looking at the above study, it seems possible that this might be 
the case. According to Jones and Preston-Shoot’s findings, disjuncture might be expected 
in any statutory social work setting, and if  the changes outlined in Section 2.1 are also 
considered, then it is logical to propose that social workers in CJSW might indeed 
experience some sort of disjuncture. 
 
In 2009, Calderwood et al. undertook a study of values and behaviour conflict experienced 
by ethnic minority students undertaking a Bachelor of Social Work course in Canada.  
Calderwood et al. found that the students had real difficulty in behaving in a way which 
promoted an ‘individualistic’ view of service users. They felt that this was at odds with 
their own value systems which prioritised family commitment, community life and 
traditional roles of men and women. To encourage and support a service user to think 
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about themselves first, before family or community, was problematic. Students reported 
that they experienced distress. The researcher was surprised at the strength of feeling 
expressed, illustrated by, for example, a focus group running well past time and people 
leaving but returning, just to air their thoughts and feelings of conflict and distress.  
Another interesting point was that the students felt value conflict when their statutory role 
would not allow them to ‘help’ as much as they would like to. So, restrictions on what a 
social worker was expected to do within their role, added to the distress experienced. It 
would seem, therefore, that once again research has suggested that when values and 
behaviour are discordant, social workers experience disjuncture. Calderwood et al. 
suggests that in order to alleviate the disjuncture experienced, students had to be allowed to 
air different views, consider other value positions and be supported to discuss all of the 
conflicts. So, a climate where this was allowed and encouraged was important for students 
to begin to reconcile their feelings and cope with the disjuncture experienced. In other 
words, students needed to be able to discuss views which were not congruent with the 
‘party line’ and to have their opinions listened to and valued. 
 
This suggestion is consistent with findings from a study of predictors of ethical stress 
experienced by social workers in health care settings (O'Donnell et al., 2008). One of the 
main results from the study was that overall, workers felt quite low ethical stress, but that 
this was influenced positively by the ethical climate which included ethically sensitive 
supervision, positive support for ethical reflection and discussion. The study also looked at 
whether workers felt they could take ‘moral action’ and act in line with values, and 
findings suggested that this was more likely when low ethical stress was experienced. 
Therefore, behaviour could be influenced by belief (values, morals) when ethical stress 
was low; and when beliefs and behaviour were congruent, this produced low stress. This is 
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consistent with Di Franks (2008), but also demonstrates that belief can influence behaviour 
when the climate is conducive to that. Therefore, ethical stress is lowered by a positive 
ethical climate. One question which might arise from this study is that would the converse 
also be true? That is, when moral action (acting upon one’s values) is felt to be impossible, 
does this lead to heightened ethical stress? This would, again, be congruent with Di 
Franks’ (2008) findings in that not being able to behave in a way which is true to your 
values, leads to disjuncture or ethical stress.  Preston-Shoot (2003) found that one 
consequence of the restrictive contexts social workers found themselves in was 
“internalised oppression” (Preston-Shoot, 2003, p12).  In other words, workers felt that any 
attempted action to relieve the hardship of services users’ lives, was futile, so why should 
they continue to try? Preston-Shoot considered this to be a “resigned acceptance” (ibid), a 
concept which reinforces O’Donnell et al’s suggestion that moral action is only possible 
when ethical stress or disjuncture is lowered by a positive and supportive ethical climate. 
In the evidence gathered by Preston-Shoot, cultures were reported to be extremely 
unsupportive, thus, perhaps, leading to disjuncture for workers and a consequent inability 
to take action. 
 
Finally, and very importantly, greater levels of ethical stress were found to have a 
significant correlation with less job satisfaction, social workers wanting to leave their jobs 
and social workers planning to do so (O’Donnell et al., 2008). Clearly, then, the 
importance of disjuncture and the influence of the ethical climate of the agency, should not 
be underestimated. 
 
To further the above discussion, we might wonder what the necessary conditions would be 
for disjuncture not to be experienced. Kosny and Eakin (2008) undertook a study in three 
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not-for-profit agencies in Toronto, looking at the “hazards of helping” and stress identified 
by the workers in the three agencies (Kosny and Eakin, 2008, p 149). The service user 
groups were drug users, homeless people and socially isolated or homeless women. The 
researchers undertook observations and interviews and one of the main findings was the 
workers’ belief in the ‘mission,’ in other words, their commitment to ‘helping’. This was 
manifest in permeable boundaries around tasks and roles,  the fact that the work centred 
around meeting the needs of the service users,  staff ‘mucking in’ and responding in ways 
which were needed and  workers coming to know clients very well and developing a real 
understanding of their histories and situations.  In Kosny and Eakin’s study, workers were 
very able to respond in the way they wanted, to the extent of working after hours, having 
loosely defined roles and tasks and simply being able to do what was needed.  
 
Kosny and Eakin’s study also found that workers held a set of key beliefs which included: 
the main task is to help and support  marginalized clients, workers should always treat 
service users with dignity and respect, they should know the service user properly, in order 
that they were “not just another dirty face” (Kosny and Eakin, 2008, p154), they should 
treat people with kindness and care, they should accept service users for who they are and 
that they should believe that these particular groups of socially excluded service users are 
the victims of an unjust and oppressive society.  In the three agencies, then, workers were 
able to base their ‘helping’ actions firmly upon their core beliefs underpinned by both 
interpersonal values and social justice values. The agencies ‘allowed’ the workers to ‘go 
the extra mile’ to respond as necessary and to ‘muck in’ in order to help. The agencies 
encouraged the workers to really get to know the service users, to view them as having 
been treated harshly by society and to treat them with dignity, respect and warmth. In other 
words, behaviour and value beliefs were entirely congruent. Workers in Kosny and Eakin’s 
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study did not experience disjuncture which  is consistent with the literature studied thus 
far.  Jones’ (2001) respondents experienced significant amounts of stress because they 
were unable to work in the above way; they could not help and care in a way which would 
be consistent with their values.   
 
Interestingly, the workers in Kosny and Eakin’s study felt stress when they acted contrary 
to the agency’s and their own values. Therefore, if they felt they had acted with 
intolerance, had not helped as much as they could have, were disrespectful to service-users, 
then they felt stress and unhappiness, and were quick to correct this via an apology or other 
reparation. Also, hearing and understanding about the dire realities of many of the service 
users’ lives, and having an inability to help or to influence structural obstacles to alleviate 
the problems also led to feelings of stress. On the other hand issues with personal safety 
(for example, passive smoking or doing home visits where there might be risks) and 
experiences of verbal aggression  were not experienced as stressful because workers 
viewed the service users as not wholly to blame. They understood the service users in the 
context of  being victims of an oppressive society, and in the face of the harrowing realities 
of the their lives, the workers did not want to complain about their relatively puny 
concerns. All of this illustrates a belief in, and clear understanding of, social justice. 
 
To sum up then, the workers in this study saw their work as a moral enterprise. The service 
users were viewed as being rejected by society and deserving of caring, kindness and 
respect. Workers personalised the work and getting to know the person and their “inner 
world” rather than simply their behaviour (Hennessey, 2011, p87), was absolutely central. 
Service users’ problems were seen as not being solely the fault of the service user (but also 
as a consequence of social injustice). An important point here is that many of the service 
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users in this study were offenders as well as, for example, homeless people or drug 
misusers, and yet they were still viewed as deserving, a concept which was raised in 
Section 2.1.2. It seems that in Kosny and Eakin’s study, the service users were deemed to 
be deserving of help, respect, care and humanity regardless of judgements of 
redeemability. They were deserving of these things simply by virtue of being human and 
being in need. 
 
It would seem, therefore, that when expected behaviour and values are very much in tune, 
workers not only do not experience disjuncture, but are able to cope with very demanding 
work which might otherwise be perceived as very stressful indeed. Stress was still 
generated by workers being unable to ‘help’ at times, but this was not due to agency 
induced restrictions, but rather structural, societal restrictions. Interestingly, none of the 
workers interviewed wanted to leave their jobs, a result which is very supportive of 
O’Donnell et al.’s finding that the less the disjuncture, the less frequently workers want to 
leave. 
 
So far, then, the literature seems consistent in its messages. When social workers cannot 
base their behaviour upon their values, they experience ethical stress or disjuncture. This 
can manifest itself in workers wanting to leave their jobs, feeling unhappy and having little 
job satisfaction.  Disjuncture can be alleviated somewhat by an agency having a supportive 
ethical climate where values are discussed and different value positions are considered 
worthy. Disjuncture is alleviated very significantly when, of course, workers can operate in 
a way which is entirely consistent with their value base, as in Kosny and Eakin’s study. As 
well as the ability to help, the workers in the study were also able, and encouraged, to care. 
Is this a key? 
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2.2.3 Should social workers ‘care’ for offenders? 
 
McNeill (2000) undertook interviews with CJ social workers about what they viewed were 
the best measures of effectiveness. He stated that he expected to reveal operational tensions 
because of the competing demands of the particularly Scottish context. He stated that 
workers might be “caught between the welfarism of the ‘Kilbrandon era’ and the more 
contemporary just deserts and public protection agendas” (McNeill, 2000, p386), as per 
section 2.1.4. He goes on to say that the renewed interest in justice (or justice model?) and 
public protection is likely to cause conflict in a service which has had welfare at its heart 
for the past 20 years. So, in terms of disjuncture, McNeill was expecting to uncover this 
type of distress. Would workers, who essentially believed in the values of welfare (caring, 
helping, building a relationship) find the behaviour demanded (strict supervision, 
sanctions, programmes of work, procedures to be followed) at odds with their beliefs? If 
so, then Di Franks’ (2008) study would suggest that they would probably experience 
disjuncture. Surprisingly, McNeill found little of the expected tensions. Social workers 
rated outcome measures as the most useful measures of effectiveness, and were not 
preoccupied with process measurements such as following NOAS (Social Work Services 
Group, 1991). McNeill interprets this as workers having higher professional expectations 
about doing a good job. They were not simply interested in following the procedure, but 
wanted to indeed have an effect. Workers themselves said that their values had been 
affected by policy but that they were still able to achieve congruence between their values 
and operational policy. They understood the different agendas held by different 
stakeholders and could appreciate the complexity of that picture. Workers associated 
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success with reducing reoffending by working, in partnership, on underlying needs. They 
also associated success with improvements in quality of life and the actualisation of 
potential. These endeavours are not at odds with social work values, and it may be that lack 
of disjuncture was found because social workers were still ‘allowed’ to work in this way 
and base their work on their values. In fact, workers placed a “still stronger emphasis on 
meeting the probationer’s needs, empowering them to actualise their potential, improve 
their quality of life and achieve change” (McNeill, 2000, p391). A reduction in offending 
was viewed as a consequence of these things. Therefore, workers had assimilated the new 
demands for accountability and the demonstration of effectiveness, but could do so whilst 
adhering to their value base.  It is interesting to note that this study is ten years old and it 
may be that the managerial practices and the consequent reduction in autonomy in CJSW 
(McNeill, 2004) had not yet taken a firm hold. 
 
The other major finding from the study was that workers highlighted the different 
meanings of success. This is graphically illustrated by an example given by a worker of a 
young girl, misusing heroin by injecting into her groin, funding this through prostitution, 
homeless with absolutely no support. NOAS were not met, offending was not reduced and 
yet the young girl survived and was kept safe through the endeavours of her social worker. 
This would not register as ‘success’ in any audit of cases and yet a life was, perhaps, saved 
or at least made tolerable.  The worker felt that this was a success.  Related to this, the 
respondents were asked to link their cases to the Cycle of Change (Prochaska and Di 
Clemente, 1984) and to say what they did and when. The response was very strongly ‘it 
depends where they (the service user) is at’. In other words, when at the ‘action’ stage, 
workers would support this with practical help, encouragement, accessing opportunities 
etc, but when they were not at this stage, the workers had other goals, for example, helping 
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with shelter, food or staying alive. It seems that CJSW needs other measures of success for 
service users who are not at a point in their lives to accept help to ‘self actualise’ but might 
need something else entirely. This resonates with the idea explored earlier that those who 
could not (or would not) accept help were then dismissed as failures. With the current 
measures of success, this is happening in CJSW. And, as Jones (2001) points out, more and 
more of social work’s client base is comprised of people in those direst of circumstances. 
Therefore, social work values would guide us to work just as hard with this most 
vulnerable group as with those demonstrating success, but our structures might not allow it 
(orders breached, return to court, custody).  
 
In McNeill’s study, workers still had some discretion to implement tailored responses and 
might it be this which helped them avoid disjuncture? Was the expression of caring also 
contributing to the minimisation of disjuncture? Some of the findings from Kosny and 
Eakin’s study also resonate with these suggestions, for example workers in McNeill’s 
study felt compelled to ‘help’ and care even when these actions did not fulfil the 
requirement for demonstrating success. Workers felt comfortable about this, however, 
because they were able to act in a way which was congruent with their values;  responding 
to needs, offering help and caring about the service users. Workers’ complaint was that this 
work did not register in the measuring of success, but at least they were still able to do it. 
 
This study then, offers a different perspective from Jones (2001) although they were 
undertaken at around the same time.  As stated, it may be, that within CJSW in Scotland at 
that time, social workers were ‘allowed’ the autonomy to decide how to work with people, 
to attend to their needs and to continue work with those on the very margins of society. If 
this was the case, then the low level of disjuncture found is unsurprising. It seems, then, 
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that a key idea is that social workers have the autonomy to respond to individual service 
users’ needs. Social workers need to be ‘allowed’ to be responsive and this would, of 
necessity, be based on comprehensive knowledge of the service user. So, these features 
might be key elements in the avoidance of disjuncture.  
 
When social workers can respond in the above way, and in the way they responded in 
Kosny and Eakin’s study, could we consider their behaviour to be about ‘caring’? Manning 
(1998) undertook an exploration of the ‘ethics of care’ which she described as a way of 
understanding one’s moral role which is more complex than simply following a list of 
ordered ethical principles.  She also drew on literature to differentiate between the 
masculine ‘voice of justice’ and the feminine ‘voice of care’. A justice voice is cognitive in 
nature and concerns applying moral principles, rules and procedures to situations and 
dilemmas. This way of understanding ethical decision making and problem solving is still 
very much present in current thinking (e.g. Reamer (1990) and Loewenberg (1996)) and 
might fit quite nicely with the proceduralisation and managerialism in CJSW, for example 
following lists of rules and applying principles in an ordered fashion. Manning, however, 
suggests that there is another way to understand ethical action. The ethics of care involves 
moral attention to the person and the situation in all its complexity, sympathetic 
understanding and an attempt to identify with the service user. Relationship awareness is 
central, including the relationship with the service user and all the important relationships 
which that service user has. Manning suggests that in order to apply an ethics of care 
framework, a person must have time to really get to know the service user, to build 
relationships with them and other important people in the situation (and if there is not a 
relationship network, should work to build one) and also to build mutual trust.  In essence, 
the ethics of care is relationship based and is built upon a recognition that we are connected 
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beings, existing in a network of others. Therefore, this must be a fundamental 
consideration. Manning states that we must also be aware of the ‘comfort’ of the service 
user and to do this, it is suggested that the social worker has to know what that means for 
each individual service user, that is, what is important to them? 
 
Gregory (2010) undertook a study of fifteen experienced probation officers in England, 
explicitly looking at how the vast changes in their practice context had affected them. In 
essence, Gregory found that the practitioners were experiencing ethical stress because of 
restrictions in the way they were able to work with people, especially in not being able to 
respond to ‘need’ (help?). The standardised, procedural tools of the work, the low priority 
given to the actual content of work with people, the technicist nature of supervision and the 
lack of autonomy all combined to produce an ethically stressful environment. However, the 
participants in the study were able to ameliorate the worst effects of disjuncture by 
resistance. For example,  regarding the use of the assessment tool a participant said, “it’s 
all fine and dandy…. but I’m not really going to use it to make the assessment” (Gregory, 
2010, p2281) and gave examples of  ‘real’ case discussions happening informally between 
colleagues, not with managers.  The author suggests that these (very experienced) workers 
managed to resist the worst excesses of the changes because of their “ability to think 
critically and reflexively. In this way they are able to retain their value base and to 
construct for themselves a form of subjectivity in which they continue to see themselves as 
social workers” (ibid. P2280, emphasis added). The author goes onto say that the value 
base the participants adhere to is an ethic of care in that they have real and enduring 
interest in, and concern for the complexity (and often dire circumstances) of the offenders’ 
lives and that they understand the importance of their relationship with the person, the 
  
 
75 
importance and subjective nature of that person’s relationship network and wider 
subjective reality.  
 
Gregory’s suggestion is exactly congruent with Manning’s point that we need to increase 
the ‘comfort’ of the person’s life, and therefore need to understand their life properly. 
Gregory sums up succinctly when she states that the participants understand that their 
practice is based not on “the instrumental application of scientifically derived method to 
subject…(but on)…relationships between the helper and the helped, in which decision 
making is indeterminate, reflexive and based upon values” (Gregory, 2010, p2282 
emphasis added).  Participants were also absolutely clear that their job was to still find 
connectedness to people who had often done terrible things, even when a technical 
response would satisfy the agency. Therefore, then, these experienced practitioners, who 
had trained as social workers, were able to reconcile their value base and reduce 
disjuncture to a manageable level, by resisting the dominant culture,  perpetuating an ethic 
of care and, within that, helping where possible. 
 
Another central theme from the study is that participants did not attend to an ethic of care 
at the expense of attention to risk or challenging offending behaviour. It was clearly not an 
‘either/or’ but a ‘both’.  And, as already discussed, helping offenders and employing an 
ethic of care is exactly in keeping with the desistance research and may therefore also be a 
more effective way of reducing re-offending. It would also seem that in Kosny and Eakin’s 
study workers fulfilled all of the principles of an ethics of care in that they really got to 
know the service-users and gained a thorough understanding of their situations and 
histories. They also empathised and felt compassion for the circumstances the service users 
were in (moral attention and sympathetic understanding). The workers understood the 
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importance of the relationship with the service user, and worked hard to reconnect them 
with their communities (importance of relationships).  Quite clearly, then, workers 
responded in an ethically caring way. It is obvious that any decisions made or any ethical 
conflicts would be considered within this framework. What about the workers in McNeill’s 
study?  It is difficult to ascertain just how much ‘caring’ was going on as a rule, although 
in some of the case examples, an ethics of care approach was obvious. The example given 
previously of the young heroin user illustrates this well. The worker did not simply apply a 
procedural list (an offender not complying, and therefore might be presenting a risk to the 
liberty of others in the community. She has therefore forfeited the right to her own liberty 
and must be reported to the court). The worker, instead, attempted to ‘help’ the young 
woman, by paying real attention and gaining sympathetic understanding of the dire 
circumstances of her life, by building mutual trust and a real relationship with the service 
user, by accommodating her needs (very basic, survival needs in this case) and by 
responding in a way which was about her needs rather than CJSW targets. So, in these 
extreme cases, it seems that in 2000 the workers in McNeill’s study were allowed to ‘care’. 
The question still remains as to whether the ethics of care had a place in more standard 
practice, and whether the same picture would emerge in Scotland today. Gregory’s (2010) 
study, interestingly, found that experienced workers were still caring for service-users, but 
managed to do so only by resisting the dominant culture, and having the confidence to do 
so. It can be assumed, therefore, that although the workers cared and helped as far as 
possible, the actuality of the practice was curtailed by the restrictive framework, hence 
workers describing resultant stress (disjuncture). 
 
It is inevitable that a question must also arise asking ‘is it appropriate to apply an ethics of 
care to offenders?’  The workers in Kosny and Eakin’s study saw the service users as 
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clearly deserving of care, but they were not labelled as offenders. Might this make a 
difference?  The first point to consider is that the stated raison d’etre of CJSW is to reduce 
offending behaviour (rather than provide ‘help’ unconditionally, as discussed in section 
2.1.5 (Raynor and Vanstone, 1994)). This then raises the question about how that should be 
done. What is effective? In section 2.1.5, Key practice skills (McNeill et al., 2005) and the 
desistance literature were explored. The question is, are they congruent with the ethics of 
care?  
 
As stated in the previous section, McNeill et al. (2005) distil the evidence about effective 
practice into four broad skill sets. Skill set one concerns building relationships with service 
users which are characterised by accurate empathy, respect, warmth, ‘therapeutic 
genuineness’, a partnership and agreement about what the work will involve and mutual 
trust. The relationship must also be explicit and fair, and the worker must offer practical 
help where necessary, demonstrating that offender is a concern “as a person” (McNeill et 
al., 2005, p33) as well as an offender. This is congruent with several principles of 
Manning’s ethics of care. For example, the emphasis on relationship between worker and 
service user, and the importance of such is central to both approaches. The fact the worker 
must be genuine in their interaction, develop mutual trust and convey accurate empathy 
also mirrors Manning’s ‘sympathetic understanding’ in that both are concerned with the 
worker really understanding how the service user thinks and feels. Skill set two concerns 
risk, needs and strength assessment. Once again, the relational aspect of risk assessment is 
highlighted. The authors discuss the limitations of the procedural methods of risk 
assessment (and workers’ over-reliance on them) and highlight the fact the service user 
must be able to be really honest with the worker. The worker must also be able to ask the 
difficult questions.  Clearly, then, it is essential that they have a good relationship. The 
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other key message is that interventions must be “thoroughly individualised” (McNeill et 
al., 2005, p35), because the desistance literature tells us that the offender’s subjective 
opinion about what is important to him is fundamental in promoting desistance. This 
concept does not imply that intervention should only tackle individual problems, seen to lie 
‘within’ the offender, but that proper cognisance must be taken of the effects of poverty, 
oppression, deprivation, boredom or whatever the individual offender points to as 
significant. The worker must really ‘hear’ the offender’s story and must develop accurate 
empathy in order to ascertain what is important to the service user. Only then will the 
worker (and service user) be able to develop a plan of action.  
 
The above links, again, with Manning’s principles of moral attention, sympathetic 
understanding and responding in a way which considers ‘comfort’. Skill set three concerns 
delivering research based plans and interventions. The desistance research has been 
covered earlier, but to reiterate the key messages, interventions must, again, be 
individualised and based on a thorough assessment, and that there must be an emphasis on 
“social capital” (McNeill et al., 2005, p36).  Social capital involves relationships, with 
family, friends and social networks. Clearly then, there is a link to Manning’s principle of 
really getting to know the service user (moral attention) as well as to the centrality of 
relationship networks. The suggestion from Manning that where there is an absence of a 
social network, the worker must help to create one, is exactly congruent with the message 
from McNeill et al. Finally, skill set four concerns managing change. The authors 
recognise that change is difficult and supporting change equally demanding. Workers need 
to demonstrate commitment and consistency (again reflecting the importance of the 
relationship) to support the process. 
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It can be clearly seen above that the ethics of care has a very significant place within the 
approach recommended by recent literature from research. Therefore, it is not wrong to 
‘care’ for offenders but, in terms of effectiveness as well as values, absolutely necessary. 
Key practice skills recommends additional elements which would supplement the ethics of 
care (such as dealing with compliance, delivering problem-solving and cognitive-
behavioural work) but none of that would be in conflict with an ethics of care approach, 
both strands could be integrated into a holistic approach to working with offenders.  
 
A study by Phillips and Bourne (2008) looked at the impact of workers’ values on 
outcomes (effectiveness). The service users in this study, as in Kosny and Eakin’s study, 
had problems broadly similar to those experienced by CJ service users including substance 
misuse, homelessness, lack of employability skills and socially exclusion. The researchers 
found that workers who had less conservative, traditional values were more likely to 
achieve better outcomes. So, those workers who would take a chance, respond individually 
to service users and not simply follow the procedures were more effective. The 
organisational structure was very ‘flat’ and decision making was devolved and innovative, 
so workers felt supported to be innovative themselves. It is very significant that the less 
procedural, the more responsive the workers were, the more effective they were, as 
responsive workers are essential within a desistance approach, Key practice skills and an 
ethics of care framework. In this agency, because of the management structure and shared 
values, workers were allowed to help, care and to build relationships with service users and 
this produced tangible benefits in terms of outcomes as well as reducing disjuncture for the 
workers themselves. 
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So, in terms of effectiveness, of avoiding disjuncture and of following research and 
messages from literature, it would seem that workers being able to ‘care’ for offenders and 
to base their work on their values would be a very positive and important development. It 
also would appear that a key to this is the adoption of a desistance approach to work with 
offenders.  
 
2.2.4 Variables which might influence ‘disjuncture:’ Part 1 
 
Thus far, then, certain features of CJSW have been identified which, it would appear from 
the literature, might influence a worker’s experience of disjuncture. The first is the 
approach taken by an agency to the work actually done with offenders, that is, ‘how the 
agency works with offenders.’ If an agency embraces a desistance approach to the work, 
with emphasis on responsivity, relationship building, helping and caring, then it could be 
suggested that value-behaviour congruence should be attained. An approach which is the 
polar opposite of this, characterised by  proceduralised, public protection and risk 
management dominated work, with a heavy reliance on manualised, correctional 
programmes might create a context within which disjuncture might flourish. ‘How the 
agency works with offenders’ is therefore the first variable which the research study will 
seek to investigate. The second feature of CJSW which, according to the literature, might 
have an impact is the ‘ethical climate of the agency.’ The literature has highlighted features 
of the ethical climate such as space for discussion of values and a lack of managerialism as 
important to workers achieving value-behaviour congruence. ‘Ethical climate’ is therefore 
the second variable for investigation.  Given the suggested importance of a desistance 
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approach to the experience of disjuncture, the next section of the literature review will 
investigate the barriers to the adoption of  such an approach. 
 
2.3  Anxiety and Risk 
2.3.1  Introduction 
Taylor (2007) poses a question about whether professional dissonance might be a 
promising concept for social work. She defines professional dissonance as a new concept, 
characterised by “a feeling of discomfort arising from the conflict between professional 
values and expected or required job tasks” (Taylor, 2007, p89). It seems at first sight, then, 
that professional dissonance equates very closely to the concept of disjuncture as explored 
in section 2.2. Interestingly, however, Taylor frames the concept as one which might be 
“promising” (ibid. p89). 
 
Taylor explores decision making through an existential framework, using key concepts 
such as “becoming” (Taylor, 2007, p92). ‘Becoming’ is a continual process in which 
human beings must be engaged to avoid stagnation: “In order to always be “becoming” and 
not have stagnated, the person must continue to act authentically and avoid bad faith 
actions” (ibid. p92). Authenticity equates to congruence or genuineness as made central to 
social work by Carl Rogers (1980 [1963]). In order to be authentic, people take 
responsibility for their decisions, are clear that they are acting in accordance with inner 
guidance, that is, their actions are congruent with their inner ‘voice’ (conscience or value 
beliefs) and that the decision is taken in ‘good faith.’  ‘Bad faith’ decisions are the opposite 
of this. Taylor gives an example of a social worker agreeing to hospitalization of a service 
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user because of pressure from a supervisor, while internally agreeing with the service 
user’s decision not to take medication because of the severe side-effects. Taylor states that 
“individuals who continually choose bad faith actions over authentic responses stop 
progressing as “becoming” human beings” (Taylor, 2007, p93). 
 
At this point then, we can see the potential for two types of decision making. One type is 
‘good faith’ decision making, in line with values and conscience and part of a responsive, 
individually tailored approach to the work. This is congruent with authenticity and 
genuineness, and a worker who can make such decisions would be, according to Taylor, in 
the healthy process of ‘becoming’.  The other type of decision, however, is the type 
illustrated by the practice example given. The worker feels that the action is ‘wrong’ and 
yet acquiesces to its execution due to other pressures. This then becomes an action 
characterised by the opposite of authenticity in that the inner voice and outer actions are in 
conflict. According to Taylor, if the social worker in this case continues with these types of 
‘bad faith’ decisions, they will stop ‘becoming’. Avoiding taking responsibility for 
decision-making is another feature of this way of acting (‘the supervisor told me to do it’).  
Taylor links the first type of decision to the existential concept of ‘ontological anxiety’ and 
the second to ‘ontological guilt’. Taylor sums up the difference very usefully as follows, 
“Quite simply, ontological anxiety is the price of living authentically. By contrast, 
choosing the more comfortable, non-anxiety-provoking course of action will, in the short 
term, result in feeling safer, but in the long term lead to the more malignant state of 
‘ontological guilt’”  (Taylor, 2007, p94).  Long term ontological guilt can lead to regret, 
shame and a feeling of stagnation. Taylor paints a picture of ontological guilt as extremely 
corrosive. Ontological anxiety, on the other hand, produced as a result of ‘good faith’ 
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decisions, is, according to Taylor, a healthy by-product of being responsive and using 
discretion. 
 
How can this help us with our understanding of what might be going on in CJSW? It is 
clear from the previous 2 sections that the concept of disjuncture is congruent with 
ontological guilt, not with ‘promising’ professional dissonance or ontological anxiety.  It is 
not anxiety produced even when one is acting in good faith, but is the ‘malignant’ state of 
continually having to undertake tasks which are at odds with our inner voice and values. 
An example of this might be Jones’s (2001) or Preston-Shoot’s (2003) findings of 
extremely unhappy and disillusioned social workers who felt they were not allowed the 
time, space or remit to make relationships and truly ‘help’ service users when they felt it 
was the right thing to do.  More generally, the theme which emerged from the literature 
about the centrality of being allowed to help where one feels it is ‘right’ and the significant 
stress caused when one cannot, is clearly an example of ontological guilt. However, we 
still do not know if social workers in CJSW are experiencing disjuncture, although there is 
evidence to suggest it might be a possibility. Also, Taylor’s ideas around having to take 
decisions because a supervisor applies pressure, might equate to having to take decisions 
because the procedure says so, or the MAPPA meeting dictates it, even when one’s inner 
voice disagrees. As Webb (2006) states “social work has sunk into a ‘managerialism’ that 
is increasingly afraid of the complexity of risk decisions and has become highly defensive” 
(Webb, 2006, p1). The point here is that ‘managerialism’ has taken hold because of ‘fear’ 
of the risky situation. As Taylor states, it is the ‘safer’ choice in the short term.  Barry 
(2007) noted, “the 21st Century review..... reported........ that the social work 
profession….had become increasingly risk averse, stifled autonomy and lacked appropriate 
support” (Barry, 2007, pi). This builds on Webb’s suggestion that the practice of ‘risk 
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aversion’ has emerged because of fear of taking risks, and the profession has chosen the 
safer, managerial option. Also, the Scottish Government highlights ‘appropriate support’ as 
an important issue, and this resonates with O’Donnell et al.’s (2008) article which 
emphasises the importance of a supportive ethical climate. Is supervision ethically 
supportive? Is discussion and airing of views encouraged? Finally, Taylor’s idea that the 
tendency to stop taking responsibility for decisions is linked to ontological guilt, is 
extremely relevant to the idea that social workers might not have the discretion and 
autonomy to act in the way they feel is right and, thus, take responsibility for their actions 
(‘the procedure told me to do it’).  
 
The social workers in McNeill’s (2000) study did not report feelings of ethical stress, and 
were still ‘allowed’ the autonomy to take decisions and to help as they felt necessary. I 
wonder if the example of helping the young heroin user (outwith  audit measures and other 
managerial tools) was not without risk and perhaps caused the worker significant 
ontological anxiety? According to Taylor, this would be entirely proper and the alternative 
ontological guilt, produced by acting in bad faith but perhaps feeling safer in the short 
term, far more corrosive. Another example of ontological anxiety is given by Sawyer 
(2009). Sawyer interviewed mental health social workers in Australia about their 
perceptions of risk assessment and management. Sawyer found that many of the 
interviewees had, like the workers in McNeill’s study, and Gregory’s (2010) study, 
incorporated the need for risk assessment into their daily practice without compromising 
their professional values. For example, a risk assessment ‘sticker’ (a tick box rating the 
perceived level of risk) had been introduced, and some workers found that this added to 
their reflections. It forced them to think further and crystallise why they felt a person 
presented a certain level of risk, and therefore the tick box was not seen as restrictive, but 
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as enhancing professional decision making. One worker also gave the example of a 
suicidal service-user whose dog had to be euthanised. The service user had previously 
made statements alluding to the dog’s death prompting his death (and had a history of 
serious self-harm), but also asked the worker for some time alone with his dog to say 
‘goodbye’.  The worker states that “I felt confident enough to say ‘I’m going to take the 
risk’” (Sawyer, 2009, p454), and agreed with the service user’s request.  As in the example 
of the heroin user, this worker’s actions very probably led to feelings of ontological 
anxiety. However, had the worker, out of fear for herself or her job, or because of a 
restrictive policy, not given the service user time with his dog, she might well have gone 
on to experience corrosive ontological guilt, even although she had chosen the safer option.  
 
There is also a theme emerging from several authors at this point that the workers required 
confidence to ‘take the risk’ or resist the dominant culture. To what extent the risk is 
shouldered by the individual or by the agency is variable, so where more resistance is 
required (e.g. Gregory, 2010), the risk is entirely borne by the individual worker, but where 
the culture of the agency allows and supports autonomy, then the burden is shared. The 
social workers in Sawyer’s study appeared to be allowed autonomy and discretion to make 
their own decisions depending on individual circumstances. Notwithstanding this finding, 
many of the social workers were also highly critical of the emphasis on risk assessment 
tools and procedures. They were not critical of having to consider and assess risk, but were 
critical of the restrictive procedures involved in that process. One social worker, for 
example, felt obliged to ignore a policy which stated that workers should not engage with 
any service user who is intoxicated. The social worker felt that the policy was extremely 
risk averse and did not allow for individual circumstances, the worker’s knowledge of, and 
relationship with, the service user and also the service user’s vulnerability. When faced 
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with this situation, the choice for this particular worker would appear to be; follow the 
procedure and live with ontological guilt, having not ‘helped’ when you felt you needed 
and wanted to (inner voice and actions in conflict); or ignore the policy (and risk himself 
and his job) and act in accordance with his values and conscience and help the service user. 
The worker consistently chose the latter. Therefore, a policy which controls workers and 
situations in such a managerial and homogenising way, may well put workers in the most 
difficult position, and this worker, as Gregory’s participants, chose active resistance at his 
own expense. This particular worker, should something go wrong, would shoulder the full 
weight of ‘blame’ and the agency would be exempt, able to say that the worker should 
have followed the policy. On the other hand, the worker, knowing the service user, simply 
could not leave him/her to suffer or be in danger. This serves to illustrate the strength of 
the toxic nature of ontological guilt, and the lengths that some people will go to avoid it 
and to do what they feel is ‘right’. 
 
An existentialist framework, then, serves as an appropriate introduction to this section. As 
Taylor says, existential psychology “answers the question of what happens to social 
workers who consistently act in ways that conflict with their ideas about what they should 
be doing” (Taylor, 2007, p94). Preston-Shoot (2003) also explains consequences of this 
type of enforced value/behaviour incongruence which includes; secret keeping, for 
example, when workers do not discuss the gap between the theory and the reality of 
resource restrictions, making no requests or demands for entitlements such as supervision, 
due to a lack of belief in their needs being met, a lack of belief that there is any point in 
making requests or taking action  on behalf of service users and a belief in the espoused 
reality of social work when in the full knowledge that the image is at odds with the reality. 
It can be seen that those consequences could quite easily lead to corrosive feelings of 
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ontological guilt or disjuncture in the long term.  Taylor (2007) states that existentialism, 
“also changes the negative cast usually given to anxiety, and encompasses anxiety as a 
potential growing experience” (Taylor, 2007, p94). This section will now look at why 
certain key features of CJSW as already defined might make embracing ontological 
anxiety extremely difficult. It will also examine the issues already raised in some more 
detail, namely risk and risk aversion, blame culture, managerialism, autonomy and ethical 
climate. 
 
2.3.2 Why is embracing ontological anxiety difficult? 
 
 First of all, clarification is required as to why ontological anxiety is important in terms of 
desistance work, and thus a reduction in disjuncture. Working with someone in order to 
support the process of desistance involves listening to their narrative, helping them with 
the problems and issues they deem to be important and building a warm, genuine, 
therapeutic relationship which encompasses interest, optimism and hope (Farrall, 2002; 
McCulloch and McNeill, 2008). In order to do this, workers need to be able to do far more 
than just follow procedures or deal with prescribed problems such as employment, 
traditionally associated with reduced re-offending. The process has to be, essentially, 
personal to the individual. In order to do this then, workers need autonomy and discretion 
to respond in thoroughly individualised ways. They need to be able to take risks and to 
help offenders (as per the workers in Kosny and Eakin’s (2008) study who could respond 
as required).  Being allowed the autonomy to do this would provide an appropriate context 
for the implementation of desistance work, and, because ‘helping’ where required is an 
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essential part of the process, should reduce feelings of disjuncture. Why might this be 
difficult for CJSW? The issues identified above will now be discussed in some more detail. 
 
Webb (2006) suggests that the neo-liberal society and the preoccupation with risk are  
essentially linked. He explains that neo-liberalism has replaced the ‘old’ welfare society 
based on universal ‘care’ (from cradle to grave), with an onslaught of individualism and 
market forces.  The important point here is that, within a neo-liberal context, risk is 
paramount.  Webb suggests that welfare is now seen as a bad thing – individuals should be 
responsible for their lives and there are no appeals to the greater good. Within this context, 
people must join in with the middle class work ethic or be left behind, once again raising 
the issue of deservedness as discussed earlier.  Webb also states that the language of choice 
and empowerment are key in this development, but cautions that the promotion of choice is 
“hollow and differentiated along class lines” (Webb, 2006, p56). He explains that people 
are not only free to choose, but obliged to be empowered and choosing individuals, even 
when perhaps not having the resources to be so.  He also points out that inclusion in 
society has become supplanted by inclusion in the job market, and suggests that this is 
confused thinking because, actually, people are not properly included until they have a 
good standard of living, opportunities for career progression etc. Webb, therefore, outlines 
a neo-liberal context where people are given help to ‘join in’ with a middle class work 
ethic, or are left behind.  Once again, the reference to deservedness and ‘underclass’ 
thinking  (Murray, 1990) can be seen, in that if people cannot join in, they are deemed to 
be beyond help, scrounging, ne’er do wells, and the rest of society are left with no option 
but to ‘contain’ them.  
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Kemshall (2002) notes that rather than the traditional bonds of class ending, studies show 
that current restrictions are just as powerful. She also highlights the theme of 
individualism, that collective, societal causes of crime and poverty have been replaced by 
individual responsibility and individual failings. This resonates with the ‘responsibility 
model’ in CJSW when a focus on welfare needs became more explicitly balanced with 
holding the offender to account for his actions (McCulloch and McNeill, 2011). If the 
balance is weighted in the direction of accountability, however, issues such as poverty and 
social exclusion are seen as excuses, and ‘individual failings’ become the only legitimate 
target for intervention. Webb (2006) would view this as an inevitable consequence of a 
neo-liberal society. This view also legitimises withdrawing services from certain groups of 
people (those who are unproductive and dependant) and therein we can again see the idea 
that welfare is a bad thing. Kemshall also notes that this idea is perpetuated by appeals to 
the middle classes that they are carrying a heavy tax burden to prop up lazy, workshy 
scroungers (who might also be offending) and are actually not much worse off than 
themselves. She states that this is a powerful idea which easily mobilises people in favour 
of benefit and other welfare reforms. Who is deserving and who is not? The culmination of 
this neo-liberal thinking is that people are seen to be excluded through their own faults and 
failings. Once again, recourse to value beliefs in the effects of poverty and disadvantage, 
and the promotion of social justice and equality, are eroded. The idea that this group must 
be regulated and controlled is emphasised. This is a theme which the literature continually 
brings the discussion back to. The social work value belief in social justice must be very 
robustly understood and very much valued by social workers to enable them to resist the 
neo-liberal, uncritical blaming of disadvantaged groups which is an idea with distant, 
historical roots as already covered, and a powerful durability. 
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How, then, does this interface with risk becoming the dominant idea? Section 2.1.5 looked 
at the rise of public protection, and this combined with the above view of  the ‘underclass’ 
leads to the conclusion that assessing and managing these risky individuals must be a 
priority task. As Feeley and Simon (1992) stated, the task has become one of managing 
groups of risk classified people. McNeill (2009) explores the issue of public protection as 
the priority task for CJSW as stated in The Tough Option  (Scottish Office, 1998). McNeill 
points out that when we commit to public protection, we confirm that there are threats and 
encourage fear. Also, when we promise to protect, we open ourselves “not to the likelihood 
of failure, but to its inevitability” (McNeill, 2009, p22). Herein, then, lies the 
preoccupation with risk assessment, risk management and ‘getting it right’ for the 
protection of the public.  
 
Littlechild (2010), expands on this point. Agencies are clearly adopting actuarial tools and 
processes to avoid ‘mistakes’ and to assist workers to make ‘defensible decisions’. 
However,  Littlechild suggests that the faith then invested in the procedures and tools 
means that if something does go wrong, it must be the worker’s fault. This thinking, in 
turn, increases the fear felt by workers: “It has been argued that it is necessary to examine 
the risks of risk assessments, as the centrally developed risk assessment agenda and its 
associated tools have (probably) inadvertently induced fearful perceptions in social 
workers. This is due to their concerns about the unrealistic expectation that they can, by the 
use of such tools, eliminate risk” (Littlechild, 2010, p672). Littlechild suggests that 
government expects that if workers only apply the tools properly, they will avoid child 
abuse deaths and continues that this is based on fundamentally flawed thinking, 
perpetuated by attention to actuarial methods and single-incident investigations. For 
example, Littlechild points out the “actuarial fallacy” (ibid. p668), that although insurance 
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companies can group people according to actuarial risk factors (and, thus have a ‘high risk’ 
group, as in social work), they do not try to predict which individual will have an accident. 
That would be impossible. In fact, they increase the cost of the premiums, knowing that 
somebody in this group, inevitably will have an accident. This is the nub of the matter – 
the use of these tools in social work do not allow us to accurately predict who will re-
offend or harm their child, and we need to accept that, inevitably, somebody will. In 
accepting this inevitability, social work could move towards a supportive, rather than 
blaming culture. Littlechild also looks at single-incident investigations, which can lead to 
the over-prioritisation of certain elements and the suppression of others. Where there is 
media outcry, the government will respond with  “managerialism…..which consists of a 
controlling approach to micro-practice” (ibid. p665). Inevitably, the controlling responses 
in criminal justice social work are characterised by “popular punitiveness” (Croall, 2005).  
 
Both of the above, then, lead to less autonomy for social workers to make decisions, as 
they are controlled centrally through procedures and checklists. Littlechild condemns this 
state of affairs, as he feels that social workers must engage with “untidy” sets of 
knowledge and relearn to live with uncertainty and ambiguity. Social workers need 
autonomy to do this properly on a case-by-case basis. This conclusion very much supports 
Taylor’s idea that social workers (and agencies) must be allowed to live with the 
ontological anxiety produced by having autonomy, acting in good faith and taking 
responsibility. However, it might be that, in the current climate, this leads to a situation 
where workers are consumed with anxiety that the (good faith) risks they have taken will 
end in disaster and they will be blamed. Phillips (2009) suggests that social workers feel 
this anxiety more strongly that any other. He describes it as the lying-awake, nightmarish 
scenario of ‘what if something goes wrong, and I will be blamed/sacked/vilified’. This 
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leads to an emphasis on defensible  (or defensive?) decision making, although even this 
might not be a protective strategy because, as Phillips points out, in hindsight any decision 
can seem indefensible.  
 
An illustrative example of the influence of hindsight was the investigation into the case of 
an offender who abducted a two year old girl, whilst subject to supervision from the social 
work department. The investigation found that the decision, by the social worker, to see the 
offender once a week was flawed (Scottish Government, 2005). The social worker made 
this decision because the offender was living in a block of flats which was staffed 24 hours 
a day, and he also received weekly visits from a housing support worker. The decision was 
criticised because the offender’s accommodation was not a specialist sex-offender unit and, 
therefore, supervision should have been closer (Scottish Government, 2005). Social 
workers have more than one service user to visit and must balance competing demands on 
their time. The worker in this case had good reasons for setting supervision at the 
frequency he did and whether this equated to a ‘bad’ decision is seriously questionable. 
O’Sullivan (1999) in his exploration of how decisions should be evaluated, states that 
evaluation needs to be based on “what the average, skilled practitioner would have done, 
given what was known and what could reasonably be expected to have been known at the 
time, without the benefit of hindsight” (O’Sullivan, 1999, p155 emphasis added).  This 
appears to be, then, an example of why social workers might well lie awake worrying 
about their decisions. In theory, a good decision, based on good, defensible reasons, should 
be robust enough to withstand scrutiny, but it appears that this might not be the case when, 
as Phillips points out, any decision can be made to look indefensible once a bad outcome is 
known. The presumption is that the decision’s worth should be measured by the outcome.  
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Banks (2006) discusses the complex reality of decision making in social work, and defines 
a social work decision as more akin to a ‘dilemma,’ that is, “a choice between two equally 
unwelcome alternatives” (Banks, 2006, p24). She goes on to say that these types of 
decisions have no clearly right and clearly wrong choices, but that the social worker must 
choose the lesser of two evils. Whatever the choice, it might still be an ‘evil’. Within every 
‘evil’ is the potential for a poor outcome, even if the social worker has chosen the path 
most likely for success. MacDonald (1990a) makes an interesting observation about 
decision making and blame in social work. She draws attention to the Report of the Panel 
of Inquiry into the death of Jasmine Beckford as follows: “In assessing whether a 
reasonable person would have known or seen an event, we are entitled to have regard to 
what actually happened” (MacDonald, 1990a, p526, emphasis added). MacDonald 
disputes this, arguing that the social worker’s course of action might have been correct 
despite the bad outcome. She suggests that most enquiries start with the assumption that a 
bad outcome equates to bad practice/bad decisions and that the wisdom of hindsight is 
applied with rigour to find evidence to support this. In summary, MacDonald proposes that 
the “criteria for assessment (of social work practice) should not be the outcomes, but the 
appropriateness of the decisions given the information available at the time” (MacDonald, 
1990a, p527, emphasis added). In the ensuing argument between MacDonald and Hollis 
and Howe (MacDonald, 1990a, Hollis and Howe, 1990 and MacDonald, 1990b), Hollis 
and Howe are quite clear in their view that outcomes are the best measure of practice 
competence (or otherwise): “the test of sound judgement verges on success” (Hollis and 
Howe, 1990, p549).  The authors suggest that if a person has accepted the role of a social 
worker, then they have accepted the risks that go with that. MacDonald, on the other hand, 
states quite simply that we cannot always predict if a bad outcome will happen, and living 
with this uncertainty is inevitable. This equates to Taylor’s and Littlechild’s ideas about 
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living with ontological anxiety generated by uncertainty, and the authors agree that this is 
right and proper, if a good, defensible decision has been made. MacDonald sums up by 
stating that social workers always have a responsibility to make the best possible decision, 
but “if the best possible decision is made, then even if a bad outcome occurs, it is morally 
correct” (MacDonald, 1990a, p543). 
 
There is a consistent message in the literature, then, that decisions about risk cannot always 
be predicted accurately and the ‘actuarial fallacy’ and related thinking leads to completely 
unreasonable expectations that social workers can always get it right if they just use the 
tools and do their jobs correctly. It is also clear, however, that the acceptance of this idea is 
not universal and there are examples of a competing premise that social workers should 
always get it right and are to blame when things go wrong. It is easy, therefore, to 
empathise with those workers who worry and feel inordinate stress because of the 
possibility of something untoward happening with one of their cases. 
 
Littlechild, similarly to O’Donnell et al. (2008), states that the above situation of extreme 
anxiety can be addressed by attention to the climate of the agency which needs to be 
supportive and ethical, underpinned by the belief that social workers cannot get every 
decision right and that, inevitably, tragedies will happen. “If we blame the staff for what 
happens, and make them fearful of reporting difficulties, the reality of the problems can 
neither be systematically examined or action taken to remedy them” (Littlechild, 2010, 
p670). One locus where the ethical climate of an agency is reflected in quite sharp relief is 
supervision. An indication of ethical climate would be social workers’ experiences of 
supervision as a time to explore ethical dilemmas and the moral and emotional impact of 
their work. Beddoe (2010) conducted a study interviewing six experienced supervisors 
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about their experiences of supervising staff.  The author looked at whether practice which 
had become “ruled by technicist approaches in which risk assessment systems and 
checklists are put in place to minimise the risk of practitioners ‘missing something 
important’” (Beddoe, 2010,  p1281), had resulted in supervision coming to “focus attention 
on micro-management and surveillance” (ibid, p1280).  Beddoe found that the supervisors 
she interviewed still had a commitment to the various purposes of supervision, whilst they 
acknowledged that the emphasis on risk management could make this difficult.  A clear 
theme emerged from the study that supervision must recognise the possibility of change (as 
opposed to management of risky populations as per the ‘new penology’, Feeley and Simon, 
1992) and retain a commitment to care, that is, discussions about care, helping and change 
must be explicitly recognised. This means that social workers must be helped, in 
supervision, to live with uncertainty and anxiety and Beddoe quotes Parton (1998) who 
stated that “social work needed the ‘rehabilitation of the idea of uncertainty, and the 
permission to talk about indeterminacy’ (Parton, 1998, P23) rather than greater 
proceduralism” (Beddoe, 2010, p1288).  Beddoe also found that her study did expose the 
possibility of a risk-averse ethical climate reducing and undermining the quality of 
supervision. In summary, therefore, Beddoe’s study demonstrates that the six particular 
supervisors were able to retain a holistic approach to supervision, and were balancing the 
different requirements of the task, but the author acknowledges that further research is 
required to better understand how good supervision can be implemented within the context 
of current social work practice.  
It is clear therefore, that risk may have changed the ethical climate of criminal justice 
social work, and may therefore have also had an impact on supervision. Sawyer (2009) 
adds weight to the conflicting priorities in supervision by suggesting that workers who 
become senior social workers are no longer “expert craftsmen” but instead are “expert 
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managers” (Sawyer, 2009, p443). They are concerned more with the completion of the 
paperwork about the work being done, rather than with the actual work being done. Since 
the issue of helping offenders and attending to their welfare sits within the realm of the 
actual work being done, it is not a priority for discussion or quality enhancement. Again, 
this would be reflected in the nature of supervision as recognised by Beddoe. 
 
Risk then, has become dominant, essentially linked as it is to public protection, the neo-
liberal society we live in and the current ‘blame culture’. As Kemshall (2002) notes, risk 
always raises the “spectre of blame” (Kemshall, 2002, p9). When something goes wrong, 
the question is usually, whose fault is this? Who can we blame? What can we do in 
supervision to ensure we do not get blamed? It is not a surprise, then, that workers worry 
about this. It would seem that the literature suggests that autonomy and discretion for 
social workers are necessary for them to engage with messy situations and untidy 
information, but that risk averse agencies find it difficult to allow that to happen. So, the 
context of attempts to adopt desistance approaches to work with offenders is characterised 
by risk aversion, blame and social workers’ anxiety. It seems the task of creating a 
situation where workers can adopt these approaches and, thus, live with ontological anxiety 
(as opposed to crippling, overwhelming anxiety) will depend on the ethical climate 
(support or blame), the acceptance of the inevitability of re-offending and/or tragedies and 
the autonomy of workers. 
 
Turning specifically to CJSW it seems clear that the themes raised earlier are, if anything, 
more significant. For example, the emphasis on accredited, approved risk assessment tools 
is apparent as part of the remit of the Risk Management Authority (RMA) which was set 
up as a result of the McLean Committee’s recommendations regarding the assessment and 
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supervision of  serious violent and sexual offenders, published in 1999 (RMA, 2006). 
Having an agency dedicated solely to risk assessment and management highlights the 
dominant nature of risk as a focus for CJSW. Also, an international literature review 
commissioned by the Scottish Government in 2007, undertaken by Barry (2007), found 
manifestation of the above themes to be pronounced in CJSW. The review was 
commissioned due to the government’s review of social work which found that social 
work, as a profession, had become very risk-averse and stifling of autonomy (Scottish 
Government, 2006). Barry (2007) considered risk assessment in the three main statutory 
social work arenas; community care, child protection and criminal justice. In regard to 
CJSW, she found that “there is currently a preoccupation with risk assessment per se, 
possibly at the expense of effective interventions with offenders” (Barry, 2007, p10).  To 
elaborate, Barry states that the terminology and context of risk, “masks the social and 
personal problems facing offenders and sees victims as the main consumers of risk 
assessment” (ibid. p14).  Also, although tools may seem effective and scientific, an 
alternative purpose is to give credence to agencies in their responses to crime, and to limit 
responsibility when things go wrong.  Barry concludes that the focus in CJSW seems to be 
about managing risk rather than working in partnership with offenders on alleviating their 
problems to reduce future offending. This is consistent with Feeley and Simon’s (1992) 
‘new penology’ and further illuminates the picture of what is actually going on within 
CJSW.  Clearly, it may suggest a reason as to why it is difficult for agencies to take a 
desistance approach to working with offenders. Again, the quick, safe answer appears 
preferable to a longer term intervention, based on working with (and helping) offenders. 
This might also mirror the ontological (healthy) anxiety which those longer term responses 
to offenders create as opposed to the safer, short term ‘management’ and procedural 
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response which might, due to the possibility of creating disjuncture for workers, produce 
ontological guilt.   
 
One question which arises from the above is; what are workers’ feelings about risk? Do 
workers want to take risks and have autonomy?  Barry suggests that agencies may take 
steps to protect themselves from blame, by focusing on their risk assessment tools and 
procedures. Therefore, when something goes wrong, or a tragedy occurs, agency staff can 
show “due diligence” (Barry, 2007, p31) and demonstrate that the workers followed 
correct procedures. The inevitable conclusion to this is that workers’ and agency safety is 
actually the paramount consideration, the protection of children or work with offenders is 
secondary.  We can link this back to Philip’s “nightmarish” situation where a social worker 
is held accountable for an inevitable bad event occurring. If this is indeed the over-riding 
anxiety for workers, then any safety net might be welcome. And actually, Barry did find 
that “social workers tend to seek reassurances, legitimacy and certainty from risk 
assessment tools that arguably professional autonomy cannot give them” (Barry, 2007, 
p36). The review also highlights that tensions (for workers) between accountability and 
autonomy are less in CJSW “because actuarial and administrative functions have all but 
taken over from one-to-one work with offenders and there are fewer worker expectations 
of professional autonomy” (ibid. p44). 
 
At this point then, it needs to be recognised that if the desistance work/ontological anxiety 
relationship is accepted, it might be difficult for agencies to implement desistance 
approaches on at least two levels. One, the aforementioned tendency towards protection of 
the agency from blame, and the safer, managerial way of approaching work. Secondly, it 
seems that workers themselves might very well not welcome an increase in autonomy and 
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discretion, and the suggestion that anxiety is healthy and can be ‘lived with’ might well be 
anathema to workers. Anxiety as currently experienced, seems to be the nightmare anxiety 
of Philip’s description, and it is unlikely workers would welcome anything akin to this 
unless they were truly convinced that the blame culture had changed. They would need to 
be allowed to take risks, experience ontological anxiety and know that they were supported 
and that a bad outcome was not seen as inevitable confirmation of bad practice. 
 
Risk aversion in CJSW is further explored in Scotland’s Choice, the Report of the Scottish 
Prison’s Commission (Scottish Government, 2008b). The report looked at how and why 
prison is used, and examined reasons for the unacceptably high, and growing, Scottish 
prison population. One focus of the report is the number of parole recalls, that is, when 
prisoners released on licence are recalled to prison due to breaches of their licence 
conditions. The report states “Between 1997/98 and 2006/07…..the number of people 
recalled on licences has soared by nearly 1,000%” (Scottish Government, 2008b, p12), a 
fact which the report describes as “astonishing” (ibid. P12). What is the reason for this? 
The report found that there was worrying evidence to suggest that many ex-prisoners were 
being returned to prison for breaking rules rather then for further offending. Whilst it is 
recognised that there must be ultimate sanctions for people who refuse to engage with the 
terms and conditions of their release, the report questions whether lapses could not better 
be managed in the community. Furthermore, the report states “research in other countries 
suggests that these changes may be less to do with managing real risks to the public than 
with those concerned becoming more defensive and risk-averse for fear of being blamed 
when things go wrong” (Scottish Government, 2008b, p45). This fits well with the 
emerging picture of CJSW, in that rule-breaking in the past might have been dealt with by 
a social worker with the discretion to issue an internal warning. Is fear of making those 
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judgements encouraging agencies to ‘pass the buck’ and refer far more decisions to the 
Parole Board?  The report certainly suggests that this is the case. 
 
 What does this all of this mean for desistance work with offenders? Clearly, taking a 
desistance approach, and living with the resultant ontological anxiety would be difficult for 
any social worker in the climate outlined above. Phillips also points out another problem; 
ideas of social capital are central to desistance in that the more the offender has to lose, the 
greater is the motivation to not offend. However, a focus on risk  outweighs this quite 
significantly and Phillips states that “it is important to redress the balance of the debate” 
(Phillips, 2009, 184). Therefore, not only is risk difficult for agencies and personally for 
workers, it is a focus which serves to mask the attention required to social and welfare 
issues which is central to desistance. 
 
Hudson (2001) looked at the issue of human rights within the probation service, 
particularly with regard to the preoccupation with risk. In essence, Hudson, states that an 
increasing focus on risk management must be balanced by an increasing focus on human 
rights of offenders. Hudson’s criticisms of current risk assessment practices resonate with 
the original criticisms from the American Friends report (1971, cited in Garland, 2001). At 
that time, sentencing was criticised for discretionary powers based on factors such as 
employment, compliance etc. which led to discriminatory sentencing. Hudson points out 
that our risk assessment criteria are also fundamentally discriminatory; employment is 
racially correlated, and relational residence might have different configurations depending 
on ethnicity. Hudson wonders why, because of this, there has not been more resistance to 
the adoption of risk practices. She suggests that the scientific and morally neutral language 
of risk masks its stigmatising nature.  So, Hudson feels we need to deal with risk in CJSW, 
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but that we must remain concerned with risk management and not slide into risk control 
which “attempts to eliminate risk, even at the expense of an equitable balance of risks and 
rights” (Hudson, 2001, p110). Risk management can allow for a whole-hearted acceptance 
of the idea of human rights (beyond just ensuring legislation complies with the Human 
Rights Act) and the adoption of a “positive rights agenda” (ibid. p110). The key here, 
according to Hudson, is that these rights apply to people simply for being human and are 
not earned by good behaviour, a basic social justice belief clearly held by the workers in 
Kosny and Eakin’s (2008) study.  She eschews the idea that a reasonable response to 
questions about offenders’ rights is that it is the victims’ or law-abiding citizens rights’ 
which are important. She states it is not an ‘either/or’, but ‘both’ – a balance. There is a 
parallel here with the participants in Gregory’s (2010) study who were clear that attention 
to needs of the offender and, at the same time, cognisance of risk and reducing re-
offending were ‘both’ the purposes of their work. Hudson accepts that there are rights 
conflicts and that some rights are lost for some of the time, due to punishment, but suggests 
that an explicit consideration of rights alongside risks should balance the tendency towards 
exclusion and management of those people deemed to belong to risky, ‘other’ populations. 
In fact, Hudson states that the community can become a barrier between inclusion and 
exclusion if the focus is entirely on risk, whereas a focus on rights allows for an inclusive 
concept of community. For probation practice, then, Hudson supports that offenders be 
recognised as part of the community; that justice consider principles of fair punishment as 
well as a focus on risk; and that there is a commitment to principles of equal freedom and 
equal respect. It can be clearly seen, then, that adopting these principles and working 
within a positive rights framework, would allow social workers to discuss and enact their 
values by respectful treatment of the offender which would encourage discussion of 
welfare, care, help and assistance. Hudson’s view that the “maximum level of rights…can 
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be preserved without detriment to…the rights of potential victims” (Hudson, 2001, p110) 
would also allow for a social work- values based, desistance approach. 
 
Taking the issue of human rights further, it would have to be accepted, and recognised 
explicitly, that the intersection between rights and risks would be where the inevitable 
negative and unforeseen outcomes would occur. This would be an inevitable product of the 
adoption of a positive rights agenda and would be a difficult idea to accept in the current 
climate of CJSW as already explored. In the explicit acknowledgement of support for the 
human rights of the offender would have to lie the explicit defence of that ideological 
position. Harding (2006), a member of the Parole Board for England and Wales, gave 
some insight into decisions made by the Parole Board which have led to bad outcomes. 
Harding reflects on the reports written after investigation into the Parole Board decision-
making and his report gives significant weight to many of the key practices inherent in 
supporting a desistance approach. He also points out that there has been an explosion in 
prison recalls, and although he is talking about the English picture, there are clear 
similarities with the situation in Scotland. His explanation is that agencies are not 
differentiating between serious re-offenders and people who break rules and might only 
require a slap on the wrist. Although not acknowledged explicitly, might this also be 
underpinned by increasingly fearful and risk-averse practices? Although all of the points 
raised by Harding would support a move towards more autonomy for workers, desistance 
approaches to licence supervision and less risk-averse practices, there is one very 
significant point he makes which is worthy of further exploration. Harding states that the 
investigation into the early release of a prisoner found that the “release decision was 
undermined by human rights considerations rather than public protection concerns” 
(Harding, 2006, p390). Returning to Hudson’s article, surely the response to this should be 
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acceptance and the statement that both fundamentals were attended to. If we can 
acknowledge that the human rights of the offender are important and not expendable, then 
we accept that this is the interface where difficult judgements are made, sometimes with 
unintended and negative consequences. However, Harding responds with some passion 
that such a thing might be suggested; “it is naïve and ill-informed to think that the parole 
board members are so fixated by human rights issues to the detriment of their major 
concern about risk assessment and public protection” (Harding, 2006, p390). The complete 
denial that there may indeed have been an over-emphasis of the offenders’ human rights 
also denies that this is  where the difficult balance lies, and that it is quite correct for the 
competing demands to be so balanced. It may be, therefore, that we are still a long way 
from the necessary and explicit acknowledgement that the human rights of the offender are 
as an essential consideration as risk assessment and ‘public protection’.   
 
So, although the adoption of a positive human rights agenda might be difficult in terms of 
release decisions, might it be less difficult in terms of the work actually done with 
offenders? The right to help, welfare assistance and respect should feature in any work 
which allows for that, as desistance work does. We have seen previously how ‘helping’ 
might not be acceptable in terms of popular punitivism, and might also be seen as a 
weighting of the risk and rights balance towards the rights of the offender. If we allow that 
to hamper what is right in terms of human rights, then, according to Hudson, we are 
bowing to the “tyranny of the majority” (Hudson, 2001, p112).  Might this be what 
‘popular punitivism’ is? Hudson reminds us that rights legislation is “anti-majoritarian; it is 
designed to uphold the rights of each against all, the rights of the few who are ‘different’ 
against the majority who are normal” (ibid. p112), and therefore might be a potential 
weapon against popular punitivism. In this way it might allow for the beginnings of a 
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culture change aimed at providing help, assistance and desistance work to offenders rather 
than categorising and managing them. 
 
Pollack (2010) looked at the experience of women within correctional services in Canada. 
This gives an interesting insight into those who actually experience social work 
characterised by the themes mentioned so far in this section. Pollack states that there is a 
clear neo-liberal agenda at play, illustrated by workers trying to get service users to take 
control of their own risk management, and to secure employment, thus joining in with the 
middle-class ethic and reducing the need for state intervention. Once again, what about 
those who struggle to do that? The women themselves appeared to have internalised these 
messages, apologising for attributing the source of their problems to wider social problems. 
For example, one woman, when stating that poverty and drugs contributed to her offending 
stated “as crazy as it sounds” (Pollack, 2010, p1272).  Pollack also suggests that a 
disillusionment with the ‘nanny state’ has led not to less interference from the state, but 
different interference which is more focussed on those who are mandatory service users, 
for example, in criminal justice or child protection. The focus is on the ‘criminal mind’ and 
the employment of cognitive-behavioural programmes, at the expense of any welfare or 
helping work, and the women say this ethos reminds them that they are bad people (once 
again this is contrary to desistance work which sets out to encourage a positive self-
narrative (Maruna, 2001)). Thus, without the qualifier “as crazy as it sounds” the woman, 
according to Pollack would have been seen to be making excuses or denying responsibility, 
which links exactly to popular punitivism’s denial of recourse to values linked to anti-
oppressive practice and social justice.  There was no evidence of pro-social modelling 
(Trotter, 2006) on the part of the workers. Again this is another strand in desistance work, 
and workers should be modelling and encouraging pro-social behaviour. Pollack states that 
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there has been a war on workers having discretion and that management information, audit 
trails, standardised tools and defensible decisions have taken its place. All of these themes 
have been covered already, but this study highlights the effect on the service users 
themselves, having to ‘fit’ with individual notions of blame, seeing the file as all-powerful 
and despairing about the difficulty in demonstrating change within a risk assessment 
framework. The women felt they were not ‘heard’ accurately and what they said was 
written in the file differently or differently categorised. This can be clearly contrasted with 
what people might experience as a result of a desistance approach, for example ‘hearing’ 
accurately and asking the women about their lives and priorities would be essential, as 
would workers really getting to know them, and building relationships with them. 
According to the women’s objections to the current regime, this would be very welcome. 
 
To sum up thus far, then, it is suggested that adopting a desistance approach to work with 
offenders would allow for ‘helping’ the offender deal with problems as defined by him or 
her, as an essential part of that approach. It would also involve really listening to the 
offender and building a relationship with him.  This should reduce disjuncture for workers 
and allow them to practise in a value-based way, helping where they feel it is right to do 
so. It is recognised that taking a desistence approach would not be without risk; anxiety 
would be produced because social workers would have autonomy and discretion to make 
decisions and respond individually to service-users, taking responsibility for their actions. 
The anxiety produced (ontological anxiety) is a healthy and proper consequence of making 
good faith decisions, and could usefully be embraced by social work. However, it is 
recognised that there may be a culture within CJSW which might make adopting a 
desistance approach, with its attendant anxiety, extremely difficult. Risk averse practice, 
the existence of a ‘blame culture’ and managerialism all play a part in creating a context 
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within which agencies, and perhaps workers too, may find embracing the change to a 
desistance paradigm for practice, frightening. How far are we from Barry’s (2007) 
suggestion in the conclusion to the literature review, that we “could well learn from social 
work 100 years ago when in 1907, the Probation Act recommended that practitioners 
‘advise, assist and befriend’ their clients. That message still holds true today, whatever the 
risks” (Barry, 2007, p47)? 
 
2.3.3 Variables which might influence ‘disjuncture:’ Part 2 
 
From this section of the literature review, then, two further variables which might affect 
disjuncture can be identified. One is the ability of agencies to tolerate ontological anxiety. 
It follows that if an agency adopts a desistance approach, it must, as a consequence, be able 
to cope with and contain the production of ontological anxiety. The polar opposite to this, 
would be an agency completely unable to tolerate ontological anxiety, and thus be very 
likely to produce ontological guilt for workers as explained above. As ontological guilt is 
similar to disjuncture, then it could be suggested that the less ontological anxiety tolerated, 
the more disjuncture would be produced. The third variable, therefore, is ‘ontological 
anxiety/guilt.’ Next, the agency’s approach to risk is suggested by the literature as a key 
feature in shaping CJSW. For example, an agency which is very risk-averse, will struggle 
to ‘allow’ responsive, desistance approaches and is likely to be characterised by blame and 
the assumption that bad outcomes equal bad practice. Thus, a procedural, defensive 
approach to the work may well flourish and  stifle value congruent engagement with 
offenders. ‘Approach to risk’ is therefore the fourth variable. Finally, the already identified 
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variable ‘ethical climate’ is enhanced by the inclusion of supervision as an important 
feature. 
 
2.3.4 Culture Change? 
 
If a desistance approach to work with offenders was to be implemented, the literature 
seems to suggest that much in the culture of CJSW would need to change. How easy would 
this be? McNeill et al. (2010) undertook a literature review exploring culture and change 
within community justice agencies. The authors drew some key themes from the literature 
on culture change in social work agencies, such as the centrality of involving practitioners. 
The literature was consistent in its messages about how important this is, and the authors 
draw attention to the absence of practitioner involvement in the centrally driven Effective 
Practice Initiative (EPI) implemented in the Probation Service (McNeill et al., 2010). 
When interviewed, probation officers were not sure about the changes, didn’t understand 
the bigger picture and were unclear as to which change belonged to which initiative. The 
authors conclude that the EPI was felt keenly by the workers, but not owned by them. 
Thus, to learn from this, social workers must be properly consulted, informed and 
involved, and this is included in the current study as another element of the variable 
‘ethical climate.’  
 
Another theme was workers’ perceptions of ‘professionalism’, the authors drawing on 
work from Robinson to explore this idea. Robinson (2003) studied practitioners’ and 
managers’ perceptions of the introduction of a structured risk assessment tool and found 
that use of the tool both heightened workers’ sense of professionalism and credibility as 
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well as, crucially, allowing them a sense of security in their decisions. They could defend 
their assessment in the event of things going wrong. This was a consistent feeling, shared 
by both practitioners and managers. Again, therefore, we can see the blame culture at 
work, and anything which can reduce the nightmarish situation of Phillip’s (2009) vivid 
description appears to be welcomed by workers. However, Robinson also found that some 
workers were unhappy with the de-skilling brought about by the introduction of the tool 
and the resultant erosion of discretion and limitations on the use of the worker’s own 
professional knowledge.  Furthermore, she found that workers adapted to the introduction 
of the tool in ways which allowed them to retain their professional practice by viewing the 
assessment tool as a supplement to their professional assessment, not as a replacement. 
They also highlighted the professional task in interpreting the knowledge needed to 
complete the form: a combination of technical and moral decision making. This seems to 
resonate with McNeill’s (2000) and Gregory’s (2010) studies where workers adapted by 
integrating the demands for accountable practice with their basic values around welfare 
and helping. Might it be that the tendency to absorb competing demands, and reconcile 
them into a worker’s framework of values and professional beliefs is, in fact, a widespread 
phenomena? As McNeill et al. (2009) state “in so far as this is revealed in their accounts of 
(social workers’) practices, partly reconfigured purposes seem to be pursued alongside and 
through more traditional priorities and techniques” (McNeill et al., 2009, p423). 
 
Sawyer (2009), as mentioned previously, found that workers in her study also 
accommodated risk assessment tasks as part of their professional role, especially in terms 
of adding to their reflective thinking about decisions. Other workers in Sawyer’s study, 
however, did feel that the dominance of the risk agenda meant that other issues of welfare 
and relationship building had suffered, as had workers’ autonomy and decision making. 
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Interestingly, participants in Sawyer’s study put far less emphasis on formal risk 
assessment tools protecting them if things were to go wrong. It was mentioned in the 
context of being able to say with certainty that a worker has followed the procedure and 
can show they have done their best for the service user. In analysis of the data, however, it 
was not recorded as an overarching theme. Might it be that the fear of being blamed is 
more prevalent in CJSW? Or might the difference be because Sawyer’s study was based in 
Australia? 
 
In Robinson’s (2003) study of  workers’ feelings towards the introduction of the risk 
assessment tool, as already mentioned, she refers to the conflicting feelings held by 
workers as the ‘professional paradox,’ that is, the tool is seen to heighten professionalism 
on one hand, yet reduce it on the other. To sum up, then, this study provides evidence that 
increasing professional autonomy (as would be necessary for the introduction of a 
desistance approach) might be welcomed by workers, but there is also clear evidence that 
workers like structured assessment tools to add to the defensibility of their decisions and 
thus increase their feelings of security. A thoroughly individual, responsive, relational 
foundation to work with offenders would therefore need to encompass a way of allowing 
workers to still feel secure even whilst using their discretion.   
 
A third theme from the review (McNeill et al., 2010) highlighted the importance of  
organisational culture and values. If changes were explicitly in tune with the values and 
agreed purpose of the agency, then they were easier to implement. Clearly, changes in the 
direction of agreed values (of workers and agency) should reduce disjuncture and should 
be welcomed. However, as already explored, the picture in CJSW is one characterised by 
tensions and competing values/objectives. McNeill et al. (2009) suggest that CJSW 
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operates in a marginal field, separate from other parts of the justice system, yet separate 
also from main stream social work. The authors highlight that moving from a welfare ethos 
to one primarily concerned with risk and public protection, has required a shift in attitude 
(embraced by some more easily than others) which allows workers to feel they might have 
gained more influence and increased the status of their marginalised position, and yet sits 
uncomfortably with their previous commitment to, and culture of, welfare. (McNeill et al., 
2009). This dilemma runs parallel to the ‘professional paradox’ explored above, but the 
authors suggest that the commitment to welfare has not yet been eclipsed (especially as 
social workers are educated during qualifying courses about the welfare roots of the 
profession). They agree that some adaptation to the risk agenda has taken place, but so has 
“misadaptation and revolt” (McNeill et al., 2009, p435). In fact the authors suggest that the 
eclipse of welfare would require a far longer period of time or a “violent rupture” in the 
progression of the profession (ibid. p435). In relation to the adoption of a desistance 
approach, then, and involving practitioners, there should in theory be a relatively easy 
transition, especially if McNeill et al. (2009) are correct and workers are still 
demonstrating loyalty to their welfare roots and social work values. However, there may be 
a threat to this optimistic picture in that McNeill et al. also found that social workers in 
CJSW have come to realise that “those welfare discourses and techniques that previously 
provided the capital in and through which they had historically traded had lost their 
political and cultural purchase” (ibid. p37). The authors suggest that as a consequence of 
this, social workers have had to adapt (not always willingly) to a public protection and risk 
management ethos, in the hope of regaining some status within a changing justice system. 
 Adding weight to this suggestion, Halliday et al. (2009) found that social workers in 
CJSW downplayed their welfare affiliations in order to gain status with those perceived of 
as having higher positioning on the hierarchy, for example, sheriffs.  It is suggested, 
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therefore, that how much an agency has adapted or held onto its traditions might vary from 
agency to agency (and from worker to worker?), and that this will therefore herald 
differences in how agencies will be able to change to a new, desistance based approach to 
working with offenders. 
 
The final theme of the review is that objectives needed to be clear, and, again, there had to 
be a commitment to, and a belief in, the underpinning values of the objectives, all of which 
would require a thoroughgoing engagement with the above issues of practitioner values, 
beliefs and thoughts about professionalism. In fact, the review quotes from the Scottish 
Prison Commission report (Scottish Government, 2008b) which states: “We need to find 
ways to release their (CJ social workers’) key professional skills in helping troubled and 
troubling people comply with supervision and helping them tackle their underlying 
problems” (McNeill et al., 2010, p38, emphasis added). The Scottish Prisons Commission 
recommends the creation of a National Community Justice Council to engage with the 
culture and practitioners in CJSW and to provide leadership. The review finally concludes 
that there is an urgent need for change, foremostly because of the changing system in 
CJSW to one based on pay-back (Scottish Government, 2008b). The review states that in 
order for the change to have any hope of success the central role of practitioners must be 
recognised (and it could be suggested that this should include hearing and addressing 
concerns about blame and the attractions of risk averse, defensive practice);  there needs to 
be open and full discussion of values (it could also be  suggested that this might lead to 
improvements in ethical climate and explicit recognition of the place of human rights and 
the discretion to ‘help’ when required) and discussion about how best to retain the valuable 
and unique parts of Scotland’s CJSW traditions (including the commitment to welfare, 
social justice and explicit recognition of the social work value base).  
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So, in summary, the ethical climate or culture of the organisation has emerged as a key 
theme in affecting culture change. Whilst the culture remains one characterised by ‘popular 
punitivism’, defensive, risk-averse practice and fear of being blamed, implementing a 
desistance approach to work with offenders seems almost impossible. If, however, values 
once more become a  centrally important subject for discussion, human rights become a 
necessary discussion topic (even within MAPPA meetings), supervision is ethically 
supportive, bad outcomes are seen as inevitable and not necessarily an indication of bad 
practice, decisions (good and bad) could then be discussed and analysed and CJSW could 
learn from ‘near misses’. All of this would allow for the participative, value-congruent 
implementation of a desistance paradigm and, hopefully, a substantial reduction in 
disjuncture.   
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
Section 2.1 set the scene for the research study by tracing the history of CJSW in Scotland, 
with a focus on the developments and changes that have taken place over the years. These 
developments have been analysed to show that public protection and risk management 
have come to dominate the work of CJSW, in contrast to its traditional endeavours of 
helping people with welfare and social needs. Ideas around social justice, deservedness and 
managing ‘incorrigibles’ were explored, having emerged as a theme throughout section 2. 
The picture which emerges from section 2.1 is of a service characterised by managerialism 
and within which technicist and procedural practice may well flourish. An overview of the 
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desistance literature was given in section 2.1.5 and how an approach based on a desistance 
framework could provide an effective antidote to technicist practice was discussed. 
 
Section 2.2 explored the concept of ‘disjuncture’ and brought together the key 
developments from section 2.1 and the key messages from the literature in regards to 
disjuncture. The suggestion was made that contemporary CJSW might well be a context 
within which workers could experience disjuncture. Section 2.2 also explored how 
traditional social work values and approach to the work, characterised by helping with 
needs, building relationships and caring about service users, still had significant value, in 
terms of reducing disjuncture but also in terms of practising effectively. These ideas came 
together in a recognition that a desistance approach to work with offenders could 
comfortably embrace social work values, helping and caring work and was based on a 
robust body of evidence. The question was raised, therefore, as to why the impact of the 
desistance literature has been “muted” (McCulloch and McNeill, 2008, p155).  
 
Section 2.3 explored why it might be that a desistance approach would be difficult for 
CJSW to adopt. The influence of risk averse practice, the blame culture and workers’ pre-
occupation with ‘getting things right’ all have an influence. Ontological anxiety was 
explored in terms of a necessary consequence of adopting a desistance approach, and 
framed as a welcome concept, in contrast to ontological guilt or disjuncture. However, it 
was also recognised that any type of anxiety might be difficult for agencies to tolerate.  
From all of the above then, four main, independent variables can be drawn which might 
have a direct effect on a workers’ experience of disjuncture within the current context of 
CJSW (see sections 2.2.4 and 2.3.3). The variables are: 
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1. How agencies work with offenders. The less desistance focussed an agency is, the 
more disjuncture would be expected. 
 
2. Ethical climate. The less value discussion, reflective supervision and participation 
of workers in changes, the more disjuncture would be expected. 
 
3. Ontological guilt/anxiety. The less tolerant of anxiety an agency is perceived to be, 
the more disjuncture would be expected.  
 
4. Agency approach to risk. The more risk averse an agency is perceived to be, the 
more disjuncture would be expected. 
 
The suggestion is that the four, independent variables above might impact on a worker’s 
experience of disjuncture. The other issue from the literature worthy of investigation is 
that, if the above factors influence disjuncture, they may well vary from agency to agency 
and, thus, workers’ experience of disjuncture may also vary from agency to agency. The 
level of ‘disjuncture’ a worker experiences, therefore, may depend on where they work.  
 
The research questions which arise from the literature, therefore, are as follows: 
 
Does each of the independent variables contribute uniquely and significantly to workers’ 
reports of disjuncture? And 
 
Do different local authority settings produce different scores for the variables? 
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The aim of the primary research investigation which follows is to construct and test a 
model of the influences on ‘disjuncture’ in CJSW in Scotland. How this was undertaken is 
explained in the next section, ‘Methodology.’ 
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3 Methodology  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
From the review of the literature, four independent variables were distilled which may 
influence the level of ‘disjuncture’ a social worker in CJSW might experience. The four 
variables are: ‘how the agency works with offenders,’ ‘agency approach to risk,’ ‘ethical 
climate of the agency’ and ‘ontological anxiety/guilt.’ The study was designed to 
investigate the impact of each variable upon the fifth, dependent, variable, ‘disjuncture.’ If 
the variables do impact on disjuncture, it could be suggested that different local authorities, 
with possible differences in the above variables, would produce different levels of 
disjuncture. The research questions are therefore reiterated as follows: 
 
Does each of the independent variables contribute uniquely and significantly to workers’ 
reports of disjuncture? And 
 
Do different local authority settings produce different scores for the variables? 
 
The aim of the research is to construct a model of the influences on ‘disjuncture’ 
experienced by social workers in CJSW in Scotland, from the answers to the above 
research questions. 
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This methodology section discusses the rationale for adopting a within-stage mixed model 
study design (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004), which uses knowledge from two 
paradigms: positivist and interpretivist. The reasons behind this choice of research design 
(operationalised via questionnaires designed to elicit both quantitative and qualitative data) 
will be fully explored, and links from the literature review will be made explicit. The 
research questions are embodied in a proposed model of CJSW-related-disjuncture (CRD), 
demonstrating the suggested relationships between the four variables and disjuncture, 
which then provides the basis for a CRD questionnaire. The CRD questionnaire was tested 
for validity and reliability and ultimately provided data on social workers’ perceptions of 
disjuncture and the contributory factors. These data were then utilised to test the proposed 
model of CRD, and further analysis was undertaken to refine and modify said model. In 
conclusion, a new model of  Ethical Stress in CJSW in Scotland was produced. 
 
3.2 Design Perspective 
 
Carey (2009) stresses that the links between ontological assumptions, epistemological 
assumptions and methodology must be clearly and explicitly made.  In the current study, 
the different elements are linked as described in this section. 
 
Carey explains that ontological assumptions are “what the researcher understands reality to 
be like” (Carey, 2009, p68). The current study is based on my belief that social workers in 
CJSW may well experience ‘disjuncture’ due to the difficulty they may face in basing their 
practice upon their values. I hold this belief because CJSW in Scotland is located within 
wider social work departments of local authorities, shares the same value base as wider 
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social work departments and workers have had the same social work educational 
experience as social workers in other areas of the profession. The juxtaposition of this 
value ethos with the increasingly managerial and neo-liberal context of CJSW lends itself 
to the possibility that the experience of disjuncture may well result. The identified 
variables (‘how the agency works with offenders’, ‘the agency’s approach to risk’, ‘ethical 
climate of the agency’ and ‘ontological anxiety/guilt’) might influence the extent to which 
workers experience disjuncture, because they may impact on how easy or difficult it is for 
a social worker to employ desistance based, helping, relational and caring responses to 
service users; responses congruent with the value base of social work. I would also suggest 
that measures of the independent variables will vary from LA to LA, because of cultures 
and work practices which are specific to each LA, and will therefore result in the 
experience of disjuncture varying between LAs. 
 
From this ontology, then, follows the explicit definition of the kind of knowledge I would 
consider to be valid in this situation i.e. my epistemological assumptions (Carey, 2009). 
Clearly, empirical evidence is required to ascertain whether there are significant 
relationships between workers’ scores on the variables and on their experience of 
disjuncture, and to compare local authorities on the experience of disjuncture and on the 
other variables. Empirical knowledge comes from a positivist paradigm which, according 
to Rubin and Babbie (2001), is based on the central idea that scientific methods can be 
applied to the study of people. Carey (2009) suggests that positivist thinking proposes that 
studies must be undertaken objectively, with the aim of empirically testing and analysing 
variables and their connections. A positivist paradigm, then, would apply if my 
epistemological belief is that ‘disjuncture’ and the other independent variables are concepts 
in themselves which exist and can be measured. As this is my belief, I was confident in 
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locating the quantitative, measurable and statistically analysable sections of the CRD 
questionnaire within a positivist paradigm.  Within a positivist paradigm, the objectivity of 
the researcher is emphasised, which is promoted, in this case, through the use of 
questionnaires which were completed independently by respondents, but might have been a 
risk factor in the drawing up and selection of the questions to be asked, especially given 
my own stance regarding CJSW and social work values. Thus, the logical content analysis 
of the questionnaire is very important (See Section 3.4.3, Figure 2).  
 
The second part of the questionnaire comprised open-ended questions designed so that 
“participants can articulate and explore their views in more detail and depth” (Carey, 2009, 
p 125). This is more in keeping with an interpretivist paradigm, in that the free text 
answers should help to uncover “the meaning and ‘reality’ (or interpretation) of people’s 
experiences” (Carey, 2009, p 53). Written, free text comments from respondents were 
therefore obtained on each of the variables and on workers’ experience of disjuncture, to 
illuminate the quantitative data obtained. In other words, the qualitative data was required 
to make sense of the quantitative data and, thus, delve more deeply into respondents’ 
understanding of the underlying structures and influences upon the opinions explored by 
the quantitative questions. 
 
I might have chosen to construct a research design which was purely positivist, and based 
entirely on quantitative data, but discarded that option because I wanted to hear from social 
workers what they felt underpinned their answers. I wanted them to be able to articulate 
‘why’ they held the opinions they did and, thus, uncover the influencing factors they felt 
were important in relation to the variable being measured. Likewise, a purely interpretivist 
study design, undertaken with a smaller sample via interviews or focus groups would not 
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have allowed me to look for connections between variables nor compare LAs on the 
variables; one paradigm without the other would have rendered my study incomplete. 
 
In summary, positivist and interpretivist paradigms (the theoretical underpinnings) co-exist 
within the study design. Participants were studied objectively and data gathered were 
subject to statistical analysis, but participants were also asked to give voice to the 
meanings they made of their workplace realities. Therefore, a within-stage, mixed model 
design was utilized; that is, a questionnaire designed for quantitative data gathering and 
qualitative free text answers. 
 
3.3 Study Design 
 
McNeill at al. (2010) discuss the ‘double-marginalisation’ of criminal justice social work 
in that it neither fully belongs to the wider social work world, nor to the rest of the criminal 
justice system (see Section 5.3.2). Therefore, the authors suggest that cultures within 
CJSW agencies tend to self-perpetuate, with new workers learning from experienced 
workers and internalising rules, beliefs and approaches. It would therefore be logical to 
suggest that each local authority CJSW agency might have its own quite unique culture, 
dependant on worker composition, managerial style, supervision expectations and style, 
ethical climate, size, location etc.  CJSW agencies are underpinned by shared legislation 
and policy, but within those restrictions, a variety of interpretations and priorities might 
exist. For example, Kemshall (1998) suggests that managers might have a lack of trust in 
social workers and therefore be reluctant to ‘allow’ autonomy: “This can result in over-
proceduralisation to alleviate managerial anxiety, or to alleviate a lack of confidence in 
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front-line operations” (Kemshall, 1998, p70). Clearly, this is one element of ‘culture’ 
which might vary from agency to agency. 
 
Culture is defined by Brown (1998) as “the pattern of beliefs, values and learned ways of 
coping with experience…and which tend to be manifested in (the organisation’s) material 
arrangements and in the behaviours of its members” (Brown, 1998, p9). Given the ‘double-
marginalisation’ of CJSW, then, beliefs and manifest behaviours (and the consequent 
experience of disjuncture) might indeed vary from local authority to local authority as 
people ‘learn’ ways of coping and develop beliefs, values and behaviour congruent with 
the agency. Alternatively, social workers might find themselves at odds with the culture, 
and therefore might experience significant disjuncture as already covered. 
 
This idea, combined with the literature covered thus far, stressing the importance of the 
ethical climate and culture to the prevalence of ‘disjuncture’ means that the extent to which 
workers experience ‘disjuncture’ might well depend on the agency they work within.  This 
study, therefore, must take account of these possible variations, and not assume that there 
is a nationwide, homogeneous CJSW culture. It must, in fact, avoid the error of 
“overgeneralization” (Rubin and Babbie, 2001, p15), that is, the assumption that findings 
in one agency can be ‘generalised’ to other agencies because of their shared remit.  As has 
been discussed, specific cultures are too powerful an influence on this particular area of 
study to make such an assumption. Also, because of the need to make comparisons 
between agencies, the sample size needed to be large enough to allow statistical analysis. 
 
Before discussing specific methods used, the proposed model of ‘disjuncture,’ constructed 
from the four variables drawn from the literature needs to be demonstrated. It is this model 
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which the research study tested out. In other words, were the variables connected to 
‘disjuncture’ in the way suggested from the literature? The suggestion, upon which the 
research questions are based, is that there may be a model of CJSW-related disjuncture, 
within which the possible variations in culture mentioned above can be taken account of. 
The two columns in the table (Figure 1) comprise opposite ends of the CJSW-related 
disjuncture model. It is suggested that the elements in column 1 will show a relationship, 
as will the elements in column 2.  Therefore, it is hypothesised that if an agency is 
characterised by strong risk-aversion, procedural practice with offenders, ontological guilt 
(but little ontological anxiety) and managerial and procedural supervision/culture, then the 
workers will experience significant disjuncture.  The more an agency moves away from the 
above description towards one characterised by the elements in the second column, then 
the hypothesis would suggest that workers’ disjuncture would reduce. 
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Figure 1: CJSW-Related Disjuncture 
 
 (Column 1) 
Workers experience 
significant disjuncture 
(Column 2) 
Workers experience 
negligible disjuncture 
Perception of risk practices Strong risk aversion and 
perception of blame culture 
Risk taking supported and 
perception of supportive 
culture. Bad outcomes 
recognised as inevitable. 
Type of work with 
offenders 
Procedural, technicist 
practice. No room for 
discretion 
Responsivity promoted. 
Desistance approaches 
implemented. Workers 
‘help’ and ‘care’. 
Ontological concepts No ontological anxiety- 
‘safe’ options. Existence of 
ontological guilt 
Agency supportive of the 
existence of ontological 
anxiety. 
Perception of culture Supervision is managerial. 
Overall culture managerial 
and process driven. 
Supervision accommodates 
discussion of value positions. 
Overall culture innovative 
and responsive. 
 
The four independent variables shown in Figure 1, and the dependent variable ‘disjuncture’ 
needed to be, therefore, quantified and measured in a large sample of criminal justice 
social workers. In this way, the connections between the variables could be explored. 
Engel and Schutt (2009) suggest that “operationalization is the process of connecting 
concepts to observations” (Engel and Schutt, 2009, p76). Therefore, CJSW-related 
disjuncture was the concept under investigation, connected to the four variables above. The 
next step, then, was for the four variables to be ‘operationalised’ by distilling specific 
questions from each of them. The concept of CJSW-related disjuncture would then be 
connected to observations which, in this case, were the questionnaire answers.  Methods 
used for exploring the research questions will now be examined. 
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3.4 Methods 
 
This section of the methodology will “describe the exact steps that … (were) undertaken to 
address…(the) hypothesis or research questions” (Rudestam and Newton, 2007, p87), in 
other words, the methods used.  
3.4.1 Ethical Approval 
 
I applied for ethical approval for the study from The University of Dundee’s University 
Research Ethics Committee (UREC), and was granted permission to embark on my study 
on 7
th
 November, 2011 (see Appendix 1 and 2). UREC’s code of practice is based on the 
three central principles of ‘informed consent,’ ‘confidentiality’ and ‘respect’ (University of 
Dundee, 2012). To obtain approval, I had to ensure that participants were well informed 
about the study. I did this by giving brief details in the email which was sent requesting 
that they take part, and including the link to the questionnaire, but also by including as a 
first page, a participant information sheet which covered details of what the study was 
about, what the information would be used for, how anonymity could be guaranteed, who 
would have sight of the data and who to contact if the participant had any questions. I also 
made sure that participants knew they could opt out of completing the questionnaire at any 
time. Informed consent was assumed by the participant then agreeing to participate, in 
other words, “consent by participation” (University of Dundee, 2012, p2). Confidentiality 
was ensured by not using names or LA identification in any of the written material which 
came from the data, and by ensuring that the data would be stored in line with data 
protection legislation.  Finally, participants were treated respectfully in all email 
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correspondence and I will disseminate my findings to those LAs taking part once the 
findings have been judged to be of an acceptable standard. 
 
3.4.2 Participants 
 
In order to answer the research questions, several criminal justice agencies were studied to 
test the connections between variables in the whole sample, but also to find out whether 
there were significant differences between agencies, thus answering both research 
questions. According to May (1993) sampling does not necessarily mean sampling 
individuals only, but that there can be a variety of units of analysis, in this case both 
individual social workers (research question 1) and local authority CJSW agencies 
(research question 2). Taking into consideration time and resource implications and the 
need to obtain permission from each local authority, the choice was made to include four 
local authorities in the study and to choose contrasting settings, that is, two urban and two 
more rural LAs. This allowed for comparison between four settings/four cultures as well as 
generating a large sample of individual social workers for statistical analysis. I decided not 
to choose the LA where I had worked in CJSW for approximately 12 years due to the 
possibility that the completion of the questionnaire would have been affected by existing 
relationships I have with some of the respondents. I might also have been less objective 
during the analysis of the data due to predetermined ideas about the agency. 
 
240 basic grade social workers across the four LAs were sent questionnaires via email. I 
obtained permission by writing to the head of service in each LA, describing my study 
requirements to them and sharing a ‘word’ version of my on-line questionnaire with them 
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so that they could see every question which was to be asked. Each head of service then 
obtained permission from within their LA and forwarded a contact name to me (usually a 
member of administration staff) who was then responsible for sending out my explanatory 
email and link to the ‘Bristol Online Survey’ questionnaire. After the initial email had been 
distributed, I sent two reminder emails, again, containing the link. I was very clear in my 
correspondence with the LAs that only front line, basic grade, CJSW social workers should 
be asked to complete the questionnaire as I wanted to hear from people who actually did 
the face-to-face work with offenders.  The whole premise of my research study was that 
within the arena of actual work with offenders lies the potential for ‘disjuncture,’ so my 
target group of responders had to be the ones doing that work. I had to know in advance 
that my questionnaire would reach a sufficient number of social workers to probably obtain 
a large enough return sample to undertake the statistical research required (see Section 
3.4.4). 103 questionnaires were returned, which was a response rate of 43%.  Three of the 
questionnaires, however, had to be removed because the social workers who completed 
them worked with victims of domestic violence rather than directly with offenders. This 
left a usable sample of 100, the equivalent of a 42% response rate.  
 
3.4.3 Instrumentation 
 
The model of CRD suggested from the literature was operationalised by translating the 
model into a questionnaire format (See appendix 3). Therefore, the four independent 
variables were measured by measuring a set of questions pertaining to that variable. The 
worker’s experience of ‘disjuncture’ was then measured by a set of questions pertaining to 
disjuncture. Questions were Likert-type, with measures of ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly 
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disagree.’ Questionnaires were chosen as the instrument because, as Rubin and Babbie 
(2001) state, “surveys are…excellent vehicles for measuring attitudes and orientations in a 
large population” (Rubin and Babbie, 2001, p361). May (1993), however, suggests that 
there are some drawbacks with questionnaires such as they do not allow for probing below 
the surface of the answer. This, of course, is true in the case of the quantitative data 
gathering section of the questionnaire, but the opportunity for respondents to make free 
text comments on each of the question areas,  hopefully addressed that concern to some 
degree. Respondents were able to make comment on anything they wished to, at the end of 
each section. May also points out that response rate might be low, and will depend on the 
questionnaire being of interest to the respondents. According to the literature examined 
thus far, the subject of value-behaviour congruence can produce strong feeling for workers, 
and the usable response rate of 42% was not entirely unexpected. 
 
I decided that questions would start with “classification questions” (May, 1993, p77), for 
example, age, gender and years in criminal justice statutory work. This information would 
allow, during analysis, to ascertain if any of those variables were having a significant 
influence on the results. 
 
Validity 
 
The first step in drawing up a questionnaire is distilling the questions from each of the 
variables and, in this way, operationalising the variable and shaping the content and  
validity of the questionnaire (Rudestam and Newton, 2007). Validity is the strength of any 
tool in actually measuring what it sets out to measure (Fischer and Corcoran, 2007). 
Questions are drawn from “the theoretical and empirical literature and surveying the 
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opinion of experts” (Rudestam and Newton, 2007, p 98). To this end, then, the literature 
review was revisited and, according to the literature, questions pertaining to each of the 
variables were identified.  
 
Having identified an initial pool of questions, the next step was to undertake a ‘logical 
content analysis,’ which is “the procedure the instrument developer used to evaluate the 
content of the items” (Fischer and Corcoran, 2007, p13).  In order to be confident in the 
‘logical content validity’ of the questionnaire, I had to be able to explicitly demonstrate the 
logic and literature base for each question. The ‘logical content analysis’ is therefore 
demonstrated in Figure 2: 
 
Figure 2: Logical Content Analysis of Questionnaire 
 
Question Underpinning Literature 
Variable: How we work with offenders:  
We work with offenders mainly via set 
programmes of work (usually from a manual 
or via prescripted sessions) 
The criticisms of stand-alone 
‘programmed’ work not allowing workers 
to be responsive and to ‘help’ when 
necessary (McNeill et al. 2005; Fenton, 
2012a) 
I am encouraged by my agency to really get 
to know the offender and to build a 
relationship with them 
Importance of relationship (McNeill et al., 
2005). Desistance theory (e.g. McCulloch 
and McNeill, 2008; Farrall, 2002 etc.) 
My agency allows me autonomy to help 
people with their own individual problems 
Desistance theory. The importance of this 
in reducing experience of disjuncture (e.g. 
Kosny and Eakin, 2008) 
My agency promotes a desistance approach to 
work with offenders i.e. building a 
relationship, supporting the offenders own 
endeavour or stop offending etc. 
Desistance theory. 
I am able to do the above ‘helping’ and 
welfare work explicitly  
As above 
  
 
129 
I am only able to do the ‘helping’ and 
responsive work quietly and discreetly 
“Quiet and discreet” welfare work going on 
(McNeill, 2004) 
My agency supports the belief that helping 
my clients is legitimate as an end in itself 
The illumination of this point in Key 
practice skills, (McNeill et al., 2005) 
My agency supports the belief that helping 
offenders is only legitimate as a component 
of reducing offending 
As above – is it still ambiguous? 
My agency is concerned with doing things 
‘to’ clients to stop them offending rather than 
working ‘with’ them 
Cognitive-behavioural group work (e.g. 
Kendall, 2004) versus desistance 
approaches (e.g. Farrall, 2002) 
As an agency, we give importance to social 
capital (i.e. clients’ links and bonds the 
community and other people) 
Desistance theory 
As an agency, we are more concerned with 
risk management than issues of welfare 
McNeill and Whyte (2007) public 
protection or rehabilitation as priority? Has 
public protection supplanted welfare work? 
Croall (2005) 
My agency is more concerned with public 
protection that with the welfare of the client 
As above 
Helping with welfare problems (even if not 
directly criminogenic) is core to the agency’s 
work 
As above. McNeill et al. (2005), helping is 
a legitimate endeavour in its own right. 
My agency really encourages me to 
empathise with the clients I am working with 
Desistance theory. Ethics of care(Manning, 
1998) 
I have the opportunities to get to know my 
clients well enough to really understand them 
As above. Gregory (2010) 
Understanding things from my client’s point 
of view is seen as irrelevant by my agency 
As above. The importance of ‘sympathetic 
understanding’ (Ethics of care, Manning, 
1998) 
My agency encourages me to try to get to 
know the social network surrounding my 
clients 
As above 
My agency encourages me to engage with 
clients’ families as a matter of course 
As above 
My agency encourages me to care about the 
clients I work with 
As above 
Variable: Ethical climate of the agency:  
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Supervision is mainly about following 
procedures and meeting key performance 
indicators. 
The trend for supervision to become 
managerial and therefore not allow 
ethically sensitive discussion of values 
(essential for the reduction of disjuncture) 
Beddoe (2010). Also, Calderwood et al., 
2009 
Supervision allows me time and space to 
discuss my work properly, including issues of 
values 
As above 
In my workplace, discussion of values and 
ethics is encouraged 
The importance of the ethical climate in 
reducing disjuncture (O’Donnell et al., 
2008, Calderwood et al., 2009, Kosny and 
Eakin, 2008). Also McNeill et al., 2010 
In my workplace, values are seen as having 
an important place in decision making 
Calderwood et al., 2009. Different value 
positions can be aired. Values considered 
explicitly. 
I would describe the culture of my agency as 
responsive to service users’ needs 
Desistance approach – does the culture 
allow it?  
I would describe the culture of my agency as 
procedurally driven 
As above 
Management in my agency impose new 
procedures on us without consultation 
An element of ethical climate (McNeill et 
al., 2010 – importance of involving 
workers) 
Staff are involved in any changes proposed to 
the working practices of the agency 
As above 
I would describe the culture of the agency as 
‘managerial’ 
The state of statutory social work? (e.g. 
Jones, 2003; Webb, 2006) 
My workload is such that it impacts on the 
time I have to work with service users in the 
way I want 
Important for desistance approaches and 
reflective of the culture (i.e. time required 
for responsive work and to avoid technical 
practice). Added after consultation with 
expert panel. 
Management recognizes that workloads need 
to be at a level that allows for time for 
thorough work with service-users to be done 
As above 
Variable: Agency approach to risk:  
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A ‘blame culture’ exists within our agency Phillips’ (2009) – workers’ perceptions of 
being blamed if things go wrong and the 
restrictive effect this might have on 
workers – leading to procedural practice 
that increases disjuncture. Also, Webb 
(2006), Littlechild (2010) etc. 
I am allowed to take risks in my work Littlechild’s (2010) work about unrealistic 
expectations that workers will always ‘get 
it right’, and the value of agencies’ 
acceptance of inevitable poor outcomes. 
The link this has to decreased disjuncture 
and autonomous practice. Also, Taylor, 
2007. 
I am allowed to work innovatively with 
service users 
As above 
My agency is ultimately concerned with 
staying ‘safe’ 
Kemshall (2003),Webb (2006), Phillips 
(2009), Taylor (2007), Barry (2007) etc. 
‘Risk averse’ describes my agency well As above 
We rely on actuarial and standardized 
methods of risk assessment 
As above 
Really getting to know the client is important 
in our risk assessment process 
McNeill et al. (2010) 
We concentrate more on risk control than 
working to produce change in clients’ lives 
Hudson (2001), Barry (2007) 
We balance risk assessment with explicit 
consideration of the client’s human rights 
Hudson (2001) 
There is an expectation from management 
that if someone re-offends, we should have 
known and prevented it 
Phillips (2009), Littlechild (2010), Webb 
(2006) etc. The assumption that a bad 
outcome equates to bad practice 
(McDonald, 1990a, 1990b; Hollis and 
Howe (1990)  
If there is a bad outcome with one of our 
cases, bad practice is assumed as a starting 
point 
As above 
It is accepted by my agency that even good 
decisions can result in bad outcomes 
As above. An acceptance that bad outcomes 
can sometimes result from good decisions. 
The most important thing about risk 
management is that I can show I have 
practiced with ‘due diligence’ should 
something go wrong 
Barry (2007) Workers feeling the 
temptation to be risk averse. Phillips (2009) 
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I report throughcare clients to the Parole 
Board now for things we would have dealt 
with internally in the past 
Scotland’s Choice (Scottish Government, 
2008b). Harding (2006) 
Structured risk assessment tools make my 
work more professional 
Robinson (2003) 
Variable: Ontological anxiety/guilt:  
In an ideal social work world I should be able 
to act in good faith and be guided by my 
conscience 
Taylor (2007) 
In the real social work world I am not able to 
do that 
As above.  
I am worried by the anxiety that having 
autonomy can produce 
Autonomy can lead to the ability to take 
risks, but often produces (healthy) 
ontological anxiety and should reduce 
disjuncture, people are working in 
accordance with their ‘inner voice’  
(Taylor, 2007). 
My agency tolerates work which might 
produce anxiety 
As above. Barry (2007) 
I wish I had more autonomy As above. Desistance requires autonomy. 
But would workers want it? (Phillips, 2009, 
Barry, 2007) 
I sometimes have to follow procedures or 
take action that doesn’t feel ‘right’ in terms of 
my conscience 
Ontological guilt (Taylor, 2007) 
When I have to follow procedures that don’t 
feel ‘right’ it causes stress 
As above 
I am happy to follow procedures to avoid 
being blamed if things go wrong 
Phillips (2009): the fear of being ‘blamed’ 
I am confident enough in the support of my 
agency to act in accordance with my 
conscience 
Taylor (2007): reduction of ontological 
guilt. 
I act in accordance with my conscience 
without the support of my agency 
Risking the ‘safe’ option by subverting an 
agency risk averse approach in order to 
avoid ontological guilt (e.g. Sawyer, 2009) 
I am not able to act in accordance with my 
conscience 
Ontological guilt (Taylor, 2007) 
In my work, I constantly have to follow 
procedures without using discretion 
Risk aversion, procedural practice (Jones, 
2001; Barry, 2007; Webb, 2006 etc.) 
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Constantly following procedures can become 
dispiriting 
As above 
I sometimes choose not to follow procedures As above 
If I ever choose not to follow procedures, I 
don’t tell my supervisor or manager 
Ignoring the policy/procedure to ‘do the 
right thing’ (Sawyer, 2009) 
It is important I always follow procedures 
regardless of what I feel about them 
As above. Showing ‘due diligence’ 
(Phillips, 2009) 
I follow procedures diligently so that I am 
protected if something goes wrong  
As above 
 
 
Similarly, the questions on ‘disjuncture’ required tracking to the literature sources to give 
them ‘logical content validity.’ Firstly, however, the question of how the questionnaire set 
out to measure the concept of disjuncture must be addressed. Di Franks (2008) stated “The 
concept of ‘disjuncture’ was operationalized by Likert-type scale questions that measured 
the tension that social workers feel as a result of implementing or not implementing 
behaviours in regard to the Code (NASW Code of Ethics)” ( Di Franks, 2008, p2). Di 
Franks gives the example: “I experience stress because I am not always able to protect my 
clients’ rights to privacy..” (ibid. p2). Di Franks was specifically looking at the values 
explicitly addressed by the NASW Code of Ethics, whereas in the current study, 
disjuncture as a result of the concepts identified from the review of the literature was being 
explored; for example being able to help, being able to care, being able to respond as 
required and being able to really get to know the service-user. Questions, and their basis in 
literature, were, therefore, as follows (Figure 3): 
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Figure 3: Logical Content Analysis of 'Disjuncture' Questions 
 
I experience stress because I am not always 
able to help my clients in the way I want to 
The importance of being able to help when 
required – the central importance of this to 
workers’ experience of disjuncture (Kosny 
and Eakin, 2008; Jones, 2001; Preston-
Shoot, 2003) 
I experience stress because I am not always 
able to respond in the way I want to clients 
As above 
I experience stress because I am not able to 
treat my clients with the care they need 
Manning (1998);  McNeill et al. (2005). 
Key Practice Skills consistent with 
important elements of an ethics of care 
approach, and this in turn impacting on 
disjuncture (Kosny and Eakin, 2008) 
I experience stress because I am not really 
able to get to know my clients 
The centrality of this in taking a desistance 
approach, and the consequent reduction in 
disjuncture (Farrall, 2002; McNeill et al., 
2005 and Kosny and Eakin, 2008)  
I experience stress because I am unable to 
base my practice on my values 
A general indication from the worker about 
their overall experience of disjuncture (Di 
Franks, 2008) 
Not being able to get to know, help, 
respond and care about my clients reduces 
my job satisfaction 
Di Franks (2008), O’Donnell et al. (2008) 
Not being able to get to know, help, 
respond and care about my clients makes 
me consider changing my job 
As above 
 
 
At the end of each question section, respondents were asked “Is there anything you would 
like to clarify about your answers to this section’s questions?” This allowed respondents to 
articulate the actual issues they felt were important, rather than being constrained by 
specific areas of enquiry. Respondents were free to express any thoughts they may have in 
relation to the question area, regardless of the subject of enquiry via the Likert-type 
questions. Thus, a layer of understanding in relation to the empirical data gathered, was 
obtained. 
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According to Rudestam and Newton (2007), the next step in designing an instrument or 
questionnaire is to establish face validity and to check for clarity. They suggest that this be 
done by establishing a group of experts who would be tasked with checking the 
questionnaire. I, therefore, identified a group of nine criminal justice social workers, 
several still in practice and others who had moved into academia from practice, and asked 
them to examine the questionnaire and give their opinions on its validity. The group of 
experts considered the questionnaire and concluded that the questions did seem to be 
measuring what they were attempting to measure. They also made some suggestions about 
inclusions and amendments to the questions. All of the suggestions were considered and 
included. 
 
The final validity check I made was undertaken once the data had been collected, and is 
known as ‘convergent validity’ (Fischer and Corcoran, 2007). In essence, this is a measure 
of whether the identified questionnaire items actually do correlate with what they are 
attempting to measure. Therefore, in this case, does a social worker’s measure of 
disjuncture correlate with each of the questionnaire’s question section’s scores (that is, 
each of the variables)? In other words, “do scores on a measure converge with theoretically 
relevant variables” (Fischer and Corcoran, 2007, p14).  Therefore, validity was 
investigated by examining whether the scores for the “theoretically relevant variables” (the 
question sections which operationalise the variables) do in fact correlate (or converge) with 
the scores for disjuncture (see Figure 1, for an illustration of how the variables are linked 
to each other and to the dependent variable, ‘disjuncture’).  
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Figure 4: Correlations between all variables 
   
    
Work 
with 
Offenders 
Ethical 
Climate 
Approach 
to Risk 
Ontological 
Guilt 
Disjunctur
e 
Work with 
Offenders 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .763(**) .752(**) .578(**) .559(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 100 100 
Ethical Climate Pearson 
Correlation 
.763(**) 1 .840(**) .677(**) .699(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000   .000 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 100 100 
Approach to Risk Pearson 
Correlation 
.752(**) .840(**) 1 .742(**) .620(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000   .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 100 100 
Ontological Guilt Pearson 
Correlation 
.578(**) .677(**) .742(**) 1 .661(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000   .000 
N 100 100 100 100 100 
Disjuncture Pearson 
Correlation 
.559(**) .699(**) .620(**) .661(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000   
N 100 100 100 100 100 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Pallant (2010) suggests that the measures above demonstrate “large” correlations because 
they lie between 0.5 and 1.0 (Pallant, 2010, p134). The questionnaire can, therefore, be 
considered to have robust convergent validity due to large correlations the variables have 
with each other, and with the dependent variable, disjuncture. 
 
In summary, then, validity of the questionnaire was demonstrated by logical content 
analysis, face validity and convergent validity. It seems that the instrument is, as much as 
can be ascertained, measuring what it set out to measure. 
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Reliability 
 
According to Rudestam and Newton (2007), the next step is to ensure that the CJSW-
related disjuncture questionnaire is reliable. In other words, is it stable and will it measure 
the same thing with each administration (Fischer and Corcoran, 2007)? There are several 
ways in which this can be ascertained, for example, the questionnaire could be 
administered twice, with a time lapse between i.e. test-retest reliability (Fischer and 
Corcoran, 2007). This would however, put a significant additional burden on the social 
workers who were asked to complete the questionnaire, and it could be suggested that there 
might be poor returns for the second administration. Alternatively, two versions of the tool 
could be administered and checked for similar measurements i.e. parallel  forms reliability 
(Fischer and Corcoran, 2007). This is not possible, however, as there is only one version of 
the CRD questionnaire. 
 
Measuring internal consistency is another way to check for reliability, that is, finding out if 
all the questions are actually tapping into the same phenomenon (in this case the relevant 
variable). In essence the questions in the questionnaire’s variable sub scales should 
correlate with each other and this can be measured by determining Cronbach’s coefficient 
alpha, which is a statistical measure of the correlation  between questionnaire items, in this 
case, questions (ibid). A Cronbach’s coefficient alpha of 0.8 or above is a measure of good 
internal consistency. For the purposes of this study, then, each of the variable sub scales 
were analysed for reliability, once the data were gathered, with the following results:  
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Figure 5: Internal Consistency of the Questionnaire Sub-Sections 
 
Variable Cronbach’s coefficient alpha 
How we work with offenders .918 
Ethical Climate .917 
Perception of Risk Approach .872 
Ontological Concepts .703 
Disjuncture .892 
 
 
According to Pallant (2010), values above .7 are acceptable, and values above .8 are good. 
Clearly, therefore, the questionnaire sub scales demonstrate robust internal consistency.   
 
3.4.4 Data Analysis 
 
Quantitative 
 
For the quantitative analysis of the data, I used SPSS (2007) for Windows, version 16.0. 
The analysis began with descriptive statistics to explore the demographics of the group of 
respondents (N=100). Secondly, tests for normality were executed to allow further 
statistical testing based on the assumption of normality. Convergent validity and reliability 
were then tested for as discussed earlier. 
 
Research question 1 was then analysed by running a standard multiple regression which 
measures whether a set of variables (‘how the agency works with offenders,’ ‘agency 
approach to risk,’ ontological anxiety/guilt’ and ‘ethical climate of the agency’) can predict 
an outcome (in this case the experience of ‘disjuncture’). In order to run a standard 
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multiple regression, the sample size must conform to the formula N>50 + 8m where m= 
number of independent variables (Pallant, 2010). In this case, m=4, so 82 subjects are 
required. As N=100, the sample was big enough. 
 
Results from the standard multiple regression demonstrated that the combined variables 
were able to predict the experience of disjuncture to a significant level (p<.001). Further 
investigation, however, demonstrated that only ‘ethical climate of the agency’ and 
‘ontological anxiety/guilt’ were in fact making significant and unique contributions to the 
experience of disjuncture, ‘approach to working with offenders’ and ‘approach to risk’ 
were not. To illustrate this, the connections were further explored by running a series of 
standard multiple regressions, with each of the variables as the outcome variable. These 
results are shown in Figure 13 and depicted diagrammatically in Diagram 1. 
 
Due to the unexpected interconnections between the variables, ‘disjuncture’ and 
‘ontological anxiety/guilt’ were combined into one new variable called ‘ethical stress.’ The 
viability of this was investigated by ascertaining the internal consistency of the new sub 
scale. The Cronbach’s coefficient alpha was found to be .780. Although this demonstrates 
acceptable internal consistency, the new scale did have substantially lower internal 
consistency than the ‘disjuncture’ sub scale alone (.892), although higher than the 
ontological anxiety/guilt scale alone (.703).  When I examined the column ‘Cronbach’s 
alpha if item is deleted’ I found that one question, 13a, appeared to be having a powerful 
effect on the internal consistency. Without question 13a, Cronbach’s coefficient alpha was 
.817, which is a ‘good’ level of internal consistency (Pallant, 2010). Question 13a is: “In 
an ideal social work world, I should be able to act in good faith and be guided by my 
conscience,” and, upon reflection, I realised that this question was incompatible with the 
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old ‘ontological anxiety/guilt’ scale as well as the new ‘ethical stress’ scale. Question 13a 
measured what social workers think an ideal world looks like, whereas the sub scale 
‘ontological anxiety/guilt’ attempted to measure the level of (healthy) anxiety an agency 
and the individual within that agency can tolerate. Within the hypothesis of the study, this 
scale could justifiably be merged with ‘disjuncture’ because I am suggesting that the more 
responsive and un-risk averse a social worker can be, the less disjuncture/ontological guilt 
they should experience. In other words, ontological anxiety is another aspect to disjuncture 
(the less anxiety, the more ontological guilt (disjuncture) as explained in Section 2.3) 
rather than a separate variable.  Returning to question 13a, I realised that it was, indeed, a 
poor question which enquired about the wrong concept and, therefore, removed question 
13a from the new ‘ethical stress’ scale. As a further check on the new scale, I ran a 
principle components analysis (PCA) (see Section 4.5). Another series of standard multiple 
regressions were then conducted to verify the significant and contributory relationships 
between ‘ethical stress,’ ‘how the agency works with offenders,’ ‘agency approach to risk’ 
and ‘ethical climate.’ Results are shown in Diagram 2 and Figures 15, 16, 17 and 18. 
 
Research question 2 was explored by running a one-way between groups multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) to compare the local authority groupings on the variables 
(that is the four variables, which include the ‘new’ variable, ‘ethical stress’).   According to 
Pallant (2010), in order to run the test, there must be more subjects in each cell than the 
number of variables (in this case, four). As LA4 returned 5 responses (the lowest return 
rate of the four LAs) and thus exceeded the minimum, all four LAs could be included in 
the MANOVA. Results can be found in Section 4.6. 
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Finally, in terms of quantitative data, an emergent finding which suggested differences 
between older, more experienced workers and younger, less experienced workers, was 
investigated by undertaking a correlation between years of experience and all four 
variables; and a partial correlation of the same relationships but controlling for age. Also a 
MANOVA was conducted on two distinct groups of workers: those who started in CJSW 
before 1997, and those who started afterwards. Results can be found in Section 4.8. and 
Figures 20 and 21. 
 
Qualitative Data 
 
To undertake an analysis of the free text comments, I printed out the comment sheets from 
the combined questionnaires and read the comments over several times. I immersed myself 
in the data and allowed themes to ‘emerge’ inductively (Carey, 2009).  I might have 
chosen a system of analysis whereby the categories or themes were pre-determined (Smith, 
2009), but decided against this as I wanted to ascertain workers’ actual feelings about the 
work, rather than to simply look for supporting comments for my statistical results. As I 
had asked respondents to comment on anything they wanted to in relation to the topic, I did 
not then want to diminish the full expression of their thoughts by only looking for themes 
as identified by me. Smith (2009) discusses keeping in mind at all times the relevance and 
connection the theme has to the original research questions, and as I became very familiar 
with the data and the emerging themes, I found I was indeed able to begin to make 
meaning of the comments in terms of the research questions. Once the themes began to 
emerge, I was able to code the comments into the emerging themes and thus was able to 
ascertain which themes were most prevalent. I then counted the number of comments 
which made reference to each theme (and some comments made reference to more than 
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one theme, so were coded into all relevant themes) and, finally, was able to rank the 
themes in terms of their prevalence. The themes and their order of prevalence are 
demonstrated in Figure 19. 
 
3.5 Limitations 
 
One of the limitations of the study is that, because of resource implications, only four LA 
agencies were studied. One of the smaller LAs only returned five responses, which just 
reached the minimum requirement for MANOVA testing. A clearer, and maybe different, 
picture might have emerged had all the LAs in Scotland been studied. 
 
As will be discussed in Section 5.2.6, the current study explored the importance of the LA 
agency in terms of the organisation, rather than the individual team cultures. Although this 
is thoroughly explored in Section 5.2.6, and the importance of the overall LA 
organisational culture highlighted, it may be that the study has missed some important 
features of culture by not drilling down into, and comparing, perceptions of the elements of 
team culture. 
 
Had I know in advance that the importance of the role of the senior social worker (SSW) in 
terms of sharing decision making with social workers, I would have included more tailored 
and specific questions in relation to the idea. Instead, I relied on unsolicited comments 
made throughout the study, and on the specific literature in relation to this (see Section 
5.2.3). Likewise, the SSW’s role in socialising new members of the team into the 
organisation and in setting the tone in terms of values and social justice commitment (see 
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Section 5.2.6) would have been very deserving of specific questions designed to 
investigate the concept more fully. 
 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this section, I have attempted to explain in detail what I did and why I did it, from 
questionnaire formulation to data analysis. Hopefully, this section, in conjunction with the 
ensuing ‘Results’ section, will create a logical and transparent link between the review of 
the literature and the discussion of the findings. 
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4  Results 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This section will explore the analysis of the data returned from the questionnaires. Of the 
240, 103 questionnaires were returned, fully completed. Three questionnaires were 
removed as the social workers worked with victims as opposed to offenders and the current 
study is about working directly with offenders. This left a sample of 100 (N=100), which is 
a usable response rate of 42%. 
 
An initial examination of the data found that 41% of respondents were from LA1, 19% 
from LA2, 35% from LA3 and 5% from LA4. 56% of respondents were women, and 44% 
were men. Mean age of respondents was 44.42, and the mean number of years experience 
in criminal justice social work was 9.31. To ensure that neither age, years of experience 
nor sex varied significantly from one local authority to another, a one way between-groups 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed on the dependent variables 
age, years of experience and sex. There was no significant difference between local 
authority groups, F(9, 229) = .860, p = .108. 
 
This section will, first of all, check for correlations between the variables to check and 
contextualise the measures of convergent validity (see Section 3.4.3). The research 
questions will then be explored, the qualitative data will be analysed and, finally, 
additional findings will be outlined. 
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4.2 Normality 
 
Before undertaking the analysis of the data, they required checking for normality: 
  
Figure 6: Normality Measures of the Variables 
 
  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov(a) Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Work with 
Offenders 
.106 100 .007 .980 100 .127 
Ethical Climate .095 100 .028 .975 100 .053 
Approach to Risk .105 100 .009 .960 100 .004 
Ontological Guilt .074 100 .200 .980 100 .134 
Disjuncture .097 100 .021 .985 100 .307 
Variable Totals .069 100 .200(*) .984 100 .250 
*  This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a  Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 
Results for all variables (apart from Ontological Guilt and Variable Totals which show a 
non-significant  Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic and therefore do not violate the assumption 
of normality) show that the assumption of normality has been violated because all 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics are significant.  However, according to Pallant (2010) this 
is not uncommon in larger samples. Pallant suggests inspecting the histogram distributions 
and the normal probability plots, all of which show reasonably normal spreads and normal 
probability plots (See Figure 7). Pallant (2010, p63) states that “a reasonably straight line 
suggests a normal distribution,” and lines were all reasonably straight. 
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Figure 7:  Normality graphs: 
 
Work with offenders:  
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Ethical Climate: 
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Approach to Risk: 
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Disjuncture: 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall, therefore, the histograms and normal probability plots demonstrate that it would 
be reasonable to proceed with the statistical tests which require normal distributions. 
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4.3 Convergent validity 
 
Firstly, correlations between each variable and disjuncture scores needed to be calculated. 
Do the variables correlate with experience of disjuncture as suggested, that is, all the 
independent variables would be expected to correlate with the level of disjuncture 
experienced as per the exploration of convergent validity in Section 3.4.3. 
 
According to Pallant (2010) the preliminary analysis for correlation should be the 
generation of scatter plots. Scatterplots are therefore shown in Figure 8 for each variable (x 
axis) against disjuncture scores (y variable): 
 
Figure 8: Scatter plots 
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Ethical climate 
 
 
 
 
Approach to Risk 
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Ontological Guilt 
 
 
All scatterplots were checked for outliers and cross checked for errors (violation of 
assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity).  No extreme outliers and no errors were 
found.  
 
The shape of the distributions suggest correlations and all distributions are in a positive 
direction. If the variables do indeed show statistically significant correlations, it will mean 
that as the scores for the variable increase, so does the reported experience of disjuncture. 
Correlations were then undertaken and results are shown in Figure 9: 
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Figure 9: Correlations Between Variables 
 
      
Work 
with 
Offenders 
Ethical 
Climate 
Approach 
to Risk 
Ontological 
Guilt 
Disjunctur
e 
Work with 
Offenders 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .763(**) .752(**) .578(**) .559(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 100 100 
Ethical Climate Pearson 
Correlation 
.763(**) 1 .840(**) .677(**) .699(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000   .000 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 100 100 
Approach to Risk Pearson 
Correlation 
.752(**) .840(**) 1 .742(**) .620(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000   .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 100 100 
Ontological Guilt Pearson 
Correlation 
.578(**) .677(**) .742(**) 1 .661(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000   .000 
N 100 100 100 100 100 
Disjuncture Pearson 
Correlation 
.559(**) .699(**) .620(**) .661(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000   
N 100 100 100 100 100 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
The data were analysed using Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient. All 
correlations were highly significant at the 0.01 level and strength of relationships were as 
shown in Figure 10: 
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Figure 10: Correlations Between the Independent Variables and 'Disjuncture' 
 
 
 Pearson Correlation Strength of 
Correlation 
Disjuncture and 
How we work with 
offenders 
.559 Large 
Disjuncture and 
ethical climate of 
the agency 
.699 Large 
Disjuncture and 
approach to risk 
.620 Large 
Disjuncture and 
Ontological Guilt 
.661 Large 
 
Pallant (2010) suggests that r values of .5 and above are ‘large.’ The ethical climate of the 
agency was most strongly correlated with workers’ experience of disjuncture, followed by  
ontological guilt, agency approach to risk and, finally, how the agency works with 
offenders. However, all variables were strongly correlated with disjuncture and, therefore, 
the questionnaire has convergent validity as outlined in Section 3.4.3. 
 
 
All variables also showed highly significant correlations with each other, the strongest 
relationship (r=.840) existing between the ethical climate of the agency and the agency 
approach to risk. The weakest relationship (r=.578 (still considered large) )  was between 
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how the agency works with offenders and ontological guilt. These results will be discussed 
later. 
 
4.4 Reliability 
 
As shown in Section 3.4.3, Figure 5, all the sub scales of the questionnaire demonstrated 
reliable internal consistency.  The scale for the variable ‘ontological anxiety/guilt’ had the 
lowest internal consistency with a Cronbach’s coefficient alpha of .703. However, this is, 
according to Pallant (2010), acceptable. 
 
4.5 Research Question 1. 
 
Does each of the independent variables contribute uniquely and significantly to workers’ 
reports of disjuncture? 
 
The statistical test conducted on the results was a standard multiple regression which can 
determine “how well a set of variables is able to predict a particular outcome” (Pallant, 
2010, p148). In this case, the “outcome” is experience of disjuncture. The test can also 
identify which variable is the best predictor of the outcome.  Before running the test, 
sample size must be checked to confirm conformity to the formula N>50 + 8m where m= 
number of independent variables (Pallant, 2010). In this case, m=4, so 82 subjects are 
required. As N=100, the sample is big enough. Next, the assumptions must be checked as 
follows. All independent variables correlate with disjuncture (already established) 
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although, Pallant (2010) advises not including independent variables with a correlation 
with another independent variable of  “.9 and above” (Pallant, 2010, p 151). Ethical 
climate and approach to risk produce  r=.840, which is the strongest correlation, and 
therefore the data shows no concerns. To look into the potential problem of 
multicollinearity further, the ‘collinearity diagnostics’ table was checked. Pallant warns 
against Tolerance values of less than .10 and none of the values reached that low level, 
suggesting no concerns. Pallant also suggests that VIF levels of more than 10 should be 
considered as concerning, and, again, none of the results reached that level. 
Multicollinearity appears, therefore, not to be a concern. 
 
Checking for normality, linearity, homoscedasticity and independence of residuals begins 
with an inspection of the graphs produced (see Figure 6), which showed no concerns. To 
check further for outliers, the  critical  Mahalanobis distance for 4 independent variables is 
identified as 18.47 (Pallant, 2010, p159). The maximum Mahal. Distance in the current 
data set is 14.06, which means there are no concerning outliers. Cook’s distance is .179, 
well below the problematic value of 1.0 (Pallant, 2010, p160). On the basis of the above, a 
standard multiple regression was subsequently conducted (See Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11: Model Summary of 'Disjuncture' 
 
Mode
l R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
1 .732(a) .536 .517 3.535 
a  Predictors: (Constant), Anxiety and autonomy totals, How we work with offenders 
totals, Ethical climate  totals, Risk totals 
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b  Dependent Variable: Disjuncture totals 
   
From the above, the identified variables explain 53.6% of the variance in disjuncture. The 
significance level for this result is p<.001. The model is, therefore, predicting disjuncture 
to a highly significant degree. 
 
The next step was to find out which of the variables are contributing to the outcome 
(disjuncture) and to what extent: 
 
Figure 12: Variables Contributing Significantly to ‘Disjuncture’ 
 
Independent Variable Beta Value 
Ethical climate of the agency .528 (sig=.000, p<.001) 
Ontological guilt .277 (sig=.004, p<.01) 
Work with Offenders .050 (sig=.662, p>.05 
Approach to risk .040 (sig=.780, p>.05) 
 
 
Therefore, the ‘ethical climate of the agency’ and ‘ontological guilt’ are making unique 
and significant contributions to workers’ experience of disjuncture. However, ‘how the 
agency works with offenders’ and the ‘agency approach to risk’ are not. This is surprising, 
and not in line with the initial hypothesis, which suggested that all four variables would 
contribute to workers’ experience of disjuncture.  
 
To explore, then, the actual connections between the 5 variables (including disjuncture), 
standard multiple regressions were conducted with each of the remaining variables as the 
‘outcome’ variable. Results are shown in Figure 13; 
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Figure 13: Significant Contributory Relationships Between Variables 
 
Outcome variable Variables Making 
Significant and 
Unique contributions 
to the outcome 
variable 
Beta values and 
significance 
Disjuncture Ethical Climate 
 
Ontological Guilt 
.528 (sig=.000, 
p<.001) 
.277 (sig=.004, 
p<.01) 
Ethical Climate Approach to risk 
 
Disjuncture 
 
Work with Offenders 
.486 (sig=.000, 
p<.001) 
.247 (sig=.000, 
p<.001) 
.251 (sig=.001, 
p<.01) 
Ontological Guilt Approach to risk 
 
Disjuncture 
.476 (sig=.001, 
p<.01) 
.309 (sig=.004, 
p<.01) 
Work with Offenders Ethical Climate 
 
Approach to risk 
.433 (sig=.001, 
p<.01) 
.397 (sig=.002, 
p<.01) 
Approach to risk Ethical climate 
 
Work with Offenders 
 
Ontological guilt 
.531 (sig=.000, 
p<.001) 
.252 (sig=.002, 
p<.01) 
.218 (sig=.001, 
p<.01) 
 
The above table details which of the variables contribute uniquely and significantly to each 
variable when it is considered as the outcome variable. As can be seen from the table, the 
variables are interconnected in quite a complex way. The relationships can be expressed 
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diagrammatically as follows (Diagram 1), with each arrow depicting the unique and 
significant contributory relationship from the table above. 
 
 
Diagram 1: Significant Contributory Relationships Between Variables 
 
 
 
As can be seen from the diagram above, ‘disjuncture’ and ‘ontological guilt’ (both ‘internal 
state’ variables) appear to be separated from ‘how the agency works with offenders’, 
‘agency approach to risk’ and ‘ethical climate’ (‘environmental’ variables). It was 
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suggested in the literature review that ontological guilt is a very similar concept to 
disjuncture in that both are concerned with the effects of not acting on the basis of values 
or conscience (Taylor, 2007). As the scores for this variable increased, a departure from 
healthy ontological anxiety to the more corrosive state of ontological guilt was 
demonstrated.  It would seem logical therefore, to combine the internal state variables from 
the diagram into one new variable, called ‘ethical stress’ which encompasses disjuncture 
and ontological guilt (see Section 2.3 for an exploration of the relationship between the 
two variables). The internal consistency of the new scale was checked (see Section 3.4.4), 
and the scale was slightly modified to give an internal consistency measure (Cronbach’s 
coefficient alpha) of .817. The scale therefore has good internal consistency. To further 
check that the new ‘ethical stress’ scale was viable, the questions were subjected to 
principal components analysis (PCA). The suitability of the data was first checked: 
inspection of the correlation matrix revealed the presence of many coefficients of .3 and 
above; the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value was .854 (well above the recommended level of .6) 
and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was statistically significant.  PCA revealed the presence of 
6 components with eigenvalues of over 1, explaining 34.0%, 11.0%, 6.6%, 5.3%, 4.9% and 
4.7% of the variance respectively. An inspection of the screeplot revealed a break after one 
component, and 19 out of the 23 questions loaded onto the first component.  The PCA and 
the good internal consistency of the new scale would, therefore, seem to support the 
decision to combine both variables into one, new variable. The new variable was then 
checked for normality and although the Kolmogorov-Smirnov value indicated a violation 
of normality, inspection of the graphs indicated a reasonably normal spread.  Skewness,  
was .018, a very slight clustering of scores towards the lower end of the scale. No 
significant difference was found in the ‘ethical stress’ scores for males (M= 71.59, SD= 
8.1) and females (M=68.71, SD=10.3; t(98)= -1.5, p=.13, two-tailed).  Returning to 
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Diagram 1, then, it can be seen that ‘disjuncture’ and ‘ontological anxiety/guilt’ would 
become one new variable, ‘ethical stress’ comprising the left hand side of a new diagram. 
‘Risk’ and ‘ethical climate’ would become the two central variables, and ‘how we work 
with offenders’ would form the right hand side of the diagram, which would now look like: 
 
Diagram 2: Significant Contributory Relationships Between Variables in New Model 
 
Ethical Stress
How we work with 
offenders
    
Risk
Ethical Climate
 
          
   
‘How we work with offenders’, and ‘ethical stress’ (new variable) are having independent, 
reciprocal and significant influences on ethical climate of the agency and approach to risk.  
 
To test the new model, a standard multiple regression was undertaken with the new 
variable as the outcome. In this case, it would be expected that ‘how we work with 
offenders’ would not make a significant and unique contribution to ‘ethical stress’ but that 
‘ethical climate’ and ‘approach to risk’ would. Prior to running the test, once again certain 
assumptions of the data had to be checked due to the reconfiguration of the sub scale data 
as explained above. The first check was an examination of the correlations between the 
‘new model’ variables, as shown in Figure 14: 
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Figure 14: Correlations Between 'New Model' Variables 
 
   
Ethical 
Stress 
Work 
with 
Offenders 
Ethical 
Climate 
Approach 
to Risk 
Pearson 
Correlation 
Ethical Stress 1.000 .587 .739 .717 
Work with 
Offenders 
.587 1.000 .763 .752 
Ethical Climate .739 .763 1.000 .840 
Approach to Risk .717 .752 .840 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Ethical Stress . .000 .000 .000 
Work with 
Offenders 
.000 . .000 .000 
Ethical Climate .000 .000 . .000 
Approach to Risk .000 .000 .000 . 
N Ethical Stress 100 100 100 100 
Work with 
Offenders 
100 100 100 100 
Ethical Climate 100 100 100 100 
Approach to Risk 100 100 100 100 
 
As previously, none of the correlations above are over .9 which, according to Pallant 
(2010) means there are no concerns. Checking further for multicollinearity, tolerance 
values and  VIF levels were checked, and also showed no concerns. Multicollinearity in 
this case is therefore not problematic. 
 
Next, I inspected the graphs produced, which showed no concerns in terms of normality, 
linearity and homoscedasticity. To check further for outliers, the critical  Mahalanobis 
distance for 3 independent variables, identified as 16.27  by Pallant (2010), was compared 
to the maximum Mahal. Distance in the current data set which was 14.06. Clearly, this is 
less than 16.27 which means there are no concerning outliers. Cook’s distance is .168, well 
below the problematic value of 1.0 (Pallant, 2010, p160). On the basis of the above, a 
further standard multiple regression was conducted (See Figure 15). 
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Figure 15: New Model Summary 
 
Mode
l R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
1 .761(a) .579 .561 6.533 
a  Predictors: (Constant), Work with Offenders, Approach to Risk, Ethical Climate 
b  Dependent Variable: Ethical Stress 
 
57.9% of ethical stress is being accounted for by the new model. To ascertain which 
variables are making contributions, the beta values must be checked: 
 
Figure 16: Variables Contributing to Ethical Stress 
 
 
Variable contributing 
to Ethical Stress 
Beta values Significance 
Work with Offenders -.036 .738 (p>.05) 
Ethical Climate .481 .000 (p<.01) 
Agency Approach to 
risk 
.341 .009 (p<.01) 
 
As expected, the ethical climate and agency approach to risk make unique and significant 
contributions to workers’ experience of ethical stress. The way the agency works with 
offenders does not. A standard multiple regression is also required to check the other end 
of the proposed model, to verify that only the ‘environmental’ variables are impacting on 
‘how we work with offenders’: 
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Figure 17: Model Summary of How we Work with Offenders 
  
Mode
l R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
1 .791(a) .625 .613 8.298 
a  Predictors: (Constant), Ethical Stress, Approach to Risk, Ethical Climate 
b  Dependent Variable: Work with Offenders 
 
 
 
The model explains 62.5% of ‘How we work with Offenders.’  Beta values are shown in 
Figure 18: 
 
Figure 18: Variables Contributing to How we Work with Offenders 
 
Variable contributing to 
‘How we work with 
offenders’ 
Beta values Significance 
Ethical Climate .462 .000 (p<.001) 
Agency Approach to Risk .387 .002 (p<.01) 
Ethical Stress -.032 .738 (p>.05) 
 
Therefore, as suggested by the model, only the environmental variables impact uniquely 
and significantly on how the agency works with offenders. In summary, then, the model 
depicted in Diagram 2 has been borne out by the statistical analyses of the variable 
connections. 
 
To check the reciprocity of the relationships as depicted in Diagram 2, further standard 
multiple regressions were conducted with ‘ethical climate’ and ‘approach to risk’ as the 
outcome variables. As expected, all remaining variables contributed uniquely and 
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significantly to each of the outcome variables: 77.6% of the total variance of ‘ethical 
climate’ was explained by the new model, with unique contributions from ‘how we work 
with offenders’ (beta=.251, p<.001), ‘approach to risk’ (beta=.486, p<.001) and ‘ethical 
stress’ (beta=.255, p<.001).  75.3% of the total variance of ‘approach to risk’ was 
explained by the new model, with unique contributions from ‘how we work with 
offenders’ (beta=.252, p<.005), ‘ethical climate’ (beta=.531, p<.001) and ‘ethical stress’ 
(beta=.200, p<.01). 
 
In conclusion, it seems that the answer to research question 1 is that the elements are 
indeed connected, but not as initially suggested. The ethical stress experienced by social 
workers in the study is influenced significantly by the ethical climate of the agency and by 
the agency approach to risk. How the agency works with offenders affects those 
environmental factors, but does not impact directly on ethical stress experienced.  
 
4.6 Research question 2.  
 
Do different local authorities produce different scores on the model variables? It was 
suggested earlier that different local authorities would produce different scores. 
 
 
In order to investigate the above question, it was decided to conduct a one-way between 
groups multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). This test was chosen to “compare 
groups on a range of different characteristics” (Pallant, 2010, p283). In this case, the 
groups were the different local authorities.  According to the model and underpinning 
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literature, different local authority cultures might produce different experiences of ethical 
stress for workers, and differences in the other variables also. Therefore local authority 
grouping is the independent variable, and ‘how we work with offenders,’ ‘ethical stress,’ 
‘ethical climate’ and ‘approach to risk’ are the four dependent variables.   
 
Prior to the test being carried out, confirmation that the data conformed to the assumptions 
required to run the test, was required. Sample size requires that at an “absolute minimum” 
(Pallant, 2010, p285) there must be more cases in each cell than there are dependant 
variables. In this case, there are 4 dependent variables.  LA4 returned 5 responses so was 
included in the test.  MANOVA is “reasonably robust to modest violations of normality” 
(Pallant, 2010, p285), but it is suggested that Mahalanobis Distances are used to check for 
multivariate normality. The value for maximum Mahalanobis Distance in the above case is 
13.75. Pallant (2010, p288) gives the critical value for Mahalanobis Distance for 4 
dependent variables as 18.47 which is more than 13.75, indicating that there are no 
concerning multivariate outliers. The next assumption is linearity, established by 
examination of a scatterplot matrix which did not show any evidence of non-linearity. 
Finally MANOVA works best if dependent variables are correlated (Pallant, 2010) as 
already established, but not overly correlated. Correlations between variables of “around .8 
or .9 are reason for concern” (ibid, p290).  Examination of Figure 10 identifies the 
correlation between ‘ethical climate’ and ‘approach to risk’ as .840. As only one pair of 
variables show a correlation high enough for concern, and the correlation is nearer to .8 
than .9, it seemed reasonable to proceed. 
   
Further preliminary assumption testing was conducted to check for normality, linearity, 
outliers, homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices (Box’s test, significance > .001) and 
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equality of variance (Levene’s Test, no variables where sig <.05) and no serious violations 
noted. The MANOVA was conducted and a statistically significant difference was found 
between LA groupings on the combined dependent variables, F(12, 246) = 3.15, p= .000; 
Wilks Lambda = .686; partial eta squared = .118. When the results for the dependent 
variables were considered separately, the variables  reaching statistical significance (using 
a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .012), were ethical stress, F(3, 96) = 3.68, p = .011, 
partial eta squared = .103; and ethical climate, (F(3,96) = 4.33, p = .007, partial eta squared 
= .119.  
 
On the combined variables, the effect size (partial eta squared = .118) would be considered 
large (Cohen, 1988, p22). The effect sizes of ‘ethical stress’ and ‘ethical climate’ are also  
large. In conclusion then, how ‘value-friendly’ the agency is, and how ethically stressed a 
social worker might feel, depends to a significant degree on where the social worker 
works. The approach to work with offenders and the approach to risk, however, seem to be 
similar regardless of LA setting. 
 
4.7 Qualitative Data 
 
The next part of the data analysis concerned the comments that respondents were invited to 
give after each variable question series. Individual comments will be referred to in the 
discussion, but an analysis of the comments by variable question series, allowed 
identification of the main themes. 
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Carey (2009) discusses a basic thematic analysis of data from interviews or free text 
answers. This is an inductive piece of investigation, whereby the answers are analysed and 
themes identified as they emerge, as described in Section 3.4.4. Smith (2009) considers the 
analysis in three stages: interrogation of the data, grouping emerging themes and providing 
an explanation for what has emerged. Smith also suggests that comments and free text can 
provide evidence for underlying influences upon the findings. In the current study, 
identifying the underlying influences and processes was an explicit objective of the study, 
in keeping with the ‘interpretivist’ approach to this part of the study design (May, 1993).  
Approximately 80 comments were received overall (excluding comments which did not 
make comments about the subjects under investigation, for instance, comments about 
working part time, giving details of the team the social worker worked in or comments 
about the questionnaire itself). Some comments were reasonable lengthy and referred to 
several themes, in which case they would be counted within several of the themed 
categories. The comments were examined (Smith’s stage 1) and grouped into themes (see 
Section 3.4.4.) Seven themes emerged as demonstrated in Figure 19 (stage 2): 
 
Figure 19: Themes from the qualitative data in descending order of prevalence:  
 
Theme Prevalence of Theme Example Quotes 
1.Workload demands and time 
restrictions are the main 
problems with undertaking 
welfare work 
Approximately 50% of the 
comments within the 
section concerned with 
‘ethical climate’ concerned 
workload. 25% of the 
comments overall 
commented on workload 
issues. 
‘Management are very 
unrealistic about the 
quantity of work people 
can manage.’ 
 
‘My workload is such that 
it impacts on the time I 
have to engage..’ 
 
‘We need more workers.’ 
 
2.Risk and public protection Approximately 50% of the ‘There is a major emphasis 
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work take priority comments within the 
section on ‘how we work 
with offenders’ make 
reference to risk and public 
protection work taking 
priority. 20% of comments 
overall referred to this 
theme. 
on risk assessment.’ 
 
‘Risk is king.’ 
 
‘Public protection is seen 
as our utmost aim.’ 
3.Statements of unhappiness 
with any aspect of the ‘New 
Penology.’ Comments about 
workload excluded. 
18.7% of comments 
referred to this theme. 
‘The focus is on meeting 
targets and PIs, which are 
often irrelevant to 
practising effectively’ 
 
‘I am in a very bureaucratic 
environment where 
engagement is viewed very 
much disdainfully.’ 
 
‘I don’t think that within 
the team I work, there is a 
sense that humanising what 
we do is relevant.’ 
4.Agencies can do both – 
public protection work and 
welfare work 
12.5% of comments overall 
made reference to the belief 
that agencies could balance 
both types of work. 
‘I think an agency can 
balance the two (welfare 
and risk work).’ 
 
‘I think my agency is 
inevitably procedurally 
driven in some ways, but 
not to the detriment of our 
values and culture.’ 
5.The role of the senior social 
worker (SSW) is important 
10% of comments overall 
made reference to the 
importance of the role of 
senior social worker or 
‘team manager’ in relation 
to 
support/values/supervision 
AND in relation to sharing 
risk and other decisions. 
‘Supervision can be totally 
one-sided at times and 
focus on clients’ 
risk/reviews/procedures 
rather than welfare.’  
 
‘My senior is excellent and 
we can discuss our values, 
ethics’ 
(Comments relating to 
supervision and values) 
 
[Additional information: 
Strong correlation between 
the question ‘supervision is 
mainly about following 
procedures and meeting 
key performance 
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indicators’ and ‘ethical 
stress,’ r=.595, n=100, 
p<,01]  
 
‘My senior allows and 
encourages me to make 
informed decisions’ 
 
‘If I ever feel I 
cannot/should not follow 
procedures, I would discuss 
with my team manager and 
seek agreement that an 
exception should be made.’ 
(Comments relating to 
sharing 
decisions/autonomy). 
[Additional information: 
only 30% of respondents 
agreed with the question ‘I 
wish I had more 
autonomy.’ Only 16% of 
respondents agreed with 
the question ‘If I ever 
choose not to follow 
procedures, I don’t tell my 
supervisor or manager.’] 
6.The work done depends on 
the individual social worker 
8.7% of comments overall 
made reference to the 
inclination of the individual 
social worker as having an 
impact on the work done.  
‘There is room for 
autonomy in individual 
sessions and their length.’ 
 
‘In my opinion there is a 
disparity among staff about 
boundaries and roles.’ 
7.Standardised risk assessment 
and procedures are positive 
7.5% of comments overall 
demonstrated a positive 
belief in risk assessments 
and procedures. 
‘I think it’s a positive 
change in practice that 
work is based on structured 
risk assessment tools.’ 
 
‘Procedures are sound but 
also regularly reviewed and 
I have confidence in the 
reviewing process.’ 
  
Stage 3, the explanation for the findings, is undertaken within Section 5.  Other, single or 
smaller groupings of comments will also be referred to in Section 5. As Smith (2009) 
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states, the purpose of a thematic analysis is to find the “best fit....rather than absolute 
certainty” (Smith, 2009, p169). 
 
4.8 Additional findings 
 
An additional finding that emerged from the analysis of both the quantitative and 
qualitative data, was that years of experience in CJSW seemed to be having an impact on 
the way workers viewed their agencies approach to practice.  
  
To investigate this further, correlations between years of experience and the four variables 
were undertaken. As scores on the variables increase, the view of the variable moves closer 
to a ‘new penological’ model (See Figure 1, Section 3.3). So, higher scores indicate a view 
that the work is more procedural, less desistance focused and more risk averse, and that 
there is a less value-friendly ethical climate and increased levels of ethical stress. In other 
words, if older, more experienced workers view those aspects of the work as increasingly 
‘new-penological’ in nature, they will score them more highly. 
Figure 20: Correlations Between Years of experience and the Four Variables 
 
 Pearson Correlation Strength of 
Correlation 
Years of 
Experience and 
How we work with 
offenders 
.461 Med/Large 
Years of 
Experience and 
ethical climate  
.465 Med/Large 
Years of 
experience and 
.541 Large 
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approach to risk 
Years of 
Experience and 
ethical stress 
.423 Med/Large 
 
Clearly, as years of experience increase, so do scores on all variables. This means that how 
‘new penological’ a worker experiences the workplace and work done to be, is 
significantly affected by how experienced they are.  A medium/large correlation was found 
between ‘I wish I had more autonomy’ and years of experience, r=.428, n=100, p<.01.  
However, it should be noted that age may well also be having an impact, as more 
experienced workers tend to be older. Therefore, partial correlation was used to explore the 
relationship between years of experience and the four variables whilst controlling for age.  
Results are shown in Figure 21: 
 
Figure 21: Partial Correlations Between Years of Experience and the Four Variables 
 
 Pearson Correlation Strength of 
Correlation 
Years of 
Experience and 
How we work with 
offenders 
.276 Small/Med 
Years of 
Experience and 
ethical climate  
.295 Small/Med 
Years of 
experience and 
approach to risk 
.357 Medium 
Years of 
Experience and 
ethical stress 
.296 Small/Med 
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Therefore, even when controlling for age, years of experience of CJSW is having a 
significant effect on how workers view all of the above variables, especially on how the 
agency approach to risk is viewed. 
 
Finally, a one-way between groups multivariate analysis of variance was performed to 
investigate the difference between two groups of workers, those who had began work in 
CJSW pre 1997, and those who began work in CJSW post 1997, on the four variables 
‘ethical stress’, ‘approach to risk’, ‘how we work with offenders’ and ‘ethical climate’.   A 
cut-off point of 1997 was chosen because it is concomitant with many of the new public 
protection ideas actually playing out in CJSW e.g. the changes brought about by the Scott 
Simpson case in Aberdeen (McManus, 1997). The respondents were divided into 2 groups, 
those with less than or equal to 15 years experience and those with more than 15 years 
experience.  Preliminary assumption testing was conducted to check for normality, 
linearity, univariate and multivariate outliers, homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices 
and multicollinearity, with no serious violations noted. Results were as follows: 
 
There was a statistically significant difference between the groups on the combined 
dependent variables, F(4,95) = 6.14, p=.000; Wilks’ Lambda = .795, partial eta squared = 
.205. When the results for the dependent variables were considered separately, using a 
Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .012, all dependent variables reached statistical 
significance: Work with offenders: F (1, 98) = 15.33, p=.000. partial eta squared = .135; 
Ethical Climate: F(1,98) = 17.93, p=.000, partial eta squared = .155; Approach to Risk: 
F(1,98) = 23.96, p=.000, partial eta squared = .196; Ethical Stress: F(1,98) = 8.16, p=.005, 
partial eta squared = .077.  
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19.6% of variance in perceived risk aversion of agencies can be explained by years of 
experience. According to Pallant (2010) this constitutes a ‘large’ effect. Experience is also 
having a ‘large’ effect on ‘how we work with offenders’ and ‘ethical climate.’ Years of 
experience is only having a medium effect on ‘ethical stress,’ however.  
 
It should be noted once again that the groups differ significantly in age as well as years of 
experience. An independent-samples t-test gave the following results for age: <=15years 
experience, M= 41.54, SD= 10.4 and >15 years experience, M= 55.24, SD= 4.35; t(79.8) = 
9.09, p=.000.  To investigate this further, an ANCOVA was conducted to explore the 
difference in perceptions of risk (the most significantly affected variable from the results 
above) between the two groups, whilst controlling for age. After ensuring that no 
assumptions were violated, results showed that years of experience did have a significant 
effect on perceptions of risk aversion, even when age was controlled for i.e. F(1,97) = 7.77, 
p= .007, partial eta squared = .074 (i.e. a medium effect size). Age had a greater significant 
effect, however, as shown by F(1,97), p= .002, partial eta squared = .095 (medium effect 
size). Therefore both years of experience and age are having effects of workers’ 
perceptions of risk aversion within their agencies. The effect of years of experience and 
age will be analysed and discussed in Section 5. 
 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, findings have emerged which both validate and repudiate the suggestions 
drawn from the literature covered in the literature review section of this thesis. The model 
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demonstrated in Diagram 2, Section 4.5, is not the one which was initially hypothesised on 
the basis of the literature. The variables were interconnected, but not in the way that was 
originally envisaged. Variations between LAs were not apparent on all variables, and, 
again, this was contrary to the original hypothesis. The model in Diagram 2 will now be 
analysed, and built upon by inclusion of explanatory information from the qualitative data 
and from relevant literature. Finally, the additional findings which have emerged as a result 
of exploration and analysis of the data, will be incorporated into the discussion. Ultimately, 
an enhanced model of influences on ethical stress will be suggested. 
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5  Discussion 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
This section has been designed to look individually at each of the research questions. 
Research question 1 (Section 5.2), which is concerned with the relationships between 
variables, will be addressed by investigating each of the significant and contributory 
relationships in turn. The absence of a directly contributory relationship between ‘how we 
work with offenders’ and ‘ethical stress’ will also be analysed as a finding in its own right. 
The conclusion to research question 1 will bring all of the findings together. Research 
question 2 (Section 5.3) is concerned with the variation in variable scores across the four 
LAs. The variables which show significant variation (‘ethical climate’ and ‘ethical stress’) 
will be discussed first, followed by an investigation into the variables which remain the 
same regardless of workplace setting (‘agency approach to work’ and ‘how we work with 
offenders’). Once again, the findings will be brought together in a concluding section. In 
Section 5.4, the additional, unexpected findings will be discussed. The importance of the 
role of the senior social worker is discussed as a theme in the exploration of both research 
questions, but the effect of years of experience is considered separately in Section 5.4.  
 
As the discussion progresses, additional concepts and suggestions are incorporated into the 
original model drawn from the results (see Diagram 3, Section 5.2.1). The additional 
conceptual material is provided by explanatory information from the qualitative data, and 
from relevant literature. A level of cogency is hopefully given to the model due to the 
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triangulation of the information utilised to construct it. The triangulated data come from 
quantitative findings, qualitative comments and other research studies and findings from 
the literature examined. The model is, therefore, further assembled in stages to produce a 
final suggested model of ‘ethical stress and its influences in CJSW in Scotland’ (see 
Diagram 8, Section 5.3.3).  
 
Finally, the discussion is concluded in Section 5.5 by bringing all of the main themes 
together to discuss the model as a whole. Implications of the findings are outlined within 
the concluding discussion. 
 
5.2  Research Question 1. Do each of the independent variables 
contribute uniquely and significantly to workers’ reports of 
disjuncture? 
 
5.2.1 Introduction 
 
The short answer to the above question is ‘no’. The independent variables ‘how we work 
with offenders,’ ‘risk,’ ‘ethical climate’ and ‘ethical stress’ (which includes disjuncture) 
are indeed linked but not in the way originally hypothesised. After analysis and distillation 
of the results, the model depicting the interlinking of the variables is depicted in Diagram 
3: 
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Diagram 3: Significant Contributory Relationships Between Variables 
 
Ethical Stress
How we work with 
offenders
    
Risk
Ethical Climate
 
 
The connections and relationships between the variables will now be discussed. 
 
5.2.2 Contributory relationship between risk and ethical stress  
 
Phillips (2009) suggests that social workers feel the fear and anxiety of something going 
wrong in their cases and being ‘blamed,’ more strongly than anything else. He suggests 
that this leads to an over-emphasis on defensible decision making and a tendency for 
agencies to become risk-averse. Taylor (2007) suggests that when workers can act in line 
with their conscience or values, they experience less ontological guilt (or ethical stress, in 
the current study), but more ontological anxiety. This is the healthy anxiety which is a 
natural consequence of using discretion to make the best possible decision for the service 
user, rather than the most easily defended one (which would be following procedures to the 
letter, regardless of value dilemmas). The question was raised in Section 2.3 as to whether 
this anxiety might be tolerable for agencies and indeed workers. In an environment where 
workers are easily blamed when things go wrong, how difficult is it to take risks and 
embrace anxiety as Taylor suggests? Webb (2006) states that social work in general has 
become afraid of risk decisions, and Barry (2007) states social workers do tend to find 
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reassurances in procedural risk assessments and procedures, that they cannot find in the 
expression of professional autonomy.  
 
 In the current study, the experience of ethical stress scores produced a reasonably normal 
spread. Upon examination of the perception of risk aversion scores, the more risk averse an 
agency was judged to be, the more ethical stress was experienced by the workers (see 
Diagram 3 and Figure 16 for the results of the standard multiple regression with ‘ethical 
stress’ as the outcome variable). This suggests that far from embracing a risk averse 
approach in order to remain ‘safe,’ workers appeared to feel less ethically stressed when 
the agency took a more flexible approach to risk assessment and management. In fact there 
was only one comment made about the desire to stay safe: 
 
“I feel that social workers can be easily blamed if something goes wrong, so it is 
important to defend our practice.” 
 
More comments were made about the recognition that risk is important, that making good, 
evidence based, defensible decisions is also very important, but that there needs to be a 
place for clinical judgement, and flexibility within procedures and practices: 
 
“They (risk assessments) are not a means to an end and should not be used without 
the benefit of professional judgement” 
AND 
“We not only rely on actuarial and standardised risk assessments, we also use 
clinical tools which are supported by our professional judgement.” 
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This reflects findings from McNeill et al. (2009) who found that, in a study of criminal 
justice social workers and the social enquiry reports they write,  risk was “not an explicit 
central concern of most of the reports” (ibid.  p428). Rather, social workers tended to 
combine technical as well as moral judgements about the offender’s character and 
‘redeemability.’ It seems that this combination of technical risk assessment and 
management tasks, and more holistic judgements, requiring flexible and discretionary 
responses, continues beyond social enquiry report compilation into the supervision of court 
orders.  From the comments, respondents also felt that, in the main, they were given the 
flexibility to use their judgement. This was, very importantly however, qualified by a 
theme from the comments that management support for discretionary decision making was 
of crucial importance: 
 
 “My senior allows and encourages me to make informed decisions,”  
 “there are times I haven’t followed procedures, but always discussed with 
management”  
And 
 
“if I ever feel I cannot/should not follow procedures, I would discuss with my team 
manager and seek agreement that an exception should be made.”  
 
Furthermore, only 16% of respondents agreed with the question “If I ever choose not to 
follow procedures, I don’t tell my supervisor or manager.” It does seem therefore, that 
flexibility is embraced, but management back-up is required, which may call into question 
the level of autonomy experienced by workers.  Munro (2011) states “Decision-making on 
cases is frequently the responsibility of that manager, despite the manager not knowing the 
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child or family very well, if at all. This leaves the social worker in an awkward 
predicament, holding case responsibility but with little autonomy for decision making” 
(Munro, 2011, p115). The results from the current study, however, suggest that rather than 
feeling “awkward” about this, respondents actually enjoy the sharing of responsibility with 
their first line manager. Gregory (2010) suggests that, since the change in direction 
towards greater mangerialism and increased prescriptive practice, probation officers in her 
study experienced dawning realisation “that their autonomy was perhaps illusory. 
Participant ‘Michael’ commented ‘what annoys me is that in so many cases where I used to 
be able to take decisions myself, I now have to take them to a senior’” (Gregory, 2010, 
p2279). The workers in Gregory’s study all had twelve or more years of experience, 
whereas the workers in the current study had an average of nine years of experience. Might 
it be that less experienced workers do not find the system of joint decision making 
disempowering, but actually like the security it provides (providing the senior is flexible 
and responsive), but that more experienced workers find this element of the culture 
stifling? If this is the case, we would expect that the perception of risk aversion within an 
agency would increase with years of experience. The relationship between the two 
variables was investigated using Pearson product-moment correlation co-efficient and 
results were given in Section 4.8. There was a strong positive correlation between years of 
experience and perception of a risk averse culture,  suggesting that social workers who are 
more experienced, perceive their agencies to be more risk averse than less experienced 
workers. Less experienced workers appear to depend more on their senior social workers 
and joint risk decision making, not perceiving this practice as risk averse in the way their 
more experienced colleagues appear to.  Perception of risk aversion was the variable with 
the strongest correlation with years of experience. Gregory’s (2010)  point that workers’ 
perceptions of autonomy was, perhaps, illusory due to the requirement to share decisions 
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with a senior, raises the question of perceptions of autonomy in the current study. Might it 
be that more experienced workers also have a perception that the autonomy they have is 
‘illusory’? Might they be less than happy with joint decision making in terms of autonomy 
as well as perceiving the practice as risk averse?  In answer to the question “I wish I had 
more autonomy” answers in the current study are skewed quite markedly to the ‘disagree’ 
columns (only 30% agreed or strongly agreed), demonstrating that workers overall are 
saying they do not want more ‘real’ autonomy.  However, another correlation was 
conducted looking at the relationship between years of experience and the question “I wish 
I had more autonomy” and, again, a significant, medium/large strength correlation was 
found (see Section 4.8). Once again, then, the desire for more authentic autonomy 
increases with years of experience.  
 
As McNeill et al. (2009) note, the investment in discourses surrounding risk procedures 
inevitably made by workers adapting to a public protection ethos, “sits uneasily with their 
existing habituses, in many cases framed in earlier eras” (McNeill et al., 2009, p434, 
emphasis added). The suggestion that habituses ‘framed in earlier eras’ may cause tension 
with relatively  recently recalibrated  expected  work practices, appears to be borne out by 
the current study, especially if the earlier era was indeed located within a different political 
and criminological context e.g. penal-welfarism. One very experienced respondent, for 
example, stated: 
 
“Starting in criminal justice in the early 80s….team leaders knew their stuff, their 
staff, their strengths, their weaknesses and their developmental needs. Our team 
leaders now are more distant, concerned that procedures are adhered to and that key 
performance targets/indicators are met. Dealing with our client base becomes more 
narrow focused, impersonal and at times superficial….We are hamstrung by the 
plethora of forms we are required to complete. We spend 80% of our time inputting 
data into the various IT interfaces we have to utilise to maintain records, to 
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undertake formal risk assessments and to record key performance indicators in 
order that our funding can be justified/secured. Work becomes more risk led – with 
‘resources following risk’ at the expense of valuable preventative work for those 
offenders at the lower end of the scale. Risk is king and needs to take a back seat.” 
 
Clearly, then, some workers feel the frustrations of the ‘new’ requirements harder to adapt 
to than others.  
 
Leaving aside the issue of differences between more and less experienced workers, and 
returning to the literature review and the interface between risk and ethical stress (Section 
2.3), it was suggested that where resistance to rigid risk assessment frameworks is 
required, the risk is either entirely borne by the worker or the burden is shared with the 
agency where the agency allows autonomy and discretion. It seems from the current study 
that there is a middle ground which was not apparent from the review of the literature. The 
agency can, in a qualified way, allow autonomy and discretion if the senior social worker 
is in agreement with the proposed course of action. Returning to the example in the 
literature review of the worker who took the risk and ignored a policy which instructed 
workers not to engage with any intoxicated service user (Sawyer, 2009) (thereby suffering 
ontological anxiety, but not the more corrosive state of ontological guilt or disjuncture 
which would have resulted from consciously ignoring one’s own value beliefs about the 
‘rightness’ of helping a service user in a vulnerable state), the situation would have played 
out somewhat differently in the current study. According to the respondents, workers 
would have sought agreement to ignore the policy from their senior social worker (perhaps 
a ‘rule of thumb’ would have been established in the team via discussion of examples of 
this type of dilemma). The middle ground then comprises workers who can use discretion 
and are not constrained too rigidly by risk-averse policy, but who also do not have to 
shoulder the risk alone. So far then, the reluctance of workers to embrace more autonomy 
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has been demonstrated by the quantitative data, and the  place and influence of the senior 
social worker has been highlighted by the qualitative data as an important factor in the 
mediation of how the agency deals with risk decisions.  
 
Evans (2011), in his critique of ‘street level bureaucracy,’ can help in the further analysis 
of the important role of the senior social worker in relation to risk. He suggests that, 
although managers are the “key regulators of discretion” (Evans, 2011, p371) they will 
encourage discretion where it is in the best interests of the organisation and will interpret 
the spirit of policy rather than adhere doggedly to its every nuance. Evans also makes the 
point that first line managers are drawn from the same pool as their professional front line 
colleagues, and as such, do not attempt to eliminate professionalism and its attendant 
discretion. O’Sullivan (1999) also notes that if first line managers share social work 
education and qualifications, they will be more sympathetic to social work values. In 
essence, as Evans states, the sharing of professional education “highlights the role of 
shared professional commitments, transcending the distinction between local managers and 
practitioners” (Evans, 2011, p377). ‘Local managers’ in this context are the equivalent of 
‘senior social workers’, and Evans’ study reinforces the findings from the current study, 
that the role of the senior social worker is crucial to staff in terms of sharing discretionary 
decisions and allowing workers to deviate from the procedure. As Evans suggests, the 
senior in this case regulates the workers’ use of discretion. This concept is, again, borne 
out by answers to the questionnaire question “If I ever choose not to follow procedures, I 
don’t tell my supervisor or manager,” only 16% agreed (with only 2 respondents strongly 
agreeing). Therefore, respondents are clearly sharing these decisions with their managers 
(see Figure 19). Dale and Trlin (2010), in their study of probation officers and their first 
line managers in New Zealand found that “having decisions backed” (Dale and Trlin, 
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2010, p129) was one of the main requirements probation officers had of their first line 
managers. They illustrate this point with the following quote: 
 
“Number one ingredient is support, backing. Everybody in the course of their employment 
makes decisions….having someone behind you who supports and backs your decisions 
creates a really good working relationship” (ibid.  p130). 
 
Possibly as a result of the above, then, and with the exception of more experienced 
workers, respondents do not want more autonomy, but do want seniors with whom they 
can share decision making, especially when those decisions deviate from procedure or 
policy. Kowalski et al. (2010) found that greater ‘latitude in decision making’ led to less 
experience of emotional exhaustion for professionals working with people with disabilities, 
which, again, is congruent with the finding from the current study that the more risk averse 
(less ‘latitude’ in decision making) an agency is, the greater the ethical stress experienced. 
It is also consistent with a senior social worker participating in flexible, responsive 
decision making alongside the social worker. Such participation would not decrease the 
latitude in decision making (depending on the senior), but neither would it leave the social 
worker alone to shoulder the (possible) resultant ontological anxiety (Taylor, 2007). 
Respondents stated: 
 
“there is a major emphasis on risk assessments and we constantly hear about 
defensible decisions. My senior allows and encourages me to make informed 
decisions that not everyone may agree with”  
And  
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“there are times when I fail to follow procedure….however, this is rare and always 
discussed with my line manager.”   
 
 
As can be seen from the above, the joint approach to decision making is only positive if the 
senior is flexible and willing to take risks and shoulder anxiety. A more risk averse senior’s 
approach would probably result in more ethically stressed workers, given the already 
established significant relationship between risk aversion and ethical stress. Comments 
once again bore this out, for example: 
 
“someone from the same agency but with a different manager may have responded 
differently.”   
 
Morazes et al. (2010) in a study comparing workers in California who stayed in child 
welfare work, compared to those who left, found that the most important factor for those 
staying was a supportive and ‘good’ relationship with their line manager. Interestingly, a 
poor relationship with the first line manager was also crucially important to those choosing 
to leave also e.g. “I could tolerate my supervisor only up to a point” (Morazes et al., 2010, 
p 241). Clearly, then, the role of the senior social worker in the literature and in the current 
study is extremely important and pivotal to decision making. In the current study, it seems 
to be particularly important to decisions involving an element of risk, where flexibility and 
responsivity are required. Bissell (2012) suggests that social work does “not really escape 
the search to identify an optimum management environment” (Bissell, 2012, p117). He 
goes on to suggest that crucial management approaches in social work are heavily 
influenced by the value base e.g. empowerment of workers, valuing their abilities, 
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maintaining their self esteem etc. although, at the same time, social workers are 
disempowered by the bureaucracy and technicist requirements as already covered. Given 
those tensions, it is unsurprising that “an optimum management environment” has not been 
identified. It is also easy to see that ‘good’ seniors will indeed be identified as the flexible, 
empowering, value-base sharing type with whom workers can discuss values, ethical 
tensions and from whom workers can be granted leeway for discretionary responses. 
According to Bissell, there would be widespread agreement that these were ‘good’ 
management traits, and this is indeed borne out by the current study. 
 
All social workers in the study experienced more ethical stress the more risk averse they 
judged the agency to be. Stanford (2009) sums the situation up when she says that “the 
mentalities of the neo-liberal risk society have undermined social work’s capacity to 
meaningfully, purposively and creatively respond to these [welfare] dilemmas” (Stanford, 
2010, p 1068) and gives mandatory reporting (for example, in CJSW) as an example of a 
social work response which does nothing to alleviate any hardship or to deal with welfare 
issues. Stanford goes on to say that how workers actually respond and practise in this 
climate is an under-researched area. However, a picture is emerging as to how the social 
workers in the current study respond and practise, that is, by seeking, and obtaining, ‘back 
up’ from senior social workers to allow them to respond flexibly and with discretion.  
 
In terms of risk, then, the current study has demonstrated that the more risk averse an 
agency is the more ethical stress a worker will experience. Within this broad picture, more 
experienced workers perceived higher levels of risk aversion within agencies and reported 
a desire for more authentic autonomy than less experienced workers. The latter group 
seemed to be happy to share decision making with flexible, responsive seniors as long as 
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said seniors demonstrated support to the workers in their decisions to deviate from 
procedures and to use their discretion.  
 
5.2.3  Contributory relationship between ethical climate and ethical 
stress  
 
The other significant variable impacting on whether workers will suffer ethical stress is the 
ethical climate of the agency (See Diagram 3). Ethical climate, for the purposes of the 
current study, includes supervision, value based discussion, the importance of values in 
decision making, staff involvement in changes and workload issues (See Section 3.4, 
Figures 2 and 5. See Section 4.5, Figure 16, for the results of the standard multiple 
regression showing ‘approach to risk’ and ‘ethical climate’ as the variables impacting 
significantly on ‘ethical stress.’)  
 
Workload was included within ‘ethical climate’ from suggestions from the panel of experts 
rather than from literature (for face validity, see Section 3.4.3 and Figure 2). However, 
issues of workload were commented on in the qualitative data more than any other single 
aspect of the work, with 25% of all comments making reference to the workload issue. In 
particular, the comments were concerned with workloads hampering the time required to 
do the work in the way the workers wanted to and to help with welfare and other issues. 
For example, one respondent said: 
 
“My managers want me to do in-depth work with clients but it is not always 
possible to do given the size of case-loads.” 
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Kowalski et al. (2010) also found that the factor that had the strongest impact on emotional 
exhaustion was workload. Shier and Graham (2010) studied subjective well being 
experienced by social work practitioners and found that, among other factors, agency 
culture and workloads have a direct impact on perceptions of subjective well being. 
However, they suggest that the quantity of work required of people is not the complete 
‘workload’ picture. They suggest that there is an interplay of factors encompassed within 
the idea of workload, including flexibility (to arrange working times etc. with a degree of 
autonomy), availability of resources and a sense of the limitations of one’s own 
capabilities. Comments from the current study reflect that respondents felt the amount of 
work was the central problem, but not because there was not time to do it all (although 
some people did say that), but mainly because it did not leave enough time to do other ‘real 
social work’ tasks such as welfare and helping. For example, workers made comments 
like:  
 
“Pressure is on to risk assess everyone, at the expense of getting to know, and work 
with, clients”  
And  
“Conscience pricks me when have to do lengthy admin tasks when time could be 
better spent working with people.”  
 
As already stated, this was the main point raised by the qualitative data. Many comments 
were made making the same point,  that is that once the public protection/risk work is 
done, there is not enough time for other social work such as helping with problems.   
Returning to Shier and Graham (2010), comments from the current study echo their 
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findings in regards to workers benefitting from a sense of their own limitations. 
Respondents in the current study seemed to have a sense of their own limitations and 
realised that they could not ‘do it all’ so did not attempt to undertake the depth of work 
they wanted to. According to Shier and Graham, this is important for workers’ overall 
well-being, but, in the current case, the moderating of what could be done contributed to 
workers’ experience of ethical stress in that they could not fully practice in accordance 
with their value base (help in the way they wanted to), for example, 
 
“during weeks when there seems to be lots of deadlines, it can be stressful and you 
feel like you are letting clients down.”  
 
The prolific amount of comments made in regard to this, however, demonstrates that it is 
of importance to workers, but they have not attempted to take on further work at their own 
expense or to the detriment of their well-being. Only one comment was made which did 
illustrate a worker doing this: 
 
“What ‘gives’ isn’t workload or time to work with clients – but my own time, 
working additional hours, often unpaid.”  
 
Therefore, in the current study, apart from the one worker quoted, respondents seem to be 
looking after their own well-being, and do have a sense of their own limitations, but suffer 
ethical stress as a result. Echoing this,  Morazes et al. (2010) found that child welfare 
social workers experienced frustration when “administrative functions prevented them 
from fulfilling ‘true social work’ functions, which were viewed in terms of forming 
relationships with clients” (Morazes et al., 2010, p 243). It is clear that workers in our 
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study felt similarly to the workers in Morazes study. Workload issues get in the way of 
helping, relationship building and other ‘real’ social work functions. When time is short, 
“king risk,” public protection and accountability tasks take priority, and welfare takes a 
back seat. 
 
In a study of Scottish criminal justice social workers in 2009, McNeill et al. found that 
reports written for the court were influenced and constrained by, among other things, the 
team culture into which the worker had been socialised and the worker’s “degree of 
engagement in social work intervention (that is seeking to help offenders)” (McNeill et al., 
2009, P426, emphasis added).  The implication here is that workers have a choice as to 
their ‘degree of engagement’ in helping or welfare work.  The workers in the current study 
seemed to echo this suggestion, with comments such as: 
 
 “the service given largely depends on the individual worker”  
And  
“there is room for autonomy in individual sessions.”  
  
Acceptance of one’s own limitations, then, plus the choice that workers have to be engaged 
in welfare work has emerged as a theme (Section 4.7, Figure 19, theme number 6). 
Workers do relational, helping, welfare work when there is time, and if they want to. 
McNeill found that the culture of the agency and the worker’s own inclination were 
important in shaping the reports written for court and it would seem that, in the current 
study, these factor are also important for shaping the content and quality of probation 
work.  Also, risk in the current study influences the extent to which a worker can become 
engaged in welfare work with respondents saying that the emphasis on risk can eclipse the 
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ability to engage in welfare work.  So, it seems that the interplay between workload (as an 
element of ethical climate or culture), workers’ own inclination and, most importantly, 
risk, is key to the level of ethical stress experienced by workers. 
 
Kowalski et al. (2010) consider the factors ‘workload’ and ‘latitude in decision-making’ to 
be elements of “work organisation” (Kowalski et al., 2010, p476). In the current study, 
these elements map to ‘ethical climate’ (workload as a part of this) and ‘risk’ (latitude in 
decision making as an expression of risk acceptance, as already analysed). The other 
element of “work organisation” in Kowlaski’s study is  social capital. Kowalski et al. 
define social capital as “the existence of collective values and convictions and mutual trust 
between the members of an organisation” (ibid.  p472)  which resonates with the concept 
of ‘ethical climate’ in the current study.  Kowalski et al. found that social capital did not 
show a significant association with emotional exhaustion, but noted that this finding was at 
odds with other studies, as it is with the current study in that ‘ethical climate’ does show a 
significant relationship with ‘ethical stress.’ Shier and Graham (2010) found that the 
“personal fit of the work” (Shier and Graham, 2010, p414), an idea that can sit within 
‘social capital,’ was an important factor in workers’ subjective measures of well-being, as 
was workers seeing the value and meaningfulness in the work they do.  This relates to a 
sense of shared purpose and value base, played out in discussion of values in the agency 
and in supervision.  The current study has produced a model with  central boxes which 
seems to be a very good fit with Kowalski et al.’s “work organisation” (ibid. P476). Within 
“work organisation” Kowalski places the importance of workload and social capital which, 
together, equate to the current model’s ‘ethical climate’ element. Shier and Graham’s 
(2010) findings also fit within this element. Ideas around the importance of decision 
making as defined by Kowalski et al. as a central element of “work organisation”, as 
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already stated, equate to the current model’s element ‘risk’. The central boxes of the 
model, therefore, could overall, in Kowalski et al.’s terms, be described as “work 
organisation.” 
 
Slate et al. (2003), in a study of stress levels and contributory factors for probation officers 
in a southern state in America, found that the key factor related to stress levels was 
employee “perceptions of participation in decision making” (Slate et al., 2003, p536).  
When employees felt that they were suitably involved in decision making and felt that they 
participated in the management of the agency, stress was markedly reduced. This relates 
both to the risk decision and ethical climate variables in the current study, and seems to be 
a key message from the literature. The more nuanced question which arises from the 
current study is whether more experienced workers’ definitions of what is suitably 
‘participative’ and allows sufficient autonomy, is different from less experienced workers. 
There may not be a ‘one size fits all’ ideal in terms of joint, senior-and-social-worker 
decision making. Slate et al. also found that as years of experience increased, so did 
probation officers’ reports of physical stress symptoms. The authors refer to literature 
which suggests that this may be explained by increasing stress as experienced workers see 
their peers achieve more seniority, and view this as unfair. It may be, however, that what is 
actually going on is dissatisfaction with the perceived ‘participative’ culture. The 
relationship between years of experience and opinion about perceptions of ‘participative’ 
culture is not documented in the study. Slate et al. also found that female probation 
workers reported significantly more physical stress symptoms than their male counterparts 
(although no significant difference in total stress was reported). In the current study, an 
independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the ‘ethical stress’ scores of males 
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and females. There was no significant difference in the scores for men and women (see 
Section 4.4).  
 
Supervision, as an element of ‘ethical climate,’ also seems to be influencing levels of 
ethical stress, which adds validity to the suggestion made by O’Donnell et al. (2008), that 
ethically supportive supervision and space and time for discussion of values and different 
value positions, impact on workers feelings of stress.  Beddoe (2010) brings the model’s 
central box variables ‘ethical climate’ and ‘agency approach to risk’ very neatly together 
within the concept of supervision when she suggests that there is a “potential for risk-
averse culture to diminish the quality of supervision” (Beddoe, 2010, p 1289). Beddoe 
explains that the literature surrounding supervision gives a strong message that open 
debate, trust and supportive discussion which encourage critical reflection on things that 
have gone wrong, allow for learning to take place is an optimum for supervision. She 
further explains, however, that this is difficult if, within a risk-averse climate “the nagging 
concerns of risk, fear and accountability crop up in the space between the participants” 
(ibid.  p1292). Goddard and Hunt (2011) illustrate this by quoting a social worker in 
relation to their unspoken concerns about supervision: “I have learned to be an isolated 
worker. If you open up, with personal issues and worries, then you are seen as personally 
incompetent” (Goddard and Hunt, 2011, p426).  The authors point out the dangers of 
supervision being concerned more with defending the agency rather than working in the 
interests of the workers, and, ultimately, the service users. Once again, the importance of 
critical thinking and reflection are highlighted.  Similarly, Beddoe’s study confirms earlier 
studies that, to impact positively on social workers’ well being, (and ethical stress 
reduction?) the supervisor needs to be able to balance managerial requirements with 
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support, trust and open discussion. As an element of an ethical culture, the current study 
echoes those findings, for example: 
 
 “supervision content is dependent upon the senior. My senior is excellent and we 
can discuss our values, ethics and receive encouragement to be autonomous. 
However, this is not a managerial point of view.”  
 
This comment also illustrates respondents’ differentiation of senior social workers from 
‘management.’  Finally, Bourn and Hafford-Letchfield (2012) highlight the mediation 
function of supervision. As well as echoing all of the above findings, the authors note the 
important role that supervisors play in “promoting or mediating organisational culture 
within their individual relationships with staff” (Bourn and Hafford-Letchfield, 2012, p51) 
and suggest that supervision is an important tool for helping workers to “contain and work 
with the anxiety that naturally arises within social work” (ibid.  p41). This ties into the 
whole idea of agency approach to risk and supervision coming together within a sub-set in 
the ‘new’ model of ethical stress (See Diagram 3). Risk decisions and approaches are 
nurtured and encouraged within the supervisory relationship, with a key focus on the 
management of the resultant ‘ontological anxiety’ (Taylor, 2007). A supervisor who can 
‘allow’ risky, responsive decisions in the best interests of service users and based on a real 
belief in social work values, needs to  be good at dealing with the resultant, healthy 
ontological anxiety. A supervisor who cannot do that may well stick to the procedural, 
box-ticking form of supervision, of which the literature is quite consistent in its criticism, 
and about which the respondents in the current study made comments such as:  
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“Supervision can be totally one-sided at times and focus on clients’ risk 
assessments/reviews/procedures rather than welfare,”  
And 
“the focus has definitely changed and there is much priority placed on meeting 
performance indicators, recording first appointments etc.”   
 
Beddoe (2010) stated that supervisors must help workers to learn to live with uncertainty 
(ontological anxiety?), rather than strive for greater proceduralism, and so supervisors 
must, obviously, be able to do this themselves. This is especially important because social 
workers are sharing decisions with them and looking for ‘back-up.’ Beddoe was also clear 
that supervision must recognise the possibility of change, as per the old penology (Feeley 
and Simon, 1992), and not stop at defensible ‘management’ of service-users (as per the 
new penology, ibid).  Sawyer (2009) suggests that supervisors are more interested in the 
documentation being competed that the actual work done. In terms of the current study, 
then, we would expect to see a correlation between perceptions of supervision as 
procedural and managerial, and experience of ethical stress. The relationship between the 
questionnaire question “Supervision is mainly about following procedures and meeting key 
performance indicators” and scores for ethical stress was investigated using Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficient. There was a strong, positive correlation between 
the two variables (see Section 4.7, Figure 19). The more procedural supervision was 
judged to be, the more ethical stress was experienced by workers.  This result reinforces 
the literature which gives a key message that supervision which allows for discussion of 
practice, values and change is crucial element of a healthy ethical climate and very 
important for low levels of worker ethical stress. 
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To sum up, then, agency approach to risk and ethical climate contribute to, and impact 
significantly on, workers’ experiences of ethical stress. A factor which seems to have a 
particularly strong influence in this contributory relationship, is the role of the senior social 
worker. In terms of risk decisions, seniors can ameliorate the worst effects of controlling 
procedures by taking decisions jointly with workers and being flexible and responsive to 
need. The question does remain, however, as to whether experienced social workers find 
this type of joint approach less reassuring and more stifling – are senior social workers 
unable to allow discretion to the level an experienced worker would want? It would seem 
that, from the findings in the current study, perhaps not. 
 
In terms of ethical climate, then, the quality of supervision depends on the senior, as does 
wider ethical discussion and value based, participative decision making. The senior 
appears to play an important role in all of these elements. Workload is another important 
factor impacting on the ethical stress of workers, but seniors do not appear to be held 
responsible for this in terms of respondents’ comments. Rather, there is a general feeling of 
externality in regards to the workload effect, for example: 
 
 “We have far too much to do.”   
 
Yin (2004), writing about management strategies for ensuring that “the health of the 
worker comes first” (Yin, 2004, p605), includes giving workers more autonomy and 
flexibility, directing emergencies to other agencies and building in resilience building 
activities and very supportive supervision. She admits, however, that she could only write 
in this way after resigning from her position. She also admits that, whilst still employed, 
she could not share the fact she ‘allowed’ her workers to operate outwith policy. This 
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seems indicative of the fact that it would be very difficult for senior social workers to 
impact upwards on management policies, which includes issues such as workload levels. 
Social workers seem to realise and accept this as there was no comment about senior social 
workers being responsible for worker overload. Rather, the responsibility for this is given 
to higher ‘management,’ for example: 
 
 “Management are very unrealistic about the amount of work people can manage”  
And  
“We need more workers.” 
 
The main themes that have emerged from the analysis of the model thus far then, are: 
 
1. The more risk averse an agency is, the more workers will suffer from ethical stress.  
 
2. There is a middle ground for workers in dealing with risk which lies between complete 
and authentic autonomy, and complete agency risk aversion and procedural practice. 
The middle ground is characterised by workers sharing decisions to deviate from 
policy or to take other anxiety-producing decisions with flexible and responsive senior 
social workers.  
 
3. There is an interplay between workload and the prioritisation of public protection/risk 
work. Welfare/ helping work ‘gives’ when workloads are high, and workers in the 
study are clear that public protection work comes first. This can cause ethical stress for 
workers, but the clarity around prioritisation leads to workers not trying to ‘do it all’ 
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and, thus they protect their well-being. The amount of this type of work done depends 
not just on workload demands, but also on worker inclination.  
 
4. Supervision, as an important part of the ethical climate, is key to workers experience 
of ethical stress.  
 
5. More experienced workers, older and socialised into CJSW prior to the emergence of a 
priority public protection agenda, feel ethical stress more strongly and perceive the 
other variables, especially the agency approach to risk, as more managerial and 
restrictive.  
 
 
5.2.4 Contributory relationship between ethical stress, and risk and 
ethical climate  
 
Further examination of the left hand side of the model (see Diagram 3), demonstrates that 
ethical stress also impacts on the ethical climate of the agency and the agency’s approach 
to risk, in a dynamic, reciprocal loop (see Section 4.5, for results on the reciprocity of the 
relationship). O’Donnell et al. (2008) found that when ethical climate was positive, 
workers could take ‘moral action,’ that is, they could act in line with their values. So, a 
positive ethical climate encouraged not only a reduction in ethical stress, but also an 
increase in ethical behaviour. This, of course, would influence the ethical climate of the 
agency as a whole, and possibly also influence the agency’s actions in dealing with risk. In 
this way, an ‘upward spiral’ can exist between the ‘environmental factors’ and ethical 
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stress. The opposite is, of course also true, an ethically insensitive, risk-averse climate can 
lead to increased levels of ethical stress for workers, and a consequent inability to take 
‘moral action.’ Behaviour in this context, does not, then, positively enhance ethical 
elements of the agency. In this way, a self perpetuating, vicious circle might well develop.  
 
In Morazes et al.’s (2010) study authors found that factors relating to the worker’s 
experience with their first line manager/supervisor was of crucial importance, as already 
mentioned.  ‘Stayers’ (those who were happy in their jobs and not looking for alternative 
work) stated that one of the most important factors was their relationship with their 
supervisors, in particular “good supervision and positive work environments” (Morazes et 
al., 2010, p240). Both stayers and leavers reported stress generated by heavy workloads 
and administrative functions getting in the way of forming proper, social work 
relationships with service users, which echoes the findings in the current study. However, 
good relationships with supervisors and peers could ameliorate these stresses.  Details of 
what exactly was going on in these relationships is not available in Morazes et al.’s study’s 
findings, but it can be ascertained that not only was the ethical climate of the agency, 
including relationships and supervision, having an impact of the stress of workers, but that 
stress was having an impact on the ethical climate of the agency due to workers leaving 
and feeling unable to act the in way they wanted to e.g. “I didn’t feel like I could be a good 
social worker being as frustrated as I was” (ibid.  p241). Once again, this resonates with 
O’Donnell et al.’s findings that people cannot take ‘moral action’ if they feel they are not 
in an ethically supportive environment. Kosny and Eakin (2008) also found that increased 
levels of value/behaviour congruence (reduced ethical stress) led to workers being able to 
cope with very stressful situations and experience high levels of job satisfaction. Satisfied 
workers who cope well will of necessity impact on the ethical climate of the agency, in a 
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positive way. Workers in the study were able, and encouraged, to help service users, really 
get to know them and enact  basic social work values characterised by respect, empathy 
etc.  The reduced ethical stress due to this value/behaviour congruence clearly impacted on 
the ethical climate and flexible approach to risk as value beliefs were considered to be an 
important priority, demonstrated by discussion of shared values and a strongly held, shared 
belief in the ‘mission’ of the agency (Kosny and Eakin, 2008). 
 
Dale and Trlin (2010) explored the relationship between probation officers and ‘service 
managers’ (equivalent of senior social worker) in New Zealand. The context for the study 
was a work environment which had seen many changes in the previous decade, including 
an increase in managerialism, an increase in accountability and a shift towards monitoring 
and control of service users rather than “the achievement of rehabilitative goals” (Dale and 
Trlin, 2010, p 122). Clearly, this is similar to the situation in Scotland (See Section 2.1). 
The authors point out that there is recognition that a relationship exists between leader and 
follower behaviour and situational factors. In other words, linked to the point made above, 
how people behave will in part depend on the ethical climate of the agency and the 
relationship with supervisor. Again, this behaviour will contribute to the ethical climate of 
the agency.  Dale and Trlin also suggest that leaders must encourage the “alignment 
between organisational values and those held by constituent professional staff” (ibid.  
p126) which would reduce the ethical stress caused by value and behaviour incongruence. 
Once again, then, the intermediation role played by the senior social worker becomes clear, 
highlighted by Dale and Trlin as crucial in terms of promoting value/behaviour congruence 
between the organisation and the worker. Successfully undertaking this mediation role 
would affect a reduction in ethical stress and a consequent increase in moral action and 
enhanced ethical climate. From the comments made by respondents in the current study, 
  
 
202 
seniors are indeed doing this, via supervision and joint, flexible and responsive decision 
making. In terms of the model, it seems that senior social workers may be mediating the 
reciprocal relationship between environmental factors and ethical stress; by their actions, 
they can create supportive and value-based supervision, and facilitate responsive, 
discretionary behaviour by workers when the workers feel it is desirable.  The evidence for 
including the SSW in the model as depicted in Diagram 4 therefore comes from both the 
quantitative and the qualitative data in the current study as well as from key messages from 
the literature. 
 
Diagram 4: The Importance of the SSW Part 1 
 
Ethical Stress
How we work with 
offenders
  SSW   
Risk
Ethical Climate
 
 
5.2.5  No contributory relationship between how we work with 
offenders and ethical stress  
 
Further examination of  the model (see Diagram 4) suggests that, contrary to the 
hypothesis drawn from the literature covered in the literature review section of this study, 
how the agency works with offenders does not impact directly on workers feelings of 
ethical stress, but does influence the ethical climate and risk approach of the agency, once 
again in a reciprocal loop (See Section 4.5, Figure 16 for results of the standard multiple 
regression investigating which of the variables have a significant and contributory 
  
 
203 
relationship with ‘ethical stress.’). Respondents, in their comments, suggested that in depth 
work with offenders was hampered by workload and time restrictions rather than any 
particular practice principle on the part of the agency. In whatever way the approach to the 
work was operationalised, if workers had time, they were able to undertake welfare, 
helping type work, for example: 
 
“the thing stopping me from doing ‘welfare’ work is lack of time and resources 
rather than a mandate not to do this.”  
 
In other words, as depicted in Diagram 4, ‘how we work with offenders’ has an effect on 
‘ethical stress’ only if the middle boxes are such that the type of work a social worker 
wants to do is restricted. The literature review had suggested that not adopting a desistance 
approach to work would mean that there was little space for responsive, ‘helping’ type 
work and that this would cause disjuncture. However, it seems that, even in a climate of 
manualised, proceduralised work with offenders, there is still allowance for social workers 
to undertake welfare, ‘helping’ work. Respondents were also quite clear that, when time 
allowed, agencies are happy for workers to undertake welfare work, whilst prioritising 
public protection (theme 4 from the qualitative data, see Section 4.7, Figure 19), for 
instance: 
 
“public protection is seen as our utmost aim; however, my agency still values the 
welfare of clients.”  
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Another comment sheds even more light on the ability of workers in agencies to do both 
types of work (public protection/risk management/ programmed work and welfare), for 
example, 
 
“the issues we try to address to help reduce re-offending are often welfare e.g. 
accommodation, employment and substance misuse.”   
 
As stated, the ability for agencies to do both types of work was the 4th most reported 
theme from the qualitative data (see Figure 19), and resonates with the study of criminal 
justice social workers and their views on effective practice, undertaken in 2000 (McNeill, 
2000) and explored in Section 2.2.3. The author expected to find that the increased interest 
in accountability and public protection was causing conflict in a service which had had 
welfare at its core for the previous 20 years. In other words, McNeill was expecting to 
uncover workers’ feelings of disjuncture. As in the current study, however, McNeill found 
that the new restrictions on how to approach work with offenders did not cause increased 
ethical stress. He found instead that workers associated effective practice in reducing 
reoffending by working, in partnership with offenders, on underlying needs.  This is not at 
odds with social work values, and, in fact, workers placed a “still stronger emphasis on 
meeting the probationer’s needs, empowering them to actualise their potential, improve 
their quality of life and achieve change” (McNeill, 2000, p391). A reduction in offending 
was viewed as a consequence of these things. Therefore, workers had absorbed the new 
demands for accountability and the demonstration of effectiveness, but could do so whilst 
adhering to their value base, as the worker making the last comment has clearly also done. 
This might explain what underpins the strongly held view that workers, and agencies, can 
do both criminal justice tasks, when time allows. So, in the current study, doing welfare 
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work is still ‘allowed’ (a question raised earlier) and not doing welfare work is viewed as a 
practical rather than an ethical problem. 
 
So, responding to welfare needs or helping offenders, can be done if and when time allows, 
but is not the priority task (prioritisation of public protection work was the 2
nd
 most widely 
reported type of comment from the qualitative data (see Figure 19). The findings also 
suggest that welfare work is pretty much at the discretion or inclination of the individual 
social worker, as already discussed. As McNeill et al. (2009) suggested, court reports are 
influenced by the individual worker’s inclination to engage in helping type work with 
offenders. The current study appears to demonstrate a similar concept – workers can, to a 
degree, choose to engage in the helping agenda. A study by Stanford (2010) considered 
how “ideas of risk are constituted and integrated into social workers’ interventions” (ibid.  
p1069) and was undertaken by analysing discussion groups of social workers in Tasmania. 
The main finding was that definitions of risk were attached to individual service users. 
Risk was always a negative concept and was considered as an “intensely moral” (ibid. 
p1071) construct, therefore ‘risky’ clients were also ‘bad.’  This is an interesting point, as 
McNeill et al. (2009) also demonstrated that risk featured as one element only in the social 
worker’s main endeavour to separate the ‘redeemable’ from the ‘incorrigible.’ From 
Stanford’s study, we can see that this happens via the entwining of ideas about risk, 
assigning these definitions to individuals and thus making a moral judgement about 
badness, goodness, incorrigibility and redeemability. In our study, a few social workers 
made comments such as: 
 
 “(clients need) to be encouraged to empower themselves” 
And 
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“the stress in the job is more about resistant clients and managing the risk they 
pose”  
 
 A further complication, however, was that the workers in Stanford’s study often identified 
clients as being ‘at risk’ as well as ‘a risk.’ Stanford suggests that this leads to a similar 
definition of ‘need’ and ‘risk’ presenting in the same client (which is, of course, the 
accurate picture). Workers are then torn as to which of these polarisations takes priority, 
which Stanford’s workers experienced as moral dilemmas. In the current study, however, 
workers were clear:  risk and public protection take priority, welfare and need come later, 
if there is time. To return to the literature review, the question was raised as to whether 
helping offenders could ever be pursued as a legitimate aim when it comes to service users 
subject to MAPPA arrangements (those defined as ‘high risk’). Linking this question to 
Stanford’s work and the findings of the current study, it would seem that for defined ‘high 
risk’ offenders, workers would have even more reason to abandon welfare ‘needs’ for the 
pursuit of risk management processes, and to suffer little ethical stress as a result. In fact, 
one respondent commented: 
 
 “Regarding risk/public protection vs welfare of the client, the balance of which 
takes priority is directly related to how serious the risk/public protection issue is 
and whether others may be at risk of serious harm. If the answer is no, then welfare 
can take more of a priority.” 
 
In contrast, then, to the service users in Kosny and Eakin’s (2008) study and to Hudson’s 
(2001) emphasis on positive human rights, criminal justice service users are not viewed as 
wholly deserving of help just by virtue of being human. They have to earn the right to help 
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by being judged as low risk. This point will be revisited in Section 5.3.2. In a study by 
McNeill et al. (2009) of court reports, as discussed earlier,  the researchers found that 
welfare concerns were not highlighted as subjects for intervention in their own right, but 
rather as a means to achieve reduced re-offending and reduced risk to the public. It would 
appear from the current study, that this frame of reference continues once a court report has 
been considered and a probation order (as was, now a payback order) implemented, in that 
welfare, even when it is undertaken, is done with the explicit purpose of reducing the risk 
of the offender, not helping him or her. The idea that as material and personal 
circumstances improve, crime should reduce (Garland, 2001) underpins the Social Work 
(Scotland) Act 1968, and should also add to the the social workers’ justification for 
tackling welfare issues and undertaking ‘helping’ work; but public protection and risk 
management over-ride this endeavour to the extent that there is often no room or time for 
welfare work at all: 
 
“workloads change so dramatically at times....so difficult to prioritise welfare over 
criminogenic needs,” 
 
“how can we get to know clients properly in terms of risk when we have to 
complete the 20 assessments within 20 days of sentencing!!!”  
And 
“although managers do seem to have an awareness of the importance of worker-
client relationship, nonetheless the primary focus is on meeting targets and 
performance indicators.” 
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Herein, then, lies one explanation why the agency’s approach to work with offenders does 
not impact directly on workers’ feelings of ethical stress. Agencies do not deter workers 
from addressing welfare needs and helping where they can, and workers consider these 
endeavours important for reducing reoffending.  However, when time is short and 
workloads high, the bureaucratic, procedural tasks associated with risk monitoring take 
priority. Workers do their best within those restrictions and, because they are doing their 
best, do not feel their values are compromised. For each worker, ‘doing what you can’ 
(healthy, in terms of overall well being, (Shier and Graham, 2010)) will be an individual 
judgement. For example, a worker who does not believe in penal-welfare values will 
choose to only do the monitoring, risk management work, and this will be viewed as 
acceptable (the important tasks are being done). A worker with a strong belief in penal-
welfarism will ‘go the extra mile’ and will attempt to do welfare work when workload 
allows. Both workers will feel they are acting in accordance with their values, within the 
external restrictions. It seems that external measures of approval and review would find 
both approaches acceptable. Only the ethical climate will exert any influence on how 
workers are ‘supposed’ to work beyond the risk management procedures. Any approach to 
work with offenders only becomes a problem in terms of ethical stress when it is 
obstructed by excessive workload demands or when the wider ethical climate is at odds 
with how the worker wants to work. Then there is a direct impact on ethical stress as 
already analysed. In support of these ideas, several comments were made regarding the 
latitude that individual workers have to involve themselves with welfare needs or not, the 
implication being that as long as the other tasks are done, working with welfare needs can 
also be undertaken if the worker chooses to do so, for example: 
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“I believe that the service a client receives is largely dependent on the individual 
worker and their knowledge and motivation.”  
 
Workers can then, to an extent, choose to work in a more or less helping/welfare driven 
manner depending on their own value base (theme number 6 from the qualitative data, see 
Section 4.7, Figure 19). It is therefore not surprising that ethical stress does not result from 
the type of approach taken. In this context, however, it also seems that no-one will be too 
perturbed if the welfare type of work does not happen. The message from the current study 
is that public protection, risk assessment and administrative paperwork all take priority and 
welfare work is done if time allows and if workers want to do so. This fits very well with 
McNeill’s (2004) argument that work with offenders has shifted from helping the offender 
as an end-in-himself to the help being offered as a means to reducing re-offending and 
protecting the public. Future victims are the ones at whom the ‘helping’ is really aimed. 
Any reduction in the poor circumstances and increase in comfort of the offender is an extra 
bonus. This, of course, dilutes the emphasis on helping if the more controlling measures of 
assessment and management are seen as the more effective, priority duties. Halliday et al. 
(2009) in a study of criminal justice social workers within the sentencing process in 
Scotland, found that welfare needs in court reports were down-played, as workers 
attempted to achieve credibility with those of higher status in the criminal justice system 
(e.g. sheriffs). Workers worried that “their professional discourse of welfare and care 
would be undervalued as “namby-pambiness”” (Halliday, et al., 2009, p422). Although 
carrying out the supervision of a court order does not involve the direct oversight of a 
sheriff in the way that reading a report a worker has written does, the tone is nonetheless 
set that welfare needs take a back seat for reasons of public protection, time restrictions 
and credibility in the eyes of the court. From the current study, then, it is easy to 
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understand why some workers will attend more to the welfare of service users than others. 
Personal motivation and a strong belief in penal-welfare values are required to overcome 
the possible justifications for not becoming involved in this type of work. 
 
5.2.6  Contributory and reciprocal relationship between how we work 
with offenders and risk and ethical climate  
 
The second point for consideration in the analysis of the model is that the approach to work 
with offenders does impact on the agency’s approach to risk and the ethical climate. See 
Section 4.5 and Figure 13 for the results of the first standard multiple regression which 
shows that ‘how we work with offenders’ has a significant and contributory relationship 
with both ‘risk’ and ‘ethical climate.’ Results are also given demonstrating that the factors 
‘risk’ and ‘ethical climate’ also impact on ‘how we work with offenders, again in a 
reciprocal loop. Also, see 5.2.4, Diagram 4 for these relationships expressed 
diagrammatically. So, the less desistance focused an agency is, the more risk-averse and 
the less ‘value-friendly’ is the culture. The connections between these three variables are 
quite easy to see. For example, if work with offenders is dominated by set programmes and 
manualised groupwork, then this will become a problem if workloads are high. High 
workloads, an element of ethical climate, will have the effect of only allowing time for risk 
management and the procedural, systematic, technicist elements of the work (which, as 
already covered, our respondents said took precedence when time was tight) and not allow 
for relationship based, helping, desistance work. The ethical climate will therefore impact 
directly on which type of work with offenders is encouraged. For workers who do not 
share penal-wefare values, this will not cause a problem, but will increase the perpetuation 
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of a vicious circle of technicist practice. Workers in this type of environment who have a 
firm belief in penal-welfare values, will feel significant ethical stress (and will try to do 
welfare work where possible, but without support or encouragement). Also, such a 
situation might well cause and be symbiotically influenced by, technical and procedural 
supervision, and an office climate where there is limited time or space for discussion of 
values or ethical issues and where the ‘new penology’ dominates. Dissatisfaction with 
elements of the ‘new penology’ was theme number 3 in the qualitative data (see Figure 
19). For example: 
 
“I am in a very bureaucratic environment where engagement (with offenders) is 
viewed very disdainfully.”  
 
On the other hand a value-friendly culture will encourage welfare, helping, relational work 
in line with the ‘old penology,’ when time allows and this will be supported and 
reinforced, thus encouraging an ‘upward spiral.’  Clearly, this will reduce the ethical stress 
experienced by workers to whom values are important (hence the relationship between 
ethical culture and ethical stress, as discussed previously). Furthermore, Dale and Trlin 
describe a ‘values-based’ style of leadership as one which depends on “the level of value-
congruence between leader and follower” (Dale and Trlin, 2010, p127). They go on to say 
that this “in turn, is likely to exert a significant influence on service delivery” (ibid.  p127). 
In other words, the ethical climate of the agency (as already established, heavily influenced 
by the senior) and the level of ‘value congruence’ between senior and social worker will 
directly impact on the work with offenders (service delivery). As Dale and Trlin explain, 
this is because within a ‘values-based’ leadership style, values are used as a guide for 
action. In the current study, if worker and senior share values characterised by penal-
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welfarism and its inherent core function of helping, then this will impact on the approach 
to working with offenders whereby helping and welfare work will remain as one of several 
priorities even in the face of the over-riding requirement for risk and public protection 
tasks.  If workers are, as suggested above, personally motivated to become involved in 
welfare work and desistance-informed approaches, this will influence the type of 
discussion that goes on in the office. As McNeill et al. (2010) state in their comprehensive 
literature review, “social workers in criminal justice have a sense of ‘double 
marginalisation’ from “generic social work….and from the law profession dominated 
world of the courts” (McNeill et al., 2010, p37).  This double marginalisation leads to 
insecurity and anxiety, expressed, for example, in the status seeking and underplaying of 
welfare concerns apparent in court report writing as already discussed (Halliday et al., 
2009). Another consequence of this marginalised context is that cultures within agencies 
become self-perpetuating, minimally affected by outside influences. McNeill et al. (2010) 
state that “criminal justice social workers may themselves tend to look inwards, to identify 
with their traditions, their teams and their peers, and to hold fast to established routines and 
practices” (ibid.  p40). Therefore, if workers have a strong commitment to penal-welfare 
values, they will imbue the culture with those norms and traditions and this will tend to self 
perpetuate in the socialisation of new workers and the type of discussions and debates 
within the agency. Conversely, however, should workers feel that welfare work is not 
valuable, then this will impact on the ethical climate in the same self-perpetuating way. It 
can be seen, therefore, how the approach to work with offenders can influence the culture 
without impacting directly on the ethical stress of the workers.  
 
Glisson and Green (2011) conducted a very large national US study looking at the effect of 
organisational climate, defined as the elements of culture experienced by workers as per 
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the current study, on outcomes for child welfare.  The researchers reported that “The 
study’s most important finding in that longterm outcomes for maltreated children are more 
positive for those children served by child welfare systems with more engaged 
organisational climates” (Glisson and Green, 2011, p 589).  The authors theorise that this 
finding is because workers from an organisation with a positive climate will be able to 
attend to a family’s unique needs to a greater extent, will be able to respond to crises more 
flexibly and attentively, build relationships with the family and child more thoroughly and 
navigate bureaucracy more effectively. This adds weight to the significant, contributory 
relationship that ‘ethical climate’ has with ‘how we work with offenders;’ that is, 
responsive, desistance characterised work will be more easily achievable if the ethical 
climate of the agency is congruent with social work and penal-welfare values. 
 
A study by Smith et al. (2010) considered the experiences of 569 new employees within an 
organisation. Their findings highlighted the importance of validation from team members 
and the team leader.  Messages and feedback particularly concerning the workers’ actual 
practices as well as opinions and views were very important to the worker making a 
commitment to the team and organisation, for example,  “Once an individual becomes 
identified with a group, he or she may also develop a commitment to the group and 
internalise its goals, culture, norms and values.” (Smith et al., 2010, p46).  Applying this 
to the argument above, then, it can be seen that new workers, learning how to work with 
offenders in the way the agency does (for example,  how much emphasis and importance is 
attached to relationship building, helping with welfare and desistance), will concurrently 
be inclined to find acceptance within the agency by attempting to find congruence between 
organisational values and their own. In CJSW this may be particularly acute given the 
doubly marginalised position of the service (McNeill et al., 2009). Smith et al. also 
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highlighted the importance of identification with the organisation, as distinct from the 
team. Surprisingly, they found that identification with the goals and aims of the 
organisation was more important (in terms of retention of staff) than identification with the 
team. Therefore feeling you ‘belong’ to a team and share their values and culture is 
important, but feeling the same kinship with the wider organisation is even more so. In the 
context of the current study, this begs the question as to why the respondents did not 
express more dissatisfaction and ethical stress overall, given that many comments were 
made about higher ‘management’ as representatives of the organisation, for example, 
 
 “management are very unrealistic about the amount of work people can manage” 
And 
“Some procedures fall to the bottom of the priority list when prioritising actual 
work with clients, but management does not like this.”   
 
A possible answer, however, is one which resonates with all of the findings so far, that is, 
the vital importance of the role of the senior social worker. Smith et al. states that, on 
joining the organisation, a new worker may be “unsure of the true nature of the 
organisation or..... ambiguous about how he or she feels about working for the 
organisation.” (ibid.  p49). Smith et al. actually describe this as a “lack of congruence” 
(ibid.  p49) between the team and the organisation which can be stressful for individual 
workers and which highlights a different level of disjuncture. Against this background, 
Smith at al found that “team leader validation positively predicted both team satisfaction 
and organisational satisfaction. It appears that team leaders can simultaneously be a 
representative of the local team and be a representative of the organisation” (ibid.  p58). 
Once again, then, the senior social worker in the current study’s context might be carrying 
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out all of the functions identified in the discussion thus far, as well as having the most 
significant influence upon new workers and their socialisation into the particular culture of 
the team, as well as into the unique interpretations of the overall organisation’s aims and 
goals. It seems there is a ‘sense-making’ function for a senior in terms of the new worker’s 
socialisation.  This might also explain why differences between LAs were found, even 
when any one LA may well encompass several different teams. It may be that the 
‘organisation’ in this context is the LA CJSW organisation (as opposed to notions of a 
national CJSW identity), and that the senior social workers employed by the particular LA, 
mediate the organisational messages. Sluss and Thomson (2012) echo these findings and 
suggest that their study provides “evidence that the supervisor......is an integral relational 
source for newcomer attitudes such as identification, fit and satisfaction.” (Sluss and 
Thompson, 2012, p120). The researchers found that on-going access to supervisors, advice, 
task instruction etc. (supervisor socialisation tactics) and discussion of mutual goals and 
values (leader-member exchange) have a strong influence on identification with the 
organisation (as explored previously, mediating organisational goals and policies, and 
actual practice) and the personal fit of the work. As discussed previously ‘personal fit’ of 
the work is a significant ethical stress reducer (Shier and Graham, 2010). So, in summary, 
as Sluss and Thompson state, “the newcomer process may be much more complex, both 
symbolically and substantively, than merely a learning process” (ibid.  p122), and the role 
of the senior social worker (in our context) may be absolutely pivotal.  The above 
discussion adds substantially to the findings from McNeill et al. (2009) in regards to a self-
perpetuating culture within CJSW. CJSW is doubly-marginalsied and the culture may be 
inward looking and self-perpetuating, but one of the key features of that process is the role 
of the senior social worker – in terms of acculturation of new workers and the on-going 
personal fit between the worker and the wider LA CJSW organisation.  
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In terms of the model, then, new workers will learn the practices of working with 
offenders, which will impact on, and perpetuate, the ethical culture of the agency. Hence 
the reciprocal influence of these working practices and the ethical climate of the agency. 
When these socialisation techniques fail, and the culture the senior, the team and the 
organisation create are at odds with those held by a worker, and no amount of mediation by 
the senior social worker can alleviate this, then the explanatory link in the model between 
ethical culture and ethical stress is obvious. There remains incongruence. This will also 
happen when the culture of the organisation is simply having too strong an influence, and 
the senior either backs up the organisational policy and procedures without any flexibility 
and/or tolerance of ontological anxiety, thus creating a restrictive, risk averse and value-
unfriendly ethical climate which also self-perpetuates and which workers find cause 
increasing levels of ethical stress. 
 
The agency approach to risk has also been demonstrated to have a significant impact on the 
agency’s approach to work with offenders. The more risk-averse the agency seems to be, 
the less desistance based is the approach to work. The suggestion was made in Section 2.3 
that desistance work might be difficult for agencies to adopt because of the ontological 
anxiety it might produce. Workers need autonomy and discretion to respond to service-
users in thoroughly individualised ways – taking into account the service user’s agenda and 
priorities. This might well involve helping with needs and problems that are not necessarily 
strictly criminogenic in nature (Fenton, 2012a). However, this approach is congruent, 
again, with values based on a penal-welfare ethos. This responsive and discretionary way 
to work does produce ontological anxiety and it seems from the results that the more risk 
averse an agency is, the less it is able to tolerate anxiety, as suggested in Section 2.3. This 
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might be one reason, therefore, why the impact of the desistance literature has been 
“muted” (McCulloch and McNeill, 2009, p155). The normal distribution for scores for the 
‘risk’ section demonstrate that the spread is skewed towards the lower scores. Therefore, 
hearteningly, workers are rating their agencies as somewhat less risk averse than a normal 
spread would have suggested. Desistance work might be hampered by risk averse practices 
in agencies as suggested, but maybe not to a great degree. Agencies are viewed by workers 
as not overly risk averse which resonates with McNeill et al.’s (2009) findings that court 
reports were also not dominated by an over-riding concern with risk. Once again, the 
comments support this in that the most prolific view is that agencies support both 
standardised risk procedures as well as responsive, helping work. The ethos is that workers 
should do both, but heavy workloads impede this, often only leaving time for the 
procedural risk/public protection priority tasks. 
 
The question does arise however, in regards to workers perhaps not viewing practices as 
risk averse not because the agency is risk accepting, but because workers’ views are in line 
with risk averse practices. For example, theme number 7 from the qualitative data (see 
Figure 19) is characterised by workers finding risk assessment tools and procedures to be 
positive additions to their work. As mentioned previously, only one worker framed this in 
overtly risk averse terms of being protected from blame, whereas other comments were 
more concerned with the work being more robust, for instance: 
 
“I think it’s a positive change in practice that work is based upon structured risk 
assessment tools,”  
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“structured risk assessment tools only add to the professionalism of my work, by 
giving a sound research base on which to base decisions” 
And 
“risk assessment tools are considered to be ‘more professional”  
 
This resonates with Robinson’s ideas around ‘professional paradox’ (Robinson, 2003). 
Given, however, that more experienced workers object to risk aversion more than any 
other single aspect of the ‘new penology’ is this being balanced in the results by a positive 
outlook from less experienced workers? The comments would suggest this may be the 
case. Is Robinson’s ‘paradox’ experienced by newer workers as more of a ‘certainty’ that 
risk assessment tools and procedures are positive and add to the professionalism of the 
work? These are, perhaps, questions for further study. 
 
It is also logical to suggest that a risk averse approach which is mediated via a senior and 
produces more or less ethical stress for workers, might also be mediated via a senior to 
impact on the type of work undertaken. Risk aversion would lend itself to manualised, 
programmed work rather than to responsive, desistance work as discussed previously. 
Might the senior social worker also be playing an important role here? The comments 
would suggest that this is the case. For example: 
 
“I think the agency struggles with the difficulty in ‘measuring’ the value of a 
helping/welfare approach, is unsure of its political acceptability and therefore is 
reluctant to embrace it openly.”  
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A senior who is clear in their adherence to social work values, would be able to rationalise 
and legitimise a welfare/helping approach, and thus be able to embed it as a vital part of 
the culture. However, as the quote above illustrates, this is not easy. Stanford (2010) states 
“It appears that fear, the undermining of trust and the need for control have overtaken and 
undermined discussions about the creative impetus and courage required to take risks in 
practice” (Stanford, 2010, p 1067). Stanford goes on to say that efforts to control and 
minimize risk have taken the place of real efforts to relieve hardship, that is, risk 
management has eclipsed helping work. In this context, senior social workers have to be 
strong and clear in their value base to be able to withstand the pervasiveness of risk 
aversion. Once again, they have to be able to see, understand and articulate the importance 
of social work values and the place of social justice and helping/welfare within that. As 
Kosny and Eakin (2008) found, the workers and managers in the agencies they studied, all 
had a strong and shared belief in underpinning social justice values. They saw service users 
as victims of an unfair society and thus were able to legitimise helping and share a belief in 
the mission of the agency. As the respondent above stated, in the current study, people 
viewed managers as being less than clear about the values of social justice in that  perhaps 
it is not politically correct to view offenders as any sort of victim whom we can 
legitimately strive to help. Once again, then, the practice and underlying value beliefs of 
the senior social worker is playing a pivotal role. Although this aspect of the analysis is 
drawn more from the literature than from the findings of the current study (see Section 3.5 
regarding this particular limitation of the study), it appears sufficiently important and 
robust to warrant inclusion in the model, with brackets to denote its more tentative nature. 
As such, the model now looks like: 
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Diagram 5: Importance of the SSW Part 2 
 
Ethical Stress
Ethical Climate
How we work with 
offenders
  SSW   (SSW)
Risk
 
 
 
5.2.7 Bringing the Findings Together and Conclusion 
The module represented in Diagram 5 has been dissected and analysed above. It is now 
necessary to relook at the deconstructed elements and attempt to reconstruct them into a 
comprehensive ‘whole.’ Obviously, the setting for the model is CJSW in Scotland, where, 
as was ascertained in the literature review, the position and importance of penal-welfare 
values and the resultant duty ‘to promote welfare’ (Sec. 12, Social Work (Scotland) Act, 
1968) has changed dramatically over the years. The erosion of these values and their 
replacement with public protection and risk prioritisation has also been discussed. These 
changes have been presented as a context wherein social workers may experience ethical 
stress, caused by the inability to base one’s practice on one’s values. The value base of 
social work is characterised by helping people with their problems and by giving attention 
to social justice issues (International Federation of Social Work (IFSW), 2012). Therefore, 
social work should be concerned with helping people with their welfare needs and 
understanding and promoting social justice, for example, understanding the effects of 
social injustice, tackling this where possible, taking cognisance of a person’s difficult 
circumstances (for example poverty, lack of opportunity) and working towards an aim of a 
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more just society and positive change for the individual. Social work departments in 
Scotland operationalise these values via the Scottish Social Services Council (SSSC), the 
regulatory body for social services in Scotland, and their Codes of practice (SSSC, 2009). 
For example, the Codes state that social workers must, “protect the rights and promote the 
interests of service users and carers” (SSSC, 2009, p 22). 
As stated in the literature review, the dominant ideology in criminal justice in the western 
world has, from the beginning of the 20
th
 century, been characterised by a penal welfare 
ethos (Garland, 2001). Penal welfarism has rehabilitation at its centre and is underpinned 
by the maxim that as material circumstances improve for people, so crime should reduce 
(Garland, 2001). There is, therefore, congruence between a penal welfare approach, the 
value base of international social work (IFSW, 2012) and the legal and value base of 
Scottish social work. Helping people to improve their circumstances is a welfare based 
approach, and endeavouring for a more materially comfortable society for everyone, is a 
social justice aim. The good fit between social work in general and social work with 
offenders, in particular, would therefore lend itself to social work with offenders sitting 
comfortably within social work departments, and having clear legitimacy for undertaking 
helping and welfare work with service users. 
 
From the findings of the current study, however, it seems that CJSW does not sit 
completely comfortably within the wider social work world. Some of the changes that the 
‘new penology’ (Feeley and Simon, 1992) has brought about are at odds with the value 
base of wider social work, and this is objected to quite strongly by workers in the 
qualitative data. Objections to features of the new penology is the third most prevalent 
theme which emerged from the data, for example: 
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“Modern social work practice is increasingly shifting focus to  ‘box-ticking’ and 
‘number-crunching.’ Lots of time is now spent on recording events.” 
 
“The degree of flexibility in how you choose to work with your client has 
decreased over time.” 
AND 
“A major emphasis on risk and, in addition, we are all about achieving targets.” 
 
At a team level, senior social workers are mediating between ethical climate, approach to 
risk and the amount of ethical stress a worker will experience. Senior social workers also 
appear to mediate between how the agency approaches the work with offenders, risk and 
ethical climate. Senior social workers have been shown to be pivotal in terms of sharing 
risk decisions, providing supervision and ‘allowing’ or encouraging penal-welfare based 
work.  However, the historical and ‘new penological’ changes discussed in Section 2.2 and 
commented upon above, have become embodied in governmental changes of direction and 
priorities, and appear to be extremely influential. For example, according to the 
quantitative data, risk aversion impacts on ethical stress and restrictive risk practices 
influence how a social worker can work with an offender (Diagram 5). Reflecting on the 
qualitative data further, however, the second most common theme, and 18.7% of all 
comments, made reference to the belief that risk and public protection work must take 
priority, and the fourth most common theme, that agencies can balance risk work with 
welfare work, are concerned with the influence of the ‘new penology’ in terms of its most 
defining feature, risk management. Add this to the third most prevalent theme which is 
defined by negative comments about ‘new penological’ features as illustrated above, and it 
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can be seen quite clearly that the qualitative data set is clearly concerned with features of 
the ‘new penology.’ Although social workers, as illustrated above, made negative 
comments about the ‘new penology,’ the prioritisation of public protection in the mid-90s 
(McCulloch and McNeill, 2011) which was very congruent with a ‘new penological’ ethos, 
appears to have impacted to such an extent that workers are extremely clear that risk and 
public protection work is always the primary concern. Notwithstanding that prioritisation, 
however, the duty to promote welfare also remains, but, according to respondents, is very 
much secondary. How much emphasis, importance and encouragement is given over to 
promoting welfare and to ‘helping’ depends on the ethical climate of the agency and to the 
approach to risk the agency takes (as suggested by the significant and contributory 
relationships these two variables have with ‘how the agency works with offenders’ see 
Section 4.5, Figure 18), but it might be argued that, according to the qualitative data, the 
most important influence on the work done with offenders is the ‘new penological’ impact 
of the Scottish Government. This can be expressed as follows (Diagram 6):  
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Diagram 6: Importance of the Impact of the Scottish Government 
 
Scottish 
Government
Senior 
management 
Ethical Stress
Ethical Climate
How we work with 
offenders
  SSW   (SSW)
Risk
 
 
 
In recognition of the powerful influence of the ‘new penology,’ and the resulting tension 
with traditional, rehabilitation and welfare based probation, Vanstone and Priestly (2008) 
proposed a new model of rehabilitation, separating the two functions completely. One 
function would be embodied in a “control agency” (Vanstone and Priestly, 2008, p68), 
designed to control and manage those offenders who pose a danger to others. The other 
function would include the community justice functions, all concerned with change and 
including traditional probation (as per the ‘old penology’). The community justice function 
would promote “a response to offending which stresses harm reduction.....dedicated to the 
production of citizens” (ibid. P70).  This model attempts to bring a structural clarity to the 
competing demands of contemporary probation, a clarity which, according to the current 
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study, social workers find in the expression of their own work at the expense of the change 
based, welfare endeavour of the ‘old penology.’ 
 
In conclusion, then, the exploration and analysis of the data collected in relation to research 
question 1 has uncovered a complex picture, best expressed diagrammatically in Figure 6. 
In addition to identifying the connections between variables and the possible underlying 
explanations for those connections, other additional findings have been emerged.  The 
important role the senior social worker plays in mediating between the intra-organisational 
features of the model, was an unexpected, and yet quite clear, finding. Exploration of the 
qualitative data has added an explanatory layer to the statistical connections described, but 
has also given a very clear message about the power of the ‘new penological’ changes 
which appear to impact forcefully on all aspects of CJSW. Finally, the difference in 
perceptions between older, more experienced workers and younger less experience 
workers is emerging as a striking theme. This will be discussed further in Sections 5.3 and 
5.4. 
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5.3  Research Question 2: Do different local authorities produce 
different scores on the model variables? 
 
5.3.1 Introduction 
 
The results from the MANOVA (see Section 4.6) show that, in terms of the combined 
variables,  there are significant variations between LAs. In other words, when the effect of 
the variables ‘ethical stress,’ ‘risk,’ ‘how we work with offenders’ and ‘ethical climate’ 
were taken together, LAs varied significantly. When the results for the four variables were 
considered separately however, it appears that only ‘ethical stress’ and ‘ethical climate’ 
vary significantly from LA to LA. ‘Approach to work with offenders’ and approach to 
‘risk’, do not.  In summary, therefore, how ethically friendly the agency climate is, and 
how ethically stressed a worker feels, depends, to a significant degree, upon where the 
social worker works. The approach to the work with offenders and the approach to risk, 
however, are similar regardless of workplace location. This will now be discussed in more 
depth. 
 
5.3.2  Ethical Stress and Ethical Climate 
 
Ethical climate varies significantly from one LA to another.  Ethical climate can be linked 
to ‘culture’ which is defined by Tyler (2007) as “A pattern of shared behaviours, beliefs, 
ideas, values and knowledge embedded in practices, systems, artefacts and symbols....It 
refers to the atmosphere or climate within the organisation and to the values that influence 
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the way people work and are managed” (Tyler, 2007, p215). It can be seen from this 
definition, then, that shared beliefs, values and how people are managed (the role of the 
senior social worker (SSW)) form part of the definition of culture as well as of the ethical 
climate variable already analysed. As McNeill et al. (2010) suggest, ignoring the powerful 
effects of culture has been recognised by many writers as a recipe for failure.  It would 
seem that the results in the current study add weight to the importance of culture, given the 
direct link between ethical climate and ethical stress, and ethical climate and the agency 
approach to working with offenders. The starting point for this section of the discussion, is 
McNeill’s hypothesis that CJSW in Scotland is in a ‘doubly marginalised’ position:  
 
“The criminal justice social workers evidenced an enduring role tension between their 
responsibilities as justice professionals towards the courts, and their responsibilities as 
social work professionals towards their clients or service users. In their discourses and 
practices, they also revealed a sense of ‘double-marginalisation;’ both from generic social 
work…and from the law-profession dominated world of the courts.” (McNeill et al., 2010, 
p37). 
 
As a result of this double-marginalisation, and also due to the changing socio-political 
landscape (the new penology), McNeill et al. suggest that criminal justice social workers 
feel insecure in their role and that they believe “that their welfare affiliations are a liability 
that must be offset by adapting to a risk management and protection ethos” (ibid.  p37).  It 
was quite clear in the first part of the discussion how social workers were adapting in that 
they continued to pursue welfare aims with their service users when there was time and 
space within workloads to do so, but were simultaneously very clear that risk management 
and public protection tasks took priority (theme number 2 from the qualitative data, see 
Figure 19, Section 4.7). They also adapted by sharing more of their decisions with senior 
social workers rather than striving for fuller, more authentic autonomy. As McNeill et al. 
state “criminal justice social work continues to struggle with fundamental issues of identity 
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and purpose” (ibid. P38), although the findings from the current study would indicate that 
there is more clarity than this would suggest, especially in relation to the prioritisation of 
public protection/risk work. Respondents were surprisingly and consistently clear about 
this. Notwithstanding this clarity of purpose, however, workers do feel ethical stress when 
they perceive their agencies to be risk averse and when workloads and ethical climates are 
such that any inclination to undertake welfare work is thwarted.  
 
McNeill et al. (2010) go on to say that a further consequence of the ‘double 
marginalisation’ is that “criminal justice social workers may themselves tend to look 
inwards, to identify with their traditions, their teams and their peers” (ibid.  p40). This then 
may mean that individual team or LA cultures are self-perpetuating, somewhat detached 
from outside influence other that those elements which are brought in by the Scottish 
Government (see Diagram 6). This would therefore explain why ethical climate varies 
depending on where you work in Scotland. Each LA (and perhaps, to some extent, each 
team) will have its own unique culture which self-perpetuates to a degree, and within 
which the senior social worker plays a major part. McNeill et al. state that “at the front 
line, ideological change can be negotiated, mediated and managed in practice by individual 
penal professionals finding different ways to re-inscribe existing …practices with evolving 
ideologies” (ibid.  p37), whereas the results from the current study would suggest that this 
is not happening at an individual social worker level, but, rather, may be happening at a 
first line manager level. Senior social workers are mediating changes in priorities and 
ethos, and ‘allowing’ workers to find time for welfare work, encouraging said work, 
allowing discretions and deviation from procedure and sharing decision making with social 
workers. In the current study, the senior social worker is the mediator of ethical stress at 
several levels (theme number 5, Section 4.7, Figure 19). Thus far, then, it can be seen that 
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the ethical climate within an agency might vary from LA to LA, and it has already been 
demonstrated that the level of ethical stress workers will experience depends significantly 
on that climate. In order to further the discussion, it is necessary to have a clearer idea of 
what ethical climate is and what kind of part it plays in the overall culture of an agency. 
 
Schein (2010) explores three different levels of culture. The first level is comprised of 
“artefacts” (Schein, 2010, p24), the observable, visible manifestations of culture. So, in the 
context of the current study, the questions about ethical climate were concerned with this 
level; supervision, group discussions, decision making discussions, workload, change 
processes and explicit jargon describing the agency (e.g. ‘procedurally driven’).  Glisson 
and Green (2011) describe ‘organisational climate’ as capturing “the qualities of work 
environments that explain how those environments are experienced by the people who 
work in them” (Glisson and Green, 2011, p 583), which, again, is congruent with the 
current study’s definition.  Schein suggests that although the artefacts level  can be seen or 
experienced, to understand what it means, one must explore the deeper level of “espoused 
beliefs and values” (Schein, 2010, p25). According to Schein, the only way to uncover this 
level is to ask people who work in the agency, as per the current study.  However, Schein 
also notes that what may be uncovered are aspirational values or beliefs, and those might 
be at odds with the actual work or practice within the agency. For example, respondents in 
the current study made some comments such as:  
 
“my agency still values the welfare of clients”  
And 
“I feel we can, and do, consider values” 
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 illustrating that social work values were sometimes being ‘espoused.’ However, given 
what the study has shown in terms of actual practice and ethical climate (the ‘artefacts’ 
level), that is that work based on traditional social work values very much takes second 
place, it would seem that these ‘espoused values’ are indeed somewhat aspirational. 
 
The current study also attempted to uncover if social workers felt their agencies shared a 
belief in penal welfare values (comprised of encouraging helping/welfare work with 
offenders, caring about them and building up relationships with them). In this context, 
respondents were clear that agencies did not object to welfare work, in fact still valued the 
clients’ welfare, but that it was not considered priority work when time was short, for 
example: 
 
“there is much priority on meeting key performance indicators.....but the general 
culture of the team is still to place importance on the actual work we do with 
clients”  
And 
“I think an agency can balance the two” (welfare and risk). 
 
The espoused beliefs then, explicitly articulated, include believing in penal-welfare values 
and the traditional helping/welfare/relationship-building work based on those values, but 
also include the prioritisation of risk, public protection and accountability requirements. 
How the agency works with offenders was consistent between local authorities but, when 
translated into artefacts or action, created differing ethical climates suggesting that the 
particular penal-welfare value belief carried more or less weight depending on the agency 
setting. Schein suggests that to understand espoused beliefs further, the deeper level of  
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culture, the “basic underlying assumptions” (Schein, 2010, p 27) needs to be analysed. 
This level includes basic assumptions about human nature or beliefs that are taken for 
granted. In the context of the current study, this concept highlights once again the erosion 
of the basic assumptions of CJSW agencies, that penal-welfarism is unquestioningly the 
way to think about, and act towards, people who offend, as per the ‘old penology’ (Feeley 
and Simon, 1992). As Garland (2001) states that, in relation to the ‘new penology’ (Feeley 
and Simon, 1092), “instead of indicating need or deprivation, crime was a matter of anti-
social cultures or personalities and of rational individual choice in the face of lax law 
enforcement and lenient sentencing regimes” (Garland, 2001, p102). Several respondents’ 
comments illustrate this: 
 
 “This (offending) is through their choice”  
And  
“clients need to be responsible for what impact their behaviour has on 
victims....child protection/public protection takes priority.”   
 
One of the central underlying assumptions of penal-welfarism is that “social reform 
together with affluence would eventually reduce the frequency of crime” (ibid.  p38), 
indicating the central position of helping and welfare in relation to need, of the old 
penology. Because this idea has lost purchase in the climate of the ‘new penology’ the 
underlying assumption that shapes the culture of criminal justice agencies, may well have 
changed also. Following Schein’s (2010) levels, if a basic underlying assumption of CJSW 
agencies is that offenders are to be risk managed as a priority task, but helped with welfare 
when feasible, this translates into an articulated value position of priority risk management 
tasks and variable welfare work. This, in turn, translates into action depending on 
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discussion of values, supervision priorities, value-based decision making etc. The elements 
of ‘ethical climate’ in fact. This is the variable concept between agencies. Given the 
message from the research study that how much welfare work is done depends on several 
factors such as workload, individual worker motivation and agency importance, it is not 
surprising that this lends itself to considerable and significant variation between settings.  
 
Bissell (2012) in his summing up of culture, emphasises the importance of value 
congruence between the agency and the worker. Once again, this is borne out by the 
current study. The levels of attention to, or allowance of, welfare work must match with 
the social worker’s value position or ethical stress is generated.  Hence the earlier 
discussion of more experienced workers experiencing more ethical stress. The suggestion 
is that their socialisations, within an ethical climate built upon a basic penal-welfare 
assumption, will lead to congruence being achieved via practice still based on such a 
belief, with espoused values concerned with welfare as a priority. Hence the value 
incongruence generated when this does not happen, and workers are restricted to box 
ticking, accountability and risk management work. 
 
So, should social workers adhere to a value base concerned with penal-welfarism or is it 
acceptable for the culture to be neo-liberalist as described by Garland (2001), especially if 
the old penology is now seen as a professional liability (McNeill et al., 2010)? The answer 
to this lies in the congruence between penal-welfarism and a commitment to social justice.  
The IFSW definition, clearly states that social work is centrally concerned with issues of 
social justice: 
“The social work profession promotes social change, problem solving in human 
relationships and the empowerment and liberation of people to enhance well-being. 
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Utilising theories of human behaviour and social systems, social work intervenes at the 
points where people interact with their environments. Principles of human rights and social 
justice are fundamental to social work” (IFSW, 2012, p1). 
 
 This means taking cognisance of structural discrimination, disadvantage, poverty, lack of 
opportunity etc. The same concerns that characterise a penal welfare approach. By 
extension, working with those issues should be central to the practice of social work rather 
than something which might happen if there is time and if the worker feels so inclined. As 
such, it is a moral and ethical endeavour, as opposed to a simple practical task. Preston-
Shoot (2011) notes that social work organisations can lose the focus on care for reasons 
including stereotyping of the service-user group (‘bad’ offenders choosing to inflict harm; 
no recourse to discussion of disadvantage) and enclosed agencies which look inward 
(CJSW agencies in their ‘doubly marginalised’ position). Preston-Shoot goes on to say that 
the organisational context and culture is very important to how social workers behave 
ethically, and that it is important to recognise that social workers “are not autonomous 
agents in their practice, independent of the organisational context in which they are 
situated” (Preston-Shoot, 2011,  p180). Codes of ethics, therefore, which emphasise the 
practitioner’s responsibility neglect the complete picture. There is a significant influence 
from the agency culture which can redefine unethical practice as the right thing to do. 
Therefore, the abandoning of social justice underpinning values, which would lend 
themselves to real welfare endeavour, can become part of the practice definition of 
prioritising public protection. It is unethical to abandon such work, and yet it can become 
redefined as acceptable in the face of policy direction which gives an alternative emphasis. 
As Preston-Shoot states “institutional patterns of conduct and organisational compliance, 
rather than professional norms, dominate responses to genuine cases for help and distance 
practitioners from people’s needs” (ibid.  p184). As discussed previously, it has become 
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acceptable to only focus on ‘risk’ and neglect ‘need’ (Stanford, 2010).  The official 
language and pseudo-scientific jargon of technical tools and procedures can also “distance 
officials from the people ‘served’ and .........promote a sense of legitimacy and routine 
without the need to engage with social or ethical concerns” (Preston-Shoot, p 187). Is this 
perhaps what Robinson (2003) uncovered when she researched the ‘professional paradox’ 
and found that some social workers objected to the introduction of a technical risk 
assessment tool, whereas some found it enhanced feelings of professionalism by conferring 
a sense of legitimacy on the work. Is this also related to why respondents in the current 
study were quite positive about risk assessment tools and procedures (see Figure 19, theme 
7)? The above point also illuminates further Gregory’s (2010) finding that the “appalling 
reality of offenders’ lives is being ignored with the abandonment of a social work approach 
to the work” (Gregory, 2010,  p2280). 
 
“Agency culture is a strong force in shaping how practitioners practice” (Preston-Shoot, 
2011, p 188), then, and social workers must be attuned to these forces to be able to resist 
their influence. The agency culture can “limit social workers to narrow interpersonal issues 
unrelated to (oppressive) social and policy contexts” (ibid.  p188). This does assume, 
however, that social workers’ themselves have a significant belief in promoting social 
justice and that they can see beyond individual pathology to wider structural influence. 
Although social justice is taught as a core part of all social work educational programmes, 
can it be assumed that workers, who have grown up in an era where “no-one can 
unabashedly support” penal-welfare beliefs (Garland, 2001) actually do believe that crime 
and social justice are linked?  Lafrance et al. (2004) found that social work education 
providers struggled with terminating students’ studies on the basis of unsuitable 
characteristics, one category of which was apathy and cynicism towards social justice 
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ideology, and inadequate political awareness. Practice educators were clear that a value 
position congruent with social justice aims was fundamental to the social work profession, 
but “expressed concern about students who failed to understand the social conditions that 
affect their clients, or to address the systemic issues that come to their attention” (Lafrance 
et al., 2004, p336). Practice educators were also concerned that students over-identify with 
“the bureaucratic imperatives and lose sight of their allegiance to the goals of social work” 
(ibid.  p337).  
 
In the context of the current study, social workers were clear and relatively happy with a 
prioritisation of the ‘bureaucratic imperatives’ (including standardised tools, paperwork 
and performance indicators) and pursued the ‘goals of social work’ in terms of welfare and 
relationships when they had time and the inclination to do so. Very few comments or 
mention was made of the social work commitment to social justice. The concerns 
expressed by the practice educators in Lafrance et al.’s study therefore appear to be playing 
out to some extent in CJSW. In the current study, older, more experienced workers 
experienced more stress by being unable to act on their values, newer workers significantly 
less so. Issues of deservedness, ‘incorrigibles,’ ‘underclass’ and risky populations who 
need to be controlled and managed repeatedly arose in the literature review of this thesis. 
Such concepts sit quite comfortably within  neo-liberal, ‘new penological’ thinking where 
issues of social justice or attempts to understand structural discrimination and disadvantage 
are irrelevant. From this ethos comes the view that people who are offenders (other than 
those who are complying, desisting and ‘doing well,’ and thus deserving of help) are 
incorrigible, part of the underclass and, therefore, simply a risk to be managed. Workers 
who believe in this basic underlying value assumption will undertake little welfare work 
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and will not consider social justice. They may well, however, do the public protection and 
risk work very well indeed. 
 
Lafrance et al. (2004) suggest that students should be “socialised into the social justice 
mission of social work in the education process” (ibid.  p337), but given the earlier 
exploration of the power of the ‘doubly-marginalised’ culture of CJSW, the parallel power 
of the socialisation process of new workers into such a culture and the wider power of the 
neo-liberal society and ‘new penology,’ it is questionable whether more attention to social 
justice within educational establishments will have sufficient impact. The culture of CJSW 
needs to become more concerned with social justice, and explicitly tuned to penal-welfare 
values to facilitate and encourage workers to adhere to the “social justice mission of social 
work” (ibid.  p337). 
 
The role of the senior social worker has been consistently highlighted as significantly 
instrumental in creating the culture of the team setting. Whittaker (2011) undertook a study 
looking at child protection workers’ defence strategies and culture of the agency. One of 
the main findings was that workers, as a defence against anxiety, tended to delegate 
decision making upwards (to their seniors). This is, of course, exactly in keeping with the 
findings from the current study, as discussed previously (see Section 5.2.2). Whittaker 
uncovered certain techniques used, beyond simple asking, for example social workers 
initiating a conversation about a case, but not suggesting any action, to the point where the 
senior social worker filled in the gap and suggested what the worker should do. Whittaker 
also noted that this anxiety-defence strategy was less prevalent among more experienced 
workers, which is, again, in line with the findings from the current study. He found that 
more experienced workers reduced their anxiety by following their own judgement, and 
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again, this resonates with experienced workers in the current study wanting more 
autonomy. Another strategy used to reduce anxiety identified by Whittaker was the use of 
“checks and counterchecks” (Whittaker, 2011, p487). This strategy is as it sounds, 
checking and rechecking that decisions are acceptable. Whittaker’s study is less clear about 
with whom the checks were made, but it could be suggested that, once again, the senior 
social worker is a key player.  Finally, the third strategy used by the child protection 
workers was to follow a specified procedure and “not being required to make a choice and 
thus incur the burden of decision-making” (Whittaker, 2011, p 489). This was a point made 
in the literature review of the current study (see Phillips, 2009, Section 2.3), when it was 
suggested that workers will follow procedures out of fear of being blamed should 
something go wrong. Whittaker adds some weight to this by highlighting the value and 
emphasis workers placed on procedural knowledge. This type of knowledge was rated as 
being of more value than case work ‘expertise.’ The workers in the current study appeared 
to experience some of this type of security generated from procedures, for example (theme 
number 5, Figure 19): 
 
 “Procedures are sound”  
And 
“Procedures are there for a reason”  
 
However, there was also a significant and contributory link between risk aversion and 
ethical stress experienced by workers. Workers seemed to resolve the need to be 
responsive and take moral risks, whilst experiencing anxiety generated by working in this 
way, by sharing the decision making with senior social workers, and thus not shouldering 
the burden alone. They also, however, did rely on risk assessment tools and procedures 
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much of the time, viewing this as positive and not as risk averse. Whittaker brings his 
findings to bear on the proposed changes in culture recommended by the Munro Report 
(Munro, 2011), in particular the key recommendation that a culture characterised by 
bureaucracy and prescriptive, procedural practice needs to be replaced by one where 
professional autonomy is central. Whittaker suggests that “rather than simply liberating 
social workers, removing bureaucratic processes may leave practitioners feeling more 
vulnerable, as they lose the protection offered by detailed and prescriptive guidance” 
(Whittaker, 2011, p491). He states that workers are not simply victims of the cultures 
within which they operate, but that the picture is more complex than that would suggest. In 
this respect, his findings are congruent with the ones from the current study, in that only 
30% of respondents expressed a desire for more autonomy, and only 16% agreed that if 
they  choose to not follow procedures they do not share that with their manager.  
Interestingly, Munro (2011) puts significant emphasis on workers having expertise to draw 
on when it comes to decision making, thus alleviating the concern from Whittaker about 
leaving social workers vulnerable, but also states that workers must have “the willingness 
to make decisions in conditions of uncertainty (i.e. risk taking)” (Munro, 2011, p43). It is 
questionable whether workers would be willing or able to do this alone. Munro, in 
considering the ‘expertise’ which should be available to workers, states “arrangements for 
practitioners to have frequent case consultations to explore and reflect on their direct 
work...separate from on-going case supervision.........(and) arrangements for frequent case 
supervision for practitioners to reflect on service effectiveness and case decision-
making...” (Munro, 2011, p108). The two functions are separate in the above proposal, but 
might actually be difficult to separate in practice. Decision making and ‘what to do next’ 
seemed to be the fundamental aspect of delegating decision making upwards in both 
Whittaker’s study and the current study. Increased autonomy for social workers might 
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simply mean more autonomy and decision making for seniors. To help social workers 
shoulder more autonomy (which in the current study they were quite clear they did not 
want) will involve an enormous culture change, and it may be that the middle ground 
which Whittaker’s subjects and CJ social workers settle for, sharing decisions with a senior 
and not aspiring to authentic autonomy, becomes a more common tactic within social work 
more broadly. 
 
In conclusion, then, ethical climate is the level of culture that workers can see and 
experience, that is,  the “artefacts” (Schein, 2010). In terms of the current study, the themes 
characterising the ethical climate are: 
 
1. The congruence of the ethical climate with the social work value base and the 
consequent legitimacy and encouragement for pursuing welfare aims. Those 
workers who have a strong belief in social justice and penal-welfarism, will feel 
ethical stress generated by a climate where such endeavours are eclipsed by risk 
management techniques and accountability measures. Hence the contributory link 
between ethical climate and ethical stress. 
 
2. Supervision. Clearly this is an element of ethical climate which will easily vary 
from agency to agency depending on the supervisor. Allowing critical reflection 
(Beddoe, 2010), allowing and containing ontological anxiety (Taylor, 2009 and 
Bourn and Hafford-Letchfield, 2011) and avoiding the dominance of risk-aversion 
(Goddard and Hunt, 2011) will all impact positively on the ethical climate of the 
agency. The supervisor is the key player who is responsible, within limits, for 
setting this positive and healthy agenda. 
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3. Workload. Workload per se might not vary from LA to LA, and neither might the 
governmental imperatives for risk and public protection work to take priority. 
However, as discussed, personal motivation is a factor in undertaking 
welfare/helping work, and this will be maximised when the ethical climate is 
characterised by a “basic underlying assumption” (Schein, 2010, p27) that penal-
welfarism and social work values more widely should permeate the work and be a 
priority alongside public protection work rather than be eclipsed by it.  
 
4. Underlying basic assumptions. In the context of CJSW, the basic underlying 
(value) assumptions from unquestioningly penal-welfare based (and, thus, 
congruent with wider social work values) to one less concerned with welfare and 
social justice and more informed by risk management, public protection and 
concerned with containing and managing a risky population of offenders (‘new 
penology’). It is suggested that the extent to which these basic underlying 
assumptions have changed will vary from LA to LA and this, in turn, will affect the 
‘espoused values’ (Schein, 2010) of the agency. Finally, the effect of the basic 
underlying assumptions will play out in the ethical climate of the agency. 
 
 
5. The central role of the senior in all of the above, according to the literature and 
illustrated by some of the comments from the quantitative data (see theme 5 from 
qualitative data, Section 4.7, Figure 19). This is especially important in socialising 
new workers, sharing joint decision making and creating a culture of more or less 
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penal-welfare priority depending on their own value position and fundamental 
assumptions. As previously discussed, workers feel reduced stress if their values 
are in line with the organisation more than the team (Dale and Trlin, 2010). 
Therefore, the senior social worker’s role in mediating organisational aims and 
interpreting them (again, with varying degrees of penal-welfare emphasis) is 
important. As respondents said:  
 
“I think it’s difficult to separate my view from my manager’s view from the agency 
view”  
And  
“there is still acceptance and allowance for welfare work to be done.”   
 
Clearly, senior social workers can only ‘mediate’ within the constraints of the absolute 
requirements of the organisation, as illustrated by Yin (2004), who attempted to create her 
own ‘employee as priority’ culture but could not admit this to anyone, and could only 
discuss it after she had resigned. Limitations on senior social workers are clearly seen, and, 
as the SSW role in this part of the model is mainly drawn from the literature, it is shown 
again in brackets to illustrate its more theoretical nature. 
 
The above analysis of the levels of culture and their connection to the model of ethical 
stress already formulated, can be shown in Diagram 7 as follows: 
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Diagram 7: Effects of Underlying Basic Value Assumptions 
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5.3.3  How the agency works with offenders and approaches risk 
 
How the agency works with offenders and agency approach to risk do not vary 
significantly from agency to agency. The approach to risk has a significant influence on the 
ethical stress experienced by workers, however, and levels of ethical stress do vary (see 
MANOVA results in Section 4.6). In the sample as a whole, as perceptions of risk aversion 
increased, so did ethical stress experienced. However, within all of the LAs, there will be a 
similar spread of perceptions of risk aversion and consequent experiences of ethical stress 
levels thus leading to similarities in risk perceptions across the LAs. From the results this 
far, it may be that the spread is based on age and experience? As already discussed, there 
was a correlation between age and years of experience and perceptions of risk aversion. 
See Section 4.8, Figures 20 and 21). Returning to the results of the MANOVA, why might 
it be that ‘how we work with offenders’ and ‘approach to risk’ are consistent across the 
LAs?  
 
Of the four variables, the ones which are most directly informed by central government 
policy are how we work with offenders and agency approach to risk. The first, and most 
obvious, manifestation of this is the roll out of standardised ‘tools’ and methods of 
working. For example, the way in which agencies work with offenders, as discussed in 
Sections 2.1 and 2.2, is based on cognitive-behavioural, accredited programmes such as 
Constructs (CJDCS, 2009) for ‘ordinary’ offenders, GSCOPT (SACRO, 2009) for sexual 
offenders and other cognitive behavioural groupwork programmes for domestic abuse 
offenders. The respondents in the study, as already explored, stated that beyond these 
programmes, agencies did not inhibit workers undertaking welfare, helping, relationship 
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based work, but this was, in reality, discretionary. This seems to be the view held 
regardless of where the respondent works and, in itself, does not cause workers to feel 
ethically stressed. However, this way of working does become a problem when the ethical 
climate is such that welfare work is discouraged or squeezed due to time restrictions.  
 
This is a very interesting finding and one which might be key to some of the dilemmas and 
problems raised by this research study. If central government has such an influence on how 
work with offenders is approached, it follows that any change to those methods must come 
from central government in the first instance. McCulloch and McNeill (2008) found that 
the “muted impact of the desistance literature” was “both surprising and problematic” 
(ibid. p 155).  However, looking at the results for the current study, it is unsurprising that 
agencies alone have been unable to embrace the desistance literature wholeheartedly, as 
there has not been action from central government to encourage this to happen. Looking at 
Diagram 7, it can be seen that if there is basic assumptive belief in penal-welfare values, 
this will influence the espoused values and, ultimately, the ethical climate of the agency. 
This should, therefore, impact on how the agency works with offenders. However, this 
effect does not appear to be  powerful enough to counteract governmental imperatives 
around risk and public protection priorities nor to overcome the anxiety which would be 
generated, even when those elements are mediated by a senior social worker with a strong 
penal-welfare belief. Government imperatives require to change so that top down influence 
matches bottom up influences (see Diagram 7), thus leading to a powerful impact on 
ethical culture, approach to risk and consequently how the agency works directly with 
offenders. 
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Returning to the Section 2.2, it would make sense to briefly think once again about the case 
for the implementation of the desistance literature as a way forward for CJSW. ‘Payback 
orders’ have now replaced the old probation and community service orders (Criminal 
Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010), but within the new legislation, the how and 
what of offenders ‘working at change’ needs to be explored. This is where a clear 
governmental direction is required in regards to workers working individually with 
offenders, helping them with their problems and promoting their welfare, in keeping with 
the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 and with underpinning penal-welfare and social 
justice values. Therefore, welfare affiliations would be once again unashamedly embraced 
and there would be clarity about CJSW’s value base being a shared one with the rest of the 
social work world (less marginalisation). The approach should be effective, as there is a 
robust body of underpinning evidence, the emphasis on the relational aspect of the work 
will allow and promote workers getting to know the service user and their family and thus 
understand the social context of their lives and problems. Finally, the magnitude of the 
claims about what we can actually do as a service would reduce from ‘we will stop people 
offending’ to ‘we will help people stop offending.’ A clear policy direction from the 
government, then, regarding the promotion of desistance work with offenders, would bring 
about the above benefits and would, as a result, reduce ethical stress experienced by 
workers by altering the ethical climate and giving over time and space for proper, 
relationship based, helping work. This suggestion also resonates with the recommendations 
from the Munro report (Munro, 2011), about de-bureaucratising child protection social 
work and promoting relationship-based, helping interactions with families. The ‘how’ of 
how to change the culture beyond a governmental direction, is, of course, a very significant 
area for further research, but as McNeill et al. (2010) state, “clear, coherent and feasible 
change objectives” (McNeill et al., 2010, p31) are key to culture change and the goal of 
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whether helping/welfare/desistance work is legitimate has not been clearly articulated in 
recent years. Respondents commented: 
 
“When I first came into social work, we were encouraged to look at the whole 
person.....more recent years have seen a major emphasis on risk instead and we are 
all about achieving targets” 
And 
“I am encouraged to refer people to other agencies for welfare support” 
 
Also, Whittaker’s (2011) point, reinforced by the findings of the current study, is that an 
increase in autonomy for social workers (necessary for flexible, autonomous responses to 
real people) will undoubtedly cause an increase in anxiety for social workers. According to 
Taylor (2007) this would be healthy, ontological anxiety, but nonetheless, would it be 
bearable, never mind welcome? Or would there simply be an increase in pressure and 
decision making responsibility for senior social workers as more and more decisions were 
delegated upwards as a defence strategy (Whittaker, 2011)? These are questions which will 
require further attention. 
 
In relation to the agency’s approach to risk, standardised risk assessment tools apply and 
local authorities do not have discretion in whether to use them or not. However, workers 
across the four local authorities felt that they did have lee-way to deviate from standardised 
risk responses, as long as they obtained senior social worker back up to do so.   Compared 
to ethical climate which is independent to a significant degree from central government 
influence (hence its variance depending on setting), risk is significantly influenced by 
central government and standardised tools as above, but has an element of flexibility 
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depending on the senior (not enough to alter its intrinsic, centrally driven character, 
however). The clearest example of the direct influence of Scottish Government is, 
arguably, the National  outcomes and standards for social work services in the criminal 
justice system (NOAS)(Scottish Government, 2010). This document sets out what it is that 
criminal justice social workers need to do. It operationalises the Criminal Justice and 
Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 and outlines how ‘Community Payback Orders’ are to be 
implemented. The document also makes the priority work clear and outlines good practice 
principles. In terms, then, of work with offenders and agency approach to risk, the 
standards from the Scottish Government are very clear. The three outcomes for CJSW 
services are “1. Community safety and public protection  2. the reduction of re-offending 
3. social inclusion to support desistance from offending” (Scottish Government, 2010, 
p15). Clearly, then, the social workers in the current study are working completely in 
sympathy with Governmental direction, public protection work (which includes risk 
assessment and management) takes priority and welfare work (or social 
inclusion/desistance work) is bottom of the list, but is still on the list. Does social inclusion 
include direct reference to helping offenders with their welfare needs? There is little 
mention of ‘helping’ in NOAS, and the standards are clear that this is the goal only when 
“there is evidence that the individual is no longer a significant risk” (ibid.  p51). Does this 
mean that reintegration work is earned by good behaviour? This would be at odds with a 
positive human rights agenda; a framework through which an argument for helping/welfare 
work to be the human right of every CJSW service user can be made (Fenton, 2012b).  The 
only other reference to what might be construed as helping or welfare is “re-integration 
should be based on an assessment of the individual’s desistance needs and his or her view 
of what constitutes a positive life free from offending” (Scottish Government, 2010, p52, 
emphasis added). This might mean that a service user can ask for help with what might not 
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be purely criminogenic needs, if it is within their vision of an offence-free life. However, 
although there might be rhetoric around a desistance approach, it is in a diluted form. 
There is little about the offender being the decision maker in what work needs to be done 
and there is little about the social worker building proper relationships with service users. 
Interestingly, NOAS also claims that CJSW is firmly based on social work values: 
“practice in Scotland has remained firmly rooted within social work principles and values 
with a strong commitment to social inclusion” (ibid.  p5). Is this true when social work 
values are so concerned with social justice and structural discrimination and disadvantage? 
There is absolutely no recognition within NOAS that these effects may have had any 
influence upon offenders’ behaviour, in fact, when social justice is mentioned it is only in 
terms of the public’s right to be protected. Consequently, there is nothing in NOAS to 
encourage workers to fight for social justice on behalf of their service users.  It would 
seem, therefore, that NOAS is ‘espousing’ values (Schein, 2010) which actually do not 
reflect the reality of practice. There is no recognition of social justice for offenders, only 
social justice from offenders. Rehabilitation is included within NOAS as correctional 
programmes of work, and agencies are encouraged to apply accredited programmes 
systematically to their client group. Once again, this does not demonstrate the embracing 
of a desistance approach but is an example of a narrowly defined, ‘correctionalist’ 
approach. 
 
It would seem that the above contradiction between espoused values in terms of 
articulating that the value base of work with offenders is the same as the value base for the 
rest of social work, and the actual reality of practice, which reflects ‘new penological’ 
(Croall, 2005) ideas, lies at the heart of the enduring tensions experienced by CJSW. In 
2003, the Labour party, in its manifesto, promised to create a Correctional Service for 
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Scotland, which would remove CJSW from local authority control (and from social work?) 
and merge it with the Scottish Prison Service (McNeill and Whyte, 2007). Although this 
was modified by the Lib/Lab partnership later to consult on proposals for such an 
arrangement, COSLA and ADSW stood firmly against the proposals which then did not 
come to fruition (although re-organisation did take place, with the creation of ‘Tough 
Option’ groupings) (ibid). An analysis of the responses to the consultation iterates the first 
“strength of the current system” as the value base of CJSW (Scottish Government, 2004, p 
6). Responses also demonstrate that working with offenders on their needs and problems is 
perceived to be key to the work done, as is building relationships and working with 
families and other resources. Comments were also made by stakeholders about tackling 
broader issues of social justice and concerns were expressed about manualised 
programmes which might not suit all offenders. Therefore, the value base of CJSW, that is, 
the value base shared with wider social work, is highlighted as a strength, as are the actions 
which would naturally extend from that value base, for example,  helping with personal 
and welfare problems and taking cognisance of wider social justice issues. Such was the 
strength of feeling among the respondents, that plans to remove CJSW from local 
authorities were abandoned. So, people working within CJSW and other stakeholders at 
that time had a firm belief in the social work value base of CJSW with which desistance 
work, as already covered, is completely compatible.  
 
As already covered,  NOAS (Scottish Government, 2010) does not emphasise the 
particular features of a desistance approach which would reduce ethical stress for workers 
and bring coherence to the work and the value base. However, in England and Wales, the 
Ministry of Justice are rolling out an approach to work involving working individually 
with offenders which actually goes a significant distance towards embracing a desistance 
  
 
250 
approach (National Offender Management Service (NOMS), 2012a). The Offender 
Engagement Programme, which is still in its early days in England and Wales, highlights 
the importance of one-to-one work with offenders, and the intrinsic importance of the 
worker and offender building a positive relationship. Emphasis is on doing with rather than 
to offenders, who are actively engaged in their own plans for change. In other words, it 
appears to be a genuine attempt to embrace the evidence around the effectiveness of 
supporting desistance. The National Offender Management Service (NOMS) appears to be 
able to promote this work within a context of over-arching public protection. For example, 
NOMS aim is to: “work collaboratively with providers and partners to achieve a 
transformed justice system to make communities safer, prevent victims and cut crime” 
(NOMS, 2012b, Foreword). The attempts to promote a desistance approach are still in their 
infancy, but a key factor in the drive is the recognition that managers play a central role, 
resonating with findings from the current study. In the 2012 implementation guidance it 
states “there was also recognition that the modelling and support of senior and middle 
managers is an essential component: without this ongoing commitment, the training alone 
is unlikely to have a significant impact” (NOMS, 2012a, p3). As discussed earlier, 
Lafrance et al. (2004) suggested that social workers need more in educational terms to 
embed the ‘mission’ and value base of social work whereas the findings from the current 
study, and the literature consulted, suggest that might not be enough. The culture and 
power of socialisation of new workers, with the senior social worker as a key player, is 
possibly a stronger influence. NOMS appears to recognise this in the explicit 
acknowledgement that training alone would not be sufficient. However, even more 
powerful, is the influence of the ‘new penological’ ethos from Scottish Government, as 
demonstrated by the quantitative findings (‘approach to risk’ and ‘how we work with 
offenders’ consistent between LAs) and the quantitative data (compelling number of 
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comments illustrating that risk and public protection are clear priorities for workers). Only 
with explicit direction and backing from the government, therefore, will the “muted impact 
of the desistance literature” (McCulloch and McNeill, 2008, p155) be addressed. The 
integration of the quantitative findings, the qualitative explanatory data and the relevant 
literature can be depicted as follows; 
 
Diagram 8: A Model of Ethical Stress and its Influences in CJSW in Scotland 
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5.3.4  Bringing the findings together and conclusion 
 
Coffey et al. (2009) studied work environment-related stress amongst social workers in 
two large social work departments in the UK. The findings demonstrated that the main 
categories of factors contributing to stress included “organisational culture and function” 
(Coffey et al., 2009, p431). As in the current study, the main factor within this category 
was workload, and specifically having too much administration and bureaucracy to deal 
with which then impeded doing the job in the way the workers wanted to, for example, 
building relationships with service-users.  When asked what could be done to make the 
difficulties at work better, the largest response “by far” (ibid.  p434) was that more 
competent, permanent staff should be employed. This is congruent with the findings from 
the current study where workload was the factor most commented on in the qualitative 
date, for example: 
 
 “we have too much to do.”   
 
The second suggestion from Coffey et al.’s study was in relation to management giving 
more ‘support’ which includes sharing decision making with workers e.g. “for 
management to realise what we have to deal with on a daily basis, especially when things 
are going wrong and there is no support and you are making decisions that you have not 
been trained for...” and “I have too much responsibility” (Coffey et al., 2009, p434). These 
two elements (i.e ethical climate, including workload, and risk, including sharing 
decisions) sit within the middle boxes of the current model and, as per Coffey et al.’s 
findings, directly effect ethical stress. 
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According to Coffey et al.’s study, the best part of the job was considered to be building 
relationships with clients, and, again, in the current model, time to do this (an aspect of 
workload) was clearly linked to reductions in ethical stress. The ethical climate is, 
therefore,   important in terms of ethical stress, and varies from agency to agency as a 
result of basic assumptions, via espoused values and finally to the creation of the ethical 
climate. The ethical climate depends to a large extent on the senior social worker, and the 
self-perpetuating culture already established within the agency.  
 
The top down effects from Scottish Government, and the power that they have, seem to 
outweigh any other cultural or value effects. The qualitative data gathered, as discussed in 
Section 5.2.7, is overwhelmingly concerned with features of the new penology, especially 
in terms of public protection and risk work taking priority, but also in relation to a ‘tick 
box’ and performance indicator driven approach. Although more experienced workers 
were somewhat uncomfortable with Scottish Government priorities, all workers were very 
clear that the risk/public protection work must take priority, with welfare and helping work 
very much secondary. This will be ameliorated to a degree by an ethical climate which 
supports traditional social work endeavours, but nonetheless is uniform across all the LAs 
studied. 
 
In conclusion, then, ethical climate impacts on ethical stress and can be influenced despite 
central government control of CJSW. Approach to risk and how the agency works with 
offenders cannot be significantly influenced internally and will therefore require external 
impetus to resurrect CJSW’s pursuit of social justice and the resultant resurrection of 
penal-welfare underpinnings.  Social work has a long and enduring tradition, however, of 
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influencing organisational and policy change and this ‘bottom up’ influence from the social 
work profession may afford some optimism in terms of influencing governmental 
direction. A reasonable aim would be the promotion of a desistance approach, with central 
government ‘rolling out’ the approach as the explicit foundation for work with offenders. 
In this way, the impact of the desistance literature might be significantly strengthened, 
ethical stress for workers reduced and the pursuit of social justice once again a legitimate 
aim.  
 
5.4  Additional Findings 
5.4.1  The Role of the Senior Social Worker 
 
This has been covered in the discussion of the research questions, with discussion based on 
qualitative data (theme 5 from the data, see Section 4.7, Figure 19), quantitative data in 
relation to particular questions about autonomy and decision-sharing, and messages from 
the literature. One of the main implications of this finding is that any culture change, any 
promotion of desistance and any increase in decision making autonomy for social workers 
may well have an effect on, and be affected by, the work of senior social workers. 
 
5.4.2  The effect of years of experience 
 
As was discussed in Section 5.2, experienced, older social workers struggled more with the 
emphasis on risk practices and the dilution of authentic autonomy. Both of these features 
characterise  the ‘new penology’ (Feeley and Simon, 1992), and, thus, it would be logical 
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to question whether more experienced workers also had difficulty with the other features of 
the ‘new penology’, for example the erosion of welfare based work and the promotion of 
work centrally concerned with manualised programmes and management of offenders. To 
investigate this further, correlations were undertaken with all four variables in the study 
and ‘years of experience.’ Results as shown in Section 4.8, Figures 20 and 21, demonstrate 
that there were large correlations between all four variables and years of experience 
(correlations reduced when age was controlled for, but were still valid). In answer to the 
above question, then, older, more experienced workers were indeed finding current 
approaches to work with offenders restrictive. Of all the variables, the approach to risk was 
the one they had the most difficulty with. 
 
There is a clearly emerging picture, then, that more experienced workers object more 
strongly to the changes brought about by the new penology (Feeley and Simon, 1992). The 
ethical climates of agencies are influenced by the surrounding political and policy context, 
and this has changed dramatically over the years, as outlined in Section 2.1. As can be seen 
from the results of the partial correlations in Figure 21, years of experience alone show 
correlations with the variables, but far stronger correlations are demonstrated when age is 
not controlled for (Figure 20). Therefore, older, more experienced workers are the ones for 
whom the ‘new penology’ is most problematic. Older workers will have been brought up 
in a different political era, will have had different educational experiences and may 
remember more clearly the important political movements and challenges of the last few 
decades. In terms of years of experience, however, the major changes in CJSW took place 
in the 1990s when risk and public protection moved centre stage, and welfare work took a 
back seat.  To investigate this further, it would be interesting to ascertain if there was any 
significant difference in the scores of those subjects who were socialised into CJSW before 
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the mid 90s and those afterwards, that is, those who ‘learned the ropes’ within a climate of 
priority welfare work and those who did within a climate of priority public protection/risk. 
The mid-90s was chosen because around this time, the underpinning ethos of criminal 
justice social work faced a “recalibration” (McCulloch and McNeill, 2011, p 186) when 
welfare became less of a priority and offenders were to be challenged about their actions. 
Their thinking was also to be ‘corrected’ via What Works inspired cognitive behavioural 
work, and public protection and risk management moved centre stage (McNeill, 2005).  As 
already stated, a cut-off point of 1997 was chosen as the point when many of the new 
public protection ideas actually played out in CJSW agencies e.g. the overhaul of practice 
initiated by the Scott Simpson case in Aberdeen (McManus, 1997).  
  
The results, as shown in Section 4.8, demonstrate that there is a statistically significant 
difference between the groups on all of the variables and, in particular, in relation to risk. 
Risk aversion is, therefore, once again highlighted the concept with which more 
experienced, older workers are having the most difficulty. As already stated, older workers 
were educated in earlier years and grew up within different political contexts, which might 
well be having a bearing on their perceptions of risk, but, independently from this, their 
years of experience in CJSW is also having a significant effect (see Section 4.8). This adds 
weight to the suggestion that when a worker was socialised into CJSW is an important 
factor in how they view things in that, for the more experienced workers, their ‘habituses’ 
were formed within an environment underpinned by penal-welfare beliefs.  Newer 
workers’ ‘habituses’ were formed within a more risk-dominated, neo-liberal culture. This 
also resonates with the earlier discussion concerning the power of the socialisation process 
of new workers. It seems to be that, in terms of changing or perpetuating a culture, the 
socialisation of new workers is very much key. 
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 More experienced workers, then, will experience a risk averse climate as more stressful 
than less experienced workers. This suggestion is at odds, however, with earlier studies, as 
McNeill et al. (2010), in relation to study by Robinson looking at worker adaptation to 
new, standardised risk assessment tool, state “Robinson’s findings contradict the notion of 
professional insecurity and ambivalence in this area as the preserve of a small minority of 
‘old guard’ officers” (McNeill et al., 2010, p30 ). The authors go state that Robinson’s 
findings are supported by a more recent study in Scotland which resulted in several 
published papers, including McNeill et al. (2009). Reading of Robinson (2003) does 
indeed demonstrate that workers with a variety of lengths of experience described 
ambivalent views towards the introduction of a standardised measurement tool for risk 
assessment: “It was clear that the commitment of many practitioners had waned over time. 
Indeed……(it) had become an aspect of practice which was resented” (ibid.  p36). In the 
absence of quantitative data, however, it may be that more experienced workers had more 
difficulty with this, even in a context where all workers experienced difficulty. This 
information is not given in the study. Drawing a parallel with the current study, 
respondents experienced slightly less ethical stress than a normal spread would indicate, 
but within that spread, it seems that more experienced workers experienced it more 
acutely. Within the spread of unhappy workers in Robinson’s study, perhaps the more 
experienced workers also experienced the frustrations more acutely. Likewise, in the study 
the reader is directed to by McNeill et al. (2009) which also disputes the notion of the ‘old 
guard’ workers adapting less. The evidence given is that two workers (workers attached to 
the example case studies) were relatively newly qualified, that is, “That both cases 
discussed above involved relatively recently qualified social workers who had been 
educated both about the emergence of risk and its associated technologies and about 
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criminal justices social work’s welfare traditions underlines the durability of the latter 
influence on the profession and its practice…” (McNeill et al., 2009, p435). Again, this 
finding does not contradict the findings in the current study. All workers were clear that 
welfare affiliations are important, and helping with circumstances is legitimate CJSW 
work, but it must take a back seat to “king risk.” This is what is objected to more strongly 
by older, more experienced workers. 
 
 
5.5  Conclusion 
 
 
The starting point of the conclusion to this Discussion section is the underpinning value 
base of CJSW. As already explored, said value base should be congruent with the value 
base of social work more widely and, thus, should be concerned with issues of welfare, 
helping, building relationships with service users and, ultimately, social justice. Any 
approach to probation type work in Scotland should connect to those values or will lack 
clear aims and coherence (and, in fact, appears to do so). It has been suggested that a 
desistance approach to the work would address this as the connections from the actual 
practice to the value base are clear. Specifically, a desistance approach recognises, and 
tries to help with, “the appalling reality” of service users lives (Gregory, 2010, p 2280). 
Herein lies the absolute fundamental requirement that social workers also explicitly 
understand their commitment to social justice. If workers see offenders simply as rational 
actors who ‘should’ be making law-abiding and sensible choices, then very narrow, 
correctional, individualised practice may well ensue because the rational actor is viewed as 
  
 
259 
a person “in need of correction, re-moralising and as a neutral receptor of correct, 
normative information” (Kemshall, 2010, p 1249). Kemshall further points out that a 
person is actually a  “social actor.....mediating social and personal constraints on their 
choices, and acting prudently within a situated rationality in which options to act otherwise 
can be severely limited by structural constraints and lack of power” (ibid, p1249). This, 
therefore, requires an understanding of the service user’s life in terms of growing up, 
opportunities (or lack of) and current context and constraints, which takes relationship 
building, a care approach, empathy and understanding, as already explored in Sections 2.2 
and 2.3.  It also requires motivation to work in partnership with the service user to attempt 
to affect positive changes in their circumstances. The social worker should be involved in 
trying to alleviate some of the hardship of the “appalling reality” of the service user’s life 
(Gregory, 2010, p2280). A desistance approach to working with offenders would facilitate 
all of the above. 
 
The discussion of the results attempted to illuminate, based on the results of the data 
collection, whether social workers were doing this in CJSW, and/or whether they suffered 
any ethical stress as a result of not being able to do so. The results demonstrate that the 
level of ethical stress experienced by workers is directly affected by the agency’s approach 
to risk and the ethical climate of the agency, but not directly by the approach to working 
with offenders. Workers felt that the approach to working with offenders allows for the 
priority public protection work to be done, and that they could choose to be involved in 
helping, desistance work if workload and ethical climate allows/encourages it. Workers 
were very clear that the risk and public protection work is priority (and this is also the clear 
direction from the Scottish Government (2010)). Workers (newer workers in particular), 
view the inability to do the welfare, desistance work as a practical rather than an ethical 
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problem. And yet, thinking about the links to social work values, it should be experienced 
as an ethical difficulty for workers.  
 
Kosny and Eakin (2008) illustrated well how value/behaviour congruence played out in 
agencies working with socially excluded and sometimes offending service users. One of 
the key messages in regards to achieving value/behaviour congruence was that the workers 
had a real sense of social justice. They viewed the service users as victims of an unjust 
society and, as such, were truly motivated to work with them as well as on their behalf. 
This brings the discussion back to Section 2.2, and begs the question ‘is there any way, that 
offenders can be viewed as any kind of victim in our neo-liberal society?’ Furthermore, in 
a service where protecting the public from risky ‘others’ is the priority, how much more 
difficult is it to hold to a view of social justice. As stated in Section 5.3.2, NOAS (Scottish 
Government, 2010) discusses social justice in terms of the public receiving social justice 
from offenders. There is nothing which mentions social justice for offenders. As Duckett 
and Schinkel (2008) point out, the disadvantaged poor in our society are the most likely to 
be sent to prison, and “are forced to make their choices under constrained circumstances” 
(Duckett and Schinkel, 2008, p521), which resonates with Kemshall’s point above. 
Workers in CJSW need not only to understand, but to believe in, the above commitment to 
social justice and it would seem that whether newer, less experienced workers have this 
commitment is seriously questionable. A commitment to social justice seems to have been 
eclipsed in the mid-90s with the significant rise in public protection/risk work, and is 
exacerbated by messages about offenders in our neo-liberal culture (see Section 2.3). 
 
Returning to Diagram 8, it can be seen that the effects of the underlying value assumptions 
directly impact on the ethical climate of the agency which, in turn directly impacts on 
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worker experience of ethical stress and how the agency approaches work. Ethical climate is 
characterised by how the underlying values play out in the elements of the culture that 
people actually experience. The more the ethical climate moves away from a concern with 
values, the more workers experience stress and the more restrictive and procedural the 
work becomes. Workers (including newer workers) still retain a belief and commitment to 
social work values in some form, and comments were made about feeling frustrated when 
they could not help or get to know offenders in the way they want to. As already stated, 
only two comments were made which alluded in any way to issues of social justice and 
even those are more concerned with the help required to respond individually and 
practically to the consequences of social injustice, rather than to the causes themselves: 
 
“I experience stress when I can’t help or respond to clients – usually only when 
resources are not available” 
And 
“I feel I can’t help my clients with issues outwith my control i.e. usually housing, 
employment etc. which can be frustrating” 
 
 It would seem, therefore, that workers understand the personal-interaction-type values 
(respect, empathy, relationships), but do not take much cognisance of wider social justice 
matters. Preston-Shoot (2011) suggested that there was legitimacy to be found in the 
distancing language and procedural approach of contemporary agencies. This can mean 
that workers do not have to engage properly with ethical issues and that an agency culture 
can “limit social workers to narrow interpersonal issues unrelated to (oppressive) social 
and policy contexts” (Preston-Shoot, 2011, p188). This appears to be exactly what is 
happening. Workers understand interpersonal value issues (and feel ethical stress when 
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behaviour based on these values is frustrated), but do not relate these issues to a wider 
understanding of, and commitment to, social justice. Lafrance (2004) found similar issues 
as already discussed. 
 
The top down, governmental influences depicted in Diagram 8, appear to be experienced 
by workers as extremely powerful. This is demonstrated in their quite startling clarity and 
consistent responses in regards to public protection work taking priority. It also suggests, 
however, that the power of these messages from the government are such that any move 
towards the undiluted adoption of a desistance approach would have to be not just 
supported by, but promoted by, the government. The social work profession, however, 
might have an influence upon the government to this end. 
 
Looking at the horizontal connections in Diagram 8, it can be seen that ethical climate 
(supervision, workload issues, values discussion and decision making) and the agency 
approach to risk are central to both the experience of workers (in terms of ethical stress) 
and to the experience of service users (in terms of the approach taken to work with them). 
The role of the senior social worker in all of the contributory relationships in the diagram is 
extremely important as discussed earlier. A consequence of this, recognised by NOMS 
(2012a), is that senior social workers must be involved in any attempt to change the culture 
as their influence and role in mediation between worker and organisation, supervision and 
acculturation of new workers is crucial. 
 
Finally, the difference between the perceptions of older, more experience workers and 
newer, younger workers is a very significant finding. Pessimistically, it might mean that 
motivation for social work, as a service, to support a drive towards reconnection with its 
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social justice roots and values will lessen as more older workers leave. This is a very 
important area for further research, not just in CJSW, but in contemporary social work 
more widely. 
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6  Conclusion 
 
This section will give an overview of the main points from each section, including the 
main findings and themes from the research. The meaning and possible implications of the 
findings and themes will then be discussed. Finally, areas for future research will be 
identified. 
 
Section 1, the introduction to the thesis explained the origins of my interest in the topic. It 
also then explained the layout of the thesis, briefly covering what the reader would find in 
each of the sections. Section, 2, the literature review, covered the history of CJSW, the 
concept of ‘disjuncture’ and anxiety and risk within CJSW agencies. It was suggested that 
contemporary CJSW is a context within which disjuncture might flourish, mainly due to 
the conflict between the parallel emphasis on public protection/risk 
management/accountability measures and erosion of traditional welfare and helping work, 
and the value base of CJSW which is shared with the value base of social work more 
widely. The desistance literature was explored as an approach to work with offenders 
which should reduce disjuncture.  Four particular variables were drawn from the literature 
which, it was suggested, would affect social workers’ experience of disjuncture. The four 
variables were ‘agency approach to risk,’ ‘how we with offenders,’ ‘ontological 
anxiety/guilt’ and ‘ethical climate.’ Also, it was suggested that these variables would vary 
from LA to LA due to differences in culture and values between LAs. The aim of the 
research, to construct a model of the influences upon disjuncture in CJSW, was iterated. 
Section 3, the methodology, began with the identification of two research questions as 
follows: 
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Does each of the independent variables contribute uniquely and significantly to workers’ 
reports of disjuncture? And 
 
Do different local authority (LA) settings produce different scores for the variables. 
 
Section 3 then gave the rationale for adopting  positivist and interpretivist approaches to 
the research, and the selection of a within-stage mixed model study design (questionnaires 
including Likert-type questions and questions requiring free text answers). The 
epistemology therefore included both empirical, positivist knowledge and qualitative, 
interpretivist knowledge. The questionnaire design was fully explored, and reliability and 
validity demonstrated. It was then distributed to 240 criminal justice social workers, across 
four LAs. A usable sample of 100 questionnaires was returned. Section 4 gave the results 
of the research, and included the creation of a new variable called ‘ethical stress’. Ethical 
stress was created by combining the two ‘internal state’ variables, namely ‘disjuncture’ and 
‘ontological anxiety/guilt.’ The resultant connections between variables can be summarised 
as follows: 
1. A significant, contributory and reciprocal relationship between ‘approach to risk’ and 
‘ethical stress.’ 
2. A significant, contributory and reciprocal relationship between ‘ethical climate’ and 
‘ethical stress.’ 
3. No significant relationship between ‘how we work with offenders’ and ‘ethical stress.’ 
4. Significant, contributory and reciprocal relationships between ‘risk’ and ‘ethical 
climate,’ and ‘how we work with offenders.’ 
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It was also demonstrated in Section 4 that, in answer to research question 2, ‘ethical stress’ 
and ‘ethical climate’ varied from LA to LA, but ‘how we work with offenders’ and 
‘agency approach to risk’ did not. Additionally, the analysis of the qualitative data was 
given in Section 4, with the seven main themes from the comments being identified. 
Finally, Section 4 gave details of an additional finding: the significant effect of years of 
experience and age on scores for all of the variables. Significant differences on all 
variables were also found when two groups of workers were compared; social workers 
socialised into CJSW pre-public protection/risk prioritisation, and social workers socialised 
into CJSW post-public protection/risk prioritisation. 
 
Section 5 discussed all of the results in turn. In summary, the discussion was concerned 
with the following: 
 
The more risk averse an agency is perceived to be, the more ethical stress a worker will 
feel. Within this finding, however, it was ascertained that older, more experienced workers 
perceived higher levels of risk aversion and desired more autonomy than younger, less 
experienced workers. The latter group was happy to share decision making and 
responsibility with flexible senior social workers. The sample overall were clear that they 
did not want more autonomy, and given that older social workers are unhappy with the 
erosion of autonomy, then younger, less experienced workers were clearly more emphatic 
in their lack of desire for more autonomy. 
 
The less ‘value friendly’ the ethical climate is perceived to be, the more ethical stress will 
be experienced by workers. Workload was included as an element of the ethical climate 
and there appeared to be an interplay between how much priority is given to technical, risk 
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assessment and management work and the amount of work social workers have. When 
workloads are heavy, social workers only have time for the risk assessment, public 
protection work, and welfare and helping concerns are undermined. There was a startling 
clarity in workers’ agreement that public protection is the absolute priority of their work. 
This is reinforced by the Scottish Government and is explicit within NOAS (Scottish 
Government, 2010). Another factor in how much welfare work was done, was worker 
inclination. It emerged from the results that if the priority work was done, no one would be 
very perturbed if the welfare work was not. There was also evidence from previous studies 
that workers were abandoning their welfare affiliations to gain status in the eyes of the 
legal professionals they worked alongside, and so, once again, welfare and helping work 
was eroded.  Supervision, another element of ethical climate, is also important to workers’ 
experience of ethical stress. Space for discussion of value dilemmas and reflection is 
crucial. 
 
Older, more experienced workers, whose ‘habituses’ (McNeill et al., 2010) were formed 
within a clear penal-welfare framework, struggle significantly more that their younger, less 
experienced peers with the prioritisation of risk, with decreased autonomy and with the 
focus on accountability measures. They, in fact, struggle more with all of the features of 
the ‘new penology’ (Feeley and Simon, 1992). This finding is at odds with what previous 
studies appear to have shown. However, closer reading of those studies, and the absence of 
quantitative data, means that the same division between workers of different ages and 
experience may still have been going on, just not identified  nor uncovered by the 
particular methods used. 
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Senior social workers appear to be mediating in many parts of the model, including 
creating an ethical climate in line with the wider LA CJSW department (via supervision,  
the socialisation of new workers and how much welfare work is identified as a legitimate 
aim and encouraged or frowned upon),  impacting upon the kind of work done with service 
users in day to day practice and, most importantly, sharing decisions with workers in 
regards to deviating from set procedures in order to respond responsively to service users. 
Returning to Diagram 8 (reproduced below), the place of the senior social work within 
several of the key relationships between parts of the model, is clearly demonstrated. 
 
‘Ethical climate’ and ‘ethical stress’ varied from LA to LA. The influence of ‘basic 
underlying assumptions’ (Schein, 2010) upon the ethical climate was investigated and the 
suggestion was made that an underlying belief in traditional social work values (congruent 
with a penal-welfare approach) will be mediated via a senior to create a ‘value friendly’ 
culture. An underlying basic assumption based on neo-liberal thinking about offenders as 
purely “rational actors” making free choices (regardless of oppression or lack of 
opportunity) (Duckett and Schinkel, 2008), will lead to a restrictive, managerial ethical 
climate concerned with management of a perceived risky population (congruent with the 
‘new penology’).  The ‘double marginalisation’ of CJSW (McNeill et al., 2010) means that 
whichever climate is produced, it is likely to self perpetuate due its separation from the 
legal world of the courts and from the rest of the social work department. The potential for 
such a culture to vary between LAs is quite clear. 
 
‘How we work with offenders’ and ‘approach to risk’ did not vary between LAs and is 
illuminated by the very obvious clarity from respondents about public protection/risk work 
being the priority. The influence of the Scottish Government, enshrined in policy (NOAS, 
  
 
269 
Scottish Government, 2010), is clearly extremely powerful. Although ‘ethical climate’ 
mediates between ‘how we work with offenders’ and ‘ethical stress,’ and thus makes work 
practices more meaningful and/or tolerable,  the actual practice of working with offenders 
does not vary no matter where a social worker works. ‘Approach to risk’ also follows this 
pattern. 
 
Although workers, hearteningly, felt frustration and ethical stress when risk aversion and 
value-unfriendly ethical climates meant they could not base their practice upon their 
values, they defined values quite narrowly in terms of individual-level, personal values 
expressed in the one-to-one work done. There was minimal reference to social justice 
issues, which simply did not appear to feature in the respondents views of the work done 
with offenders. And yet, the IFSW (2012) clearly states that social workers must be 
concerned with issues of social justice. Preston-Shoot (2011), suggests that the culture of 
an agency can “limit social workers to narrow interpersonal issues unrelated to 
(oppressive) social and policy contexts” (Preston-Shoot, 2011, p188) and this appears to be 
exactly what is happening. 
 
What do these findings mean, then, for the future of CJSW? There is scope for reasonable 
optimism in that most workers state they want to engage in relationship based, helping 
work with offenders, as per the desistance literature, if only they had more space and time 
to do so. The results show that they experience ethical stress when their desire to do this is 
thwarted. Gregory (2010) also found that the probation workers in her study were very 
clear indeed that relationships with service users were at the very heart of their practice.  
Two issues, however, have emerged which may be cause for less optimism. One is that 
much of the service a service user receives depends upon the individual inclination and 
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motivation of the social worker as well as upon a culture which encourages desistance, 
welfare based work. The reasons why a social worker might choose not to become 
involved in welfare work have been covered in terms of status seeking with associated 
legal professionals,  lack of external interest or audit in regards to undertaking the welfare 
work and the overwhelming preoccupation with risk and public protection work. Another 
element, however, might be how much individual workers themselves  believe in a 
commitment to social justice (regardless of the fact that they should) which would have a 
direct effect on whether they would choose to undertake welfare work or not. There was a 
striking lack of reference to matters of social justice in the results. Lafrance (2004) and 
Preston-Shoot (2011) have both discussed the phenomena of social work struggling to 
retain its commitment to social justice, and the findings in the current study echo these 
concerns. A robust social justice commitment would be consonant with a robust objection 
to the features of the ‘new penology’ (Feeley and Simon, 1992). As older, more 
experienced workers objected to those features (for example, emphasis on risk 
management, reliance on technicist tools and procedures, lack of involvement in 
relationships or personal change and reduced autonomy) significantly more than younger, 
less experienced workers, it can be reasonably suggested that the older, more experienced 
workers are likely to be those with stronger social justice awareness and commitment, 
although even that commitment may not be particularly strong, given the lack of comment 
about social justice across the sample (although comments objecting to features of the 
‘new penology’ were made; third theme from the qualitative data, see Figure 19). The lack 
of direct comment about social justice, however, calls into question the assertion that there 
is “durability” of CJSW’s welfare traditions (McNeill et al., 2010, p38) and that “the 
eclipse of welfarism might require the passage of considerable time, or some more violent 
rupture in the development of the profession” (ibid.). From the results of the current study, 
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it would seem that once the older, more experienced workers leave the profession and 
more newer workers join, the commitment to social justice and welfare and the objection 
to the features of the ‘new penology’ within CJSW as a whole, will probably reduce quite 
significantly. Whether this will take ‘considerable time’ is questionable, and whether a 
‘violent rupture’ is required at all, is seriously questionable. It is interesting at this point to 
look at the SSSC Codes of Practice (SSSC, 2009). The codes state that social workers have 
a duty to “protect the rights and promote the interests of service users and carers” (SSSC, 
2009, p 22), but do not refer, any more explicitly, to any issues of social justice. They 
require social workers not to practice in discriminatory way, and not to accept 
discriminatory practice from others, but do not require that workers challenge oppression 
more widely nor do they make any reference to societal discrimination or disadvantage. 
The focus in the codes, therefore, also appears to highlight values pertaining to the 
individual level of practice; the values important in inter-personal work rather than the 
values concerned with social justice. This mirrors exactly the values emphasised by the 
respondents in the study. It is therefore unsurprising that there is an erosion of the focus on 
social justice, and, as the codes apply to all of social work in Scotland, not just CJSW, 
might this be a phenomenon in social work more widely? 
In conclusion then, if things are to change, and if CJSW is to become a setting where a 
desistance approach to work with offenders can flourish, the suggestion is that the message 
must come from central government. Desistance work must be promoted by a powerful 
and undiluted message from the government that this is the core approach to working with 
offenders. In order to facilitate this, workers would need to believe that the autonomy 
required to engage in the work and the anxiety produced as a result, would be fully 
supported by their LA agency and by government. Therefore, there would need to be an 
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explicit acknowledgement of this support and a real engagement with workers, including 
hearing their concerns. Such a culture change would also need to take cognisance of the 
centrality of the senior social worker and would need to resurrect a welfare, helping, caring 
and social justice informed value base as the reference point for CJSW. The finding 
discussed earlier, that social workers take discretionary decisions to seniors to share (or 
avoid?) the responsibility, would need to be comprehensively investigated and considered 
in any change process, otherwise more autonomy and discretion for social workers might 
play out in practice as more autonomy, discretion and responsibility for senior social 
workers. If a desistance approach was promoted, taking into account all of the above 
caveats, then it could be suggested that ethical stress for workers might be markedly 
reduced.  Considering Diagram 8, it can be seen that ‘how we work with offenders’ would 
be strongly influenced by messages about desistance from the government. The ‘ethical 
climate’ would then be affected by ‘how we work with offenders,’ including elements such 
as the nature of values discussion, supervision, less reliance on technical procedures and 
less accountability and blame concerns. Workloads might still be excessive, but desistance 
work would become more of a priority, comparable with public protection and risk work, 
and therefore would have a higher profile. ‘Ethical climate’ would also be influenced by an 
explicit acknowledgement and resurrection of a penal-welfare, social work value base and 
belief in social justice (underlying basic assumptions). ‘Risk’ approaches would be revised 
in line with a desistance approach (messages from government; vertical influence) and 
would be influenced by a more responsive, desistance approach (horizontal influence). 
Finally, both ‘risk’ and ‘ethical climate’ would, positively, influence workers’ experience 
of ethical stress. 
Finally, some suggestions for future research are: 
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To what extent have CJSW workers absorbed neo-liberal, underlying value assumptions 
(including a certainty and belief in tools and procedures and a belief in the ‘management 
of’ as opposed to ‘working with,’ offenders)? 
 
Is there a diluted commitment to social justice from less experienced social workers in 
social work as a whole? Is there a diluted commitment to social justice from students 
entering the profession? Does the current teaching on social justice within HEIs impact 
upon students? Does the socialisation of newly qualified social workers into the workplace 
impact upon their social justice beliefs? 
 
What are senior social workers’ views about the finding that social workers share 
discretionary decisions with them and eschew the idea that, in the current climate, they 
should have more autonomy? What is the importance of the SSW role more broadly? What 
effect does team culture have? 
 
How would workers feel about an increase in authentic autonomy? 
 
The final thought from this reasonably large study of criminal justice social workers, is that 
the active involvement of government in promoting and supporting the implementation of 
a desistance approach is absolutely crucial. It can be suggested that without governmental 
engagement, and a simultaneous governmental commitment to broad social work values, 
CJSW will continue to be increasingly characterised by a ‘new penology’ and will look 
increasingly unlike a setting within which qualified social workers are required to do the 
job. 
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8 Appendix 1: request for ethical approval 
 
University of Dundee Research Ethics Committee (UREC) 
Standard Operating Procedures for all researchers 
 
8.1.1.1 Constitution of the Committee 
The Committee is based on the existing Psychology Ethics Committee, and comprises six 
members of staff from that School (from 1 October 2004: Professor Trevor Harley (Chair), Dr 
Ronni Greenwood, Professor Alan Kennedy, Dr Emese Nagy, Dr Astrid Schloerscheidt, Dr Roger 
van Gompel, and Dr Peter Willatts). The Committee comprises three additional representatives, 
one from the School of Education and Social Work (Dr Elaine Smith), one from the School of 
Nursing & Midwifery (Dr John Drummond), and one from the School of Computing (Dr Annalu 
Waller). The lay member is Mrs. Elizabeth Melville. The Committee reports annually to and is 
appointed by the University of Dundee Research Committee. The Committee operates a joint 
auditing process with the University of Abertay. 
 
8.1.1.2 Remit of the Committee 
The remit is to make recommendations and to provide feedback on the ethical appropriateness 
of research projects. Some aspects of design may be relevant to ethical considerations (e.g. 
research should not be so poorly designed as to guarantee meaningless results, thereby wasting 
participants’ time). Note that any research involving the collection of human biological samples 
or data from NHS patients who are included by virtue of their being patients, or their carers, 
must be approved by the Tayside University Hospitals Trust Ethics Local Research Ethics 
Committee (LREC). 
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Note also that ethical approval may not in itself be a sufficient precondition for carrying out the 
research (e.g. the research might need clearance from Disclosure Scotland, or approval of local 
education authorities, parents, and teachers, or some other body; contact Dr Peter Willatts in 
the School of Psychology, p.willatts@dundee.ac.uk, for advice); such conditions are outside the 
remit of the committee. You must also ensure that you carry out any necessary risk assessment, 
and you must abide by all appropriate safety regulations. (Contact the University Safety Officer 
for advice.) You are also responsible for ensuring that your research complies with the Data 
Protection regulations. If your data are stored in any way such that the data can be linked to an 
identifiable individual (e.g. by name or by code) then the data must be registered by filling out 
the form at http://www.dundee.ac.uk/recordsmanagement/dataprotection/pro-forma.htm. 
 
8.1.1.2.1 Application Procedure 
All research involving collecting data from humans must be approved by the Committee before 
data collection commences; “research” includes experimental work, questionnaires, and face-to-
face, telephone, and Internet surveys. You must read and follow the University of Dundee Code 
of Practice for Research on Human Participants. 
 
Research carried out by undergraduate students and taught Masters must have appropriate 
ethical approval. This approval will be dealt with by another mechanism, normally at the school 
or college level (details will be supplied by your college). Academic staff, researchers and 
postgraduate (research) students are responsible for producing their applications to the 
University Committee. 
 
All applications for ethical approval from the UREC must be submitted to Mrs Liz Evans in the 
School of Psychology General Office (e.evans@dundee.ac.uk) using the attached form, both as 
a hard and an electronic copy. Incomplete applications will be returned. Note that in many 
cases it is possible to seek generic approval for a methodology, although any subsequent 
significant changes in methodology will necessitate fresh approval. Copies of sample informed 
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consent and participant information sheet templates are also attached. An ethics application 
should consist of: 
 
• The attached Ethical Approval Form, completed and signed 
• The Informed Consent Form (or alternative means of establishing informed consent if 
written consent is not appropriate – e.g. if the participants have restricted literacy) 
• The Participant Information Sheet (which must be distinct from the consent form) 
• If necessary you will also need to produce a debriefing Information Sheet to give 
participants after the research is complete (e.g. if the research involves any sort of 
deception). 
• Any supporting documentation required (e.g. grant applications, a copy of any 
questionnaire, any covering letters; see form below) 
 
8.1.1.2.2 Approval 
There are three routes to possible approval, depending on the responses on the form. 
 
1. If any of the answers to Questions 10-12 is “Yes” then the proposal will be referred to the 
full Committee. Note that research involving any form of deception are particularly 
problematical, and a full explanation of why deceit is necessary, why there are no 
acceptable alternative approaches not involving deceit, and the scientific justification for 
deceit must be provided in a covering letter. 
2. If any of the answers to Questions 1-9 is “No”, but the researcher still considers the 
research to be ethically non-problematical, the researcher must write a covering letter 
explaining the answers and explaining why there are no ethical difficulties. The Chair may 
then approve the proposal by Chair’s action, or may decide to refer it to the Committee. 
3. If the answers to Questions 1-8 on the form are all “Yes” or “Not applicable”, and the 
answers to Questions 9-11 are all “No” or “Not applicable”, then the Chair of the 
Committee will usually approve the proposal on Chair’s Action. 
 
At least three members of the Committee (including the Chair) will read any proposal 
referred to the full committee. The Committee provides written comments on the 
application. The Chair of the Committee makes the final decision based upon the 
  
 
287 
Committee’s comments. The applicant is informed in writing or by email of the decision, and 
given any feedback. The decision is one of: 
 
1. Accept without conditions 
2. Accept with conditions 
3. Recommend submission to another committee (e.g. Tayside NHS LREC) 
4. Revise and resubmit (with conditions) 
5. Reject (with reasons) 
 
We aim to provide a decision in three weeks from submission during semester time. If the 
decision is accept with conditions, you must write to the Chair of the Committee explaining how 
those conditions will be met. You must notify the Chair of the Committee of any subsequent 
deviations from the agreed protocol. Note that the University may audit projects to ensure that 
ethical standards are being maintained. You should keep and file your email confirming Ethical 
Approval. When the research is complete you should provide a brief report noting any complaints 
or ethical issues that may have arisen while carrying out the research. (For taught students an 
electronic copy of the final project is acceptable.) 
 
All researchers must abide by the University of Dundee’s Code of Practice for Research on 
Human Participants, as well as the guidelines of any other relevant body; for example that of 
the British Psychological Society (on whose form ours is loosely based; see The BPS Ethical 
Guidelines: Guidelines for minimum standards of ethical approval in psychological research 
(July 2004). 
 
 
Professor Trevor Harley 
Chair, University of Dundee Research Ethics Committee 
UREC v. 1.9, 15 December 2006 
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Checklist of common errors 
 
 
These are some of the most common reasons why we have to return ethics applications for 
resubmission. You will improve your chances of success if you check your application against this 
list. Please make sure: 
 
You have answered all questions on the form. 
You have appended your Participant Information Sheet(s), Informed Consent Form, and 
Debriefing Form, and that these are all clearly labelled. 
Any additional description or summary of the Project is clearly labelled and differentiated from 
the other forms. 
You have run the information sheet and consent form through a spell checker. 
The consent form should be separable from the information sheet so that the participants can 
retain the information sheet. 
If you are making audio or visual recordings that you have said where the tapes will stored and 
how long they will be kept before they are destroyed. 
If making recordings you must make clear that you will inform the participants and obtain their 
consent beforehand. 
You have included a copy of your questionnaire, and the lead questions if you are using a 
structured interview. 
If your study involves deception this automatically raises an ethical concern, so you should tick 
box B on the form. You must show how your debriefing will explain the deception. 
If your experiment involves deception you must provide participants with an opportunity to 
withdraw their data after debriefing. 
You have provided an estimate of the planned sample size. 
You have specified your participant population and how you will recruit from them. 
You have said where testing will happen. 
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9 UNIVERSITY OF DUNDEE UNIVERSITY RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE 
APPROVAL FORM 
Title of project: ‘Disjuncture’ in Criminal Justice Social Work 
Name of lead Investigator, School (or equivalent), Status (e.g. staff, student): Jane Fenton 
Other Academic Staff involved (e.g. supervisor, co-researchers): Tim Kelly (supervisor) 
E-mail address: j.fenton@dundee.ac.uk 
Date: 28.7.11. UREC Ref no. (LEAVE BLANK): 
 
  YES NO N/A 
1 Will you describe the main procedures to participants in advance so that they 
are informed about what to expect in your study? 
X   
2 Will you tell participants that their participation is voluntary? X   
3 Will your participants be able to read and understand the participant 
information sheet? 
X   
4 Will you obtain written informed consent for participation?   X 
5 If the research is observational, will you ask participants for their consent to 
being observed? 
  X 
6 Will you tell participants that they may withdraw from the research at any 
time without penalty and for any reason? 
X   
7 With questionnaires, will you give participants the option of omitting 
questions they do not want to answer? 
X   
8 Will you tell participants that their data will be treated with full 
confidentiality and that, if published, it will not be identifiable as theirs? 
X   
9 Will you give participants a brief explanation of the purpose of the study at 
the end of their participation in it, and answer any questions? 
X   
10 Will your project involve deliberately misleading participants in any way?  X  
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11 Is there any realistic risk of any participants experiencing either physical or 
psychological distress or discomfort? If Yes, give details on a separate sheet 
and state what you will tell them to do if they should experience any 
problems (e.g. who they can contact for help). 
 X  
12 Do participants fall into any of the 
following special groups? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If YES please specify disability. 
Children (under 18 years of age) 
 
 X  
Children under 5 years of age 
 
Pregnant women 
 
Participants studied with respect to 
contraception or conception 
People with disability (e.g. learning 
or communication difficulties) 
Note that you may also need to 
obtain satisfactory Disclosure 
Scotland (or equivalent) clearance. 
People in custody 
 
People engaged in illegal activities 
(e.g. drug-taking) 
Non-human animals  
 
Patients 
More than 5000 participants 
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Please tick either Box A or Box B below and provide any details required in support of 
your application. If you ticked NO to any of Q1-9 or YES to any of Q10-12 then you must 
tick Box B. 
 
A. I consider that this project has no significant ethical implications to be brought before the 
University Research Ethics Committee.    
 
State the purpose of the research. Give a brief description of participants and procedure 
(including the planned sample size and methods and tests used). This description must 
make clear what participants are expected to do. You must also make clear how data 
(e.g. video tapes) will be kept confidential and secure. Note that this description will be 
read by non-specialists and must be readily comprehensible by a lay person. 
 
You must attach intended information and consent forms and copies of any 
questionnaires you plan to use. 
 
The purpose of my research is to identify via questionnaires whether social workers in 4 different 
statutory Criminal Justice Social Work agencies ever experience ‘disjuncture’ (a feeling of stress 
generated when value beliefs and behaviour are in conflict) and to what extent this is related to certain 
key features of the agency’s culture. 
 
Permission will be obtained from the relevant person within the council or within the Community Justice 
Authority (depending on who holds responsibility for this) and the questionnaires will then be distributed 
to all qualified social workers within the agency via an online, secure system (Bristol online). The 
questionnaire will be fronted by an information sheet and an option to ‘click to continue’ if the worker 
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wishes to take part. It is clear in the information sheet (attached as part of the word version of the 
questionnaire) that participation is voluntary. At the end of the questionnaire, participants will be asked 
whether they would be happy to take part in a focus group. Focus groups will be audio recorded.  All 
data and audio files will be password protected and housed on secure university servers for a maximum of 
10 years. 
  
 
 
I am approaching 2 urban agencies  and 2 rural agencies, and hope to distribute my questionnaire to all 
qualified workers. A word document version of the questionnaire is attached, and has also gone out to a 
group of criminal justice social work experts who are checking further for face validity. Depending upon 
their feedback, some questions may change, and if this happens, I will forward the final version to you as 
soon as it is available. 
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B. I consider that this project may have ethical implications that should be brought before the Ethics 
Committee.  
 
Please provide all the further information listed below in a separate attachment. Note that 
this description will be read by non-specialists and must be readily comprehensible by a lay 
person. 
 
1. Title of project. 
2. Purpose of project and its academic rationale. 
3. Brief description of methods and measurements and how data will be stored. 
4. Participants: recruitment methods, number, age, gender, exclusion/inclusion criteria. 
5. Consent and participant information arrangements, debriefing. 
6. A clear statement of the ethical considerations raised by the project and how you 
intend to deal with them. 
7. Estimated start date and duration of project. 
 
 
 
I am familiar with the University of Dundee Code of Practice for Research on Human 
Participants, and have discussed them with the other researchers involved in the project. I 
confirm that my research abides by these guidelines. 
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Signed Jane Fenton ..............................  Print Name Jane Fenton ....................... Date 
30.9.11 .............................................  
(Lead Investigator) 
 
 
There is an obligation on the lead researcher to bring to the attention of the Ethics 
Committee any issues with ethical implications not covered by the above checklist. 
 
UREC v. 1.9, 15 December 2006 
  
 
295 
9 Appendix 2: ethical approval granted 
 
Dear Jane, 
 
Thank you for sending us the final version of your questionnaire.  I've reviewed your application, 
and have no ethical concerns.  I can therefore deal with it by Chair's Action.  There are a few 
things to change, and some additional information I need. 
 
1. The information provided at the beginning of the questionnaire is very clear, and the 
arrangements for obtaining 'consent by participation' are acceptable. The involvement of 
participants who do not wish to take part in a focus group and do not give their email address will 
be completely anonymous. 
 
2. You will need a Participant Information Sheet (PIS) and Consent Form for participants who take 
part in the focus group.  The PIS should explain the aims of the research, and give details of the 
location and duration of the focus group.  You also need to give some general indication of the 
questions to be discussed, and provide information about confidentiality and termination of 
participation etc. 
 
3. In the Participant Information Sheet (PIS), you need to inform Participants that an audio 
recording will be made of the Focus Group.  If a participant doesn't agree to the audio recording, 
can he or she still take part, with you making written notes?  If the audio recording is a 
requirement, then you should say this in the PIS.  Something like the following wording would do: 
"If you do not agree to the audio recording, then you cannot take part in the focus group." 
  
4. In the Consent Form, add a line for participants to consent to the audio recording.  Some 
wording like the following would be suitable: 'I agree to the audio recording of the interview  YES    
NO (please delete as appropriate).'  
 
5. Please send a list of questions to be discussed by the focus group. 
 
Please send the revised documents and your answers to these queries in an email directly to me. 
 
 
With best wishes, 
 
Peter Willatts 
Chair, University Research Ethics Committee 
 
 
................................................................................................................................. 
Dr Peter Willatts 
School of Psychology, University of Dundee, Nethergate, Dundee, DD1 4HN, UK. 
Email: p.willatts@dundee.ac.uk 
Tel: +44 (0)1382 384618; 384623 
Fax: +44 (0)1382 229993 
The University of Dundee is a registered Scottish charity, No: SC015096 
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NB: Points made in regard to the planned focus groups are not relevant as the methodology 
changed to a within-stage mixed methods design. Focus groups were not held. 
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10 Appendix 3: questionnaire 
Disjuncture in Criminal Justice Social Work Survey 
Welcome 
Welcome to the Survey for the research project entitled, 'Disjuncture' in criminal 
justice social work.  
The survey is completed confidentially and takes around 15 minutes to complete. 
When you click the CONTINUE button at the bottom of the page you will be shown an 
Information Sheet. You should read the information and then indicate that you agree to 
participate if you wish to continue on to the survey.  
Participant information and consent 
I am interested in exploring the place of values in criminal justice social work. The field has 
changed quite dramatically over the past 20 years, with public protection and risk 
management taking a much more central position in the work done. What I want to 
explore is; do social workers ever feel that they cannot base their practice on their values? 
Also, when values and expected work behaviour are at odds, do workers ever feel 
'disjuncture' i.e. ethical stress or negative feelings associated with this conflict? 
 
From the literature, I have identified four main question areas based on what seems to be 
the main factors which could contribute to feelings of disjuncture, and have drawn a set of 
questions from each of them. 
 
I really hope you will be able to help me to investigate this unexplored area in order to 
ascertain: do workers experience disjuncture; and if they do, why? These questions form 
the basis of my Phd study. 
 
What will I be asked to do if I agree to participate? 
 
You will be asked to complete a secure, online questionnaire. It will take about 15 minutes 
to complete. 
 
At the end of the questionnaire, you will be asked if you would be happy to be contacted to 
take part in a focus group about the same subject. You do not have to do so. Focus groups 
will last for approximately an hour and will be held at or near your place of work. 
 
How confidential is the information I give? 
 
The information you give will be kept entirely confidential. The questionnaire is completed 
anonymously and agency names will not be given in any write up of the findings. No 
names of individuals will be disclosed at any time. If you give your email address as 
someone interested in taking part in a focus group, only I, as the researcher, will be aware 
of your answers to the questions. If you do wish to take part in a focus group, I will 
contact you via email.  
 
Focus groups will be audio recorded, but, again, will only be heard and analysed by the 
researcher. Once again, no names will be used. All recordings and questionnaires will be 
stored securely and in line with the Data Protection Act and university ethics 
arrangements. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
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No. Participation is entirely voluntary and you can opt out at any time. 
 
Who are the researchers? 
 
I am the only researcher involved and will be the only person analysing the findings. 
Completely anonymised data and analysis might be checked for accuracy by my Phd 
supervisor, Professor Tim Kelly, University of Dundee. 
 
What will you do with the research? 
 
The research project will be written up as part of my Phd thesis. I will also attempt to 
publish the findings in academic and professional journals which might impact in some way 
on the development of criminal justice social work. 
 
Who should I contact with any questions I might have? 
 
Please feel free to contact me at j.fenton@dundee.ac.uk  
 
Who should I contact if I have any concerns or complaints? 
 
In that instance, you should contact Professor Tim Kelly at t.b.kelly@dundee.ac.uk 
 
CONSENT 
 
If you give your consent to participate in this survey, please click CONTINUE. If 
you do not, please close down the survey now. Many thanks. 
Questions are mandatory unless marked otherwise.  
 
Note that once you have clicked on the CONTINUE button your answers are submitted and 
you can not return to review or amend that page. 
 
Introductory questions about you 
1. Which local authority do you work in? 
2. Are you male or female? 
3. What age are you? 
4. What year did you qualify as a social worker? 
5. How many years experience do you have in CJSW? 
6. What type of work do you do? Tick all that apply. 
(select all that apply) 
Questions about how your agency approaches work with offenders 
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Please check one answer per question. There is a box for free text at the end of the section 
where you can clarify any of your answers if you want to. 
7.  
 strongly 
agree  
agree  neutral  disagree  strongly 
disagree  
a. We work with 
offenders mainly 
via set 
programmes of 
work (usually 
from a manual or 
via prescripted 
sessions) 
     
b. I am 
encouraged by 
my agency to 
really get to 
know the 
offender and to 
build a 
relationship with 
them 
     
c. My agency 
allows me the 
autonomy to help 
people with their 
own individual 
problems 
     
d. My agency 
promotes a 
desistance 
approach to work 
with offenders 
i.e. building a 
relationship, 
supporting the 
offenders own 
endeavour to 
stop offending 
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etc.  
e. I have 
autonomy to 
work with 
offenders on the 
things they feel 
are important to 
them (welfare as 
well as 
'criminogenic') 
     
f. I am able to do 
'helping' and 
welfare work 
explicitly  
     
g. I am only able 
to do 'helping' 
and welfare work 
quietly and 
discreetly 
     
h. My agency 
supports the 
belief that 
helping my 
clients is 
legitimate as an 
end in itself 
     
i. My agency 
supports the 
belief that 
helping offenders 
is only legitimate 
as a component 
of reducing 
offending 
     
j. My agency is 
concerned with 
doing things 'to' 
clients to stop 
them offending, 
rather than 
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working 'with' 
them. 
k. As an agency, 
we give 
importance to 
social capital (ie 
clients' links and 
bonds with the 
community and 
other people)  
     
l. As an agency, 
we are more 
concerned with 
risk management 
than issues of 
welfare 
     
m. My agency is 
more concerned 
with public 
protection than 
with the welfare 
of the client 
     
n. Helping with 
welfare problems 
(even if not 
directly 
criminogenic) is 
core to the 
agency's work 
     
o. My agency 
really encourages 
me to empathise 
with the clients I 
am working with 
     
p. I have the 
opportunities to 
get to know my 
clients well 
enough to really 
understand them 
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q. Understanding 
things from my 
client's point of 
view is seen as 
irrelevant by my 
agency 
     
r. My agency 
encourages me 
to try to get to 
know the social 
network 
surrounding my 
clients 
     
s. My agency 
encourages me 
to engage with 
clients' families 
as a matter of 
course 
     
t. My agency 
encourages me 
to care about the 
clients I work 
with 
     
 
8. Is there anything you would like to clarify about your answers to this section's 
questions? (Optional) 
Questions about the culture of the agency 
Please check one answer per question. There is a box for free text at the end of the section 
where you can clarify any of your answers if you want to. 
9.  
 strongly 
agree  
agree  neutral  disagree  strongly 
disagree  
a. Supervision is 
mainly about 
following 
procedures and 
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meeting key 
performance 
indicators 
b. Supervision 
allows me time 
and space to 
discuss my work, 
including issues 
of values 
     
c. In my 
workplace, 
discussion of 
values and ethics 
is encouraged 
     
d. In my 
workplace, values 
are seen as 
having an 
important place 
in decision 
making 
     
e. I would 
describe the 
culture of my 
agency as 
responsive to 
service users' 
needs 
     
f. I would 
describe the 
culture of my 
agency as 
procedurally 
driven 
     
g. Management 
in my agency 
impose new 
procedures on us 
without 
consultation 
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h. Staff are 
involved in any 
changes 
proposed to the 
working practices 
of the agency 
     
i. I would 
describe the 
culture of the 
agency as 
'managerial'  
     
j. My workload is 
such that it 
impacts on the 
time I have to 
work with 
service-users in 
the way I want 
     
k. Management 
recognises that 
workloads need 
to be at a level 
that allows time 
for thorough 
work with 
service-users to 
be done 
     
 
10. Is there anything you would like to clarify about your answers to this section's 
questions? (Optional) 
Questions about risk 
Please check one answer per question. There is a box for free text at the end of the section 
where you can clarify any of your answers if you want to. 
11.  
 strongly 
agree  
agree  neutral  disagree  strongly 
disagree  
a. A 'blame      
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culture' exists 
within my agency 
b. I am allowed 
to take risks in 
my work  
     
c. I am allowed 
to work 
innovatively with 
service-users 
     
d. My agency is 
ultimately 
concerned with 
staying 'safe' 
     
e. 'Risk Averse' 
describes my 
agency well 
     
f. We rely on 
actuarial and 
standardised 
methods of risk 
assessment 
     
g. Really getting 
to know the 
client is 
important in our 
risk assessment 
process 
     
h. We 
concentrate more 
on risk control 
than working to 
produce change 
in clients' lives 
     
i. We balance risk 
assessment with 
explicit 
consideration of 
the client's 
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human rights 
j. There is an 
expectation from 
management that 
if someone re-
offends, we 
should have 
known and 
prevented it 
     
k. If there is a 
bad outcome with 
one our cases, 
bad practice is 
assumed as a 
starting point 
     
l. It is accepted 
by the agency 
that even good 
decisions can 
result in bad 
outcomes 
     
m. The most 
important thing 
about risk 
management is 
that I can show I 
have practised 
with 'due 
diligence' should 
something go 
wrong 
     
n. I report 
throughcare 
clients to the 
Parole Board now 
for things we 
would have dealt 
with internally in 
the past  
     
o. Structured risk      
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assessment tools 
make my work 
more professional 
 
12. Is there anything you would like to clarify about your answers to this section's 
questions? (Optional) 
Questions about autonomy and anxiety 
Please check one answer per question. There is a box for free text at the end of the section 
where you can clarify any of your answers if you want to. 
13.  
 strongly 
agree  
agree  neutral  disagree  strongly 
disagree  
a. In an ideal 
social work 
world, I should 
be able to act in 
good faith and be 
guided by my 
conscience 
     
b. In the real 
social work world 
I am not able to 
do that 
     
c. I am worried 
by the anxiety 
that having 
autonomy can 
produce 
     
d. My agency 
tolerates work 
which might 
produce anxiety  
     
e. I wish I had 
more autonomy 
     
f. I sometimes 
have to follow 
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procedures or 
take action that 
doesn't feel 
'right' in terms of 
my conscience 
g. When I have 
to follow 
procedures that 
don't feel'right' it 
causes stress 
     
h. I am happy to 
follow procedures 
to avoid being 
blamed if things 
go wrong 
     
i. I am confident 
enough in the 
support of my 
agency to act in 
accordance with 
my conscience 
     
j. I act in 
accordance with 
my conscience 
without the 
support of my 
agency 
     
k. I am not able 
to act in 
accordance with 
my conscience 
     
l. In my work I 
constantly have 
to follow 
procedures 
without using 
discretion 
     
m. Constantly 
following 
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procedures in 
work can become 
dispiriting 
n. I sometimes 
choose not to 
follow procedures 
     
o. If I ever 
choose not to 
follow 
procedures, I 
don't tell my 
supervisor or 
manager 
     
p. It is important 
I always follow 
procedures 
regardless of 
what I feel about 
them 
     
q. I follow 
procedures 
diligently so that 
I am protected if 
something goes 
wrong 
     
 
14. Is there anything you would like to clarify about your answers to this section's 
questions? (Optional) 
Questions about 'disjuncture' 
Please check one answer per question. There is a box for free text at the end of the section 
where you can clarify any of your answers if you want to. (NOTE THAT THE ANSWERS IN THIS 
SECTION RANGE FROM 'ALWAYS' TO 'NEVER') 
15.  
 Always  Frequently  Sometimes  Infrequently  Never  
a. I 
experience 
stress 
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because I 
am not 
able to 
help my 
clients in 
the way I 
want 
b. I 
experience 
stress 
because I 
am not 
able to 
respond in 
the way I 
want to 
clients' 
needs 
     
c. I 
experience 
stress 
because I 
am not 
able to 
treat my 
clients with 
the care I 
think they 
need 
     
d. I 
experience 
stress 
because I 
am not 
really able 
to get to 
know my 
clients 
     
e. I 
experience 
stress 
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because I 
am not 
able to 
base my 
practice on 
my values 
f. Not 
being able 
to get to 
know, 
help, 
respond 
and care 
about my 
clients 
reduces 
my job 
satisfaction 
     
g. Not 
being able 
to get to 
know, 
help, 
respond 
and care 
about my 
clients 
makes me 
consider 
changing 
my job 
     
 
16. Is there anything you would like to clarify about your answers to this section's 
questions? (Optional) 
Other information 
17. Is there anything else you would like to add in relation to the questionnaire as a 
whole? (Optional) 
 
Would you be happy to be part of a focus group looking more 
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closely at this subject? If so, please enter your email address 
and I will contact you once the questionnaire results have been 
collated. If not, just leave the box blank. Many thanks! 
(Optional) 
 
 
You have now finished the survey. Please click CONTINUE and your answers will 
be submitted. 
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11 Appendix 4: glossary of acronyms 
 
CJDCS – Criminal Justice Development Centre for Scotland 
CJSW – criminal justice social work 
CJS – Community Justice Authority 
CRD – cjsw related disjuncture 
C-SCOGP – Community Sexual Offending Groupwork Programme 
EPI – Effective Practice Initiative 
IFSW – International Federation of Social Work 
LA – local authority 
MANOVA – multivariate analysis of variance 
MAPPA – multi-agency public protection arrangements 
NASW – National Association of Social Workers 
NOAS – National Objectives and Standards for Social Work in the Criminal Justice 
System 
NOMS – National Offenders Management Service 
POS – Professional Opinion Scale 
RMA – Risk Management Authority 
SACRO – Safeguarding Communities – Reducing Reoffending 
SPSS – Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
SSSC – Scottish Social Services Council 
SSW – senior social worker 
SWSG – Social Work Services Group 
UREC – University research Ethics Committee 
VIF – variance inflation factor 
 
 
